| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.115, the A2U (Agent-to-User) event stream server in PraisonAI exposes all agent activity without authentication. The create_a2u_routes() function registers the following endpoints with NO authentication checks: /a2u/info, /a2u/subscribe, /a2u/events/{stream_name}, /a2u/events/sub/{id}, and /a2u/health. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.115. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.121, the execute_command function and workflow shell execution are exposed to user-controlled input via agent workflows, YAML definitions, and LLM-generated tool calls, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary shell commands through shell metacharacters. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.121. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, _validate_path() calls os.path.normpath() first, which collapses .. sequences, then checks for '..' in normalized. Since .. is already collapsed, the check always passes. This makes the check completely useless and allows trivial path traversal to any file on the system. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, the Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, PraisonAI's recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled .praison tar archives with tar.extractall() and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains ../ traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected. This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, The PraisonAI templates installation feature is vulnerable to a "Zip Slip" Arbitrary File Write attack. When downloading and extracting template archives from external sources (e.g., GitHub), the application uses Python's zipfile.extractall() without verifying if the files within the archive resolve outside of the intended extraction directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, PraisonAI's recipe registry publish endpoint writes uploaded recipe bundles to a filesystem path derived from the bundle's internal manifest.json before it verifies that the manifest name and version match the HTTP route. A malicious publisher can place ../ traversal sequences in the bundle manifest and cause the registry server to create files outside the configured registry root even though the request is ultimately rejected with HTTP 400. This is an arbitrary file write / path traversal issue on the registry host. It affects deployments that expose the recipe registry publish flow. If the registry is intentionally run without a token, any network client that can reach the service can trigger it. If a token is configured, any user with publish access can still exploit it. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI treats remotely fetched template files as trusted executable code without integrity verification, origin validation, or user confirmation, enabling supply chain attacks through malicious templates. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.115, execute_code() in praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools defaults to sandbox_mode="sandbox", which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a restricted __builtins__ dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (blocked_attrs of python_tools.py) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+ names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list (__traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, and f_builtins). Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python builtins dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which exec can be retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every remaining security layer. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.115. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.115, the AgentService.loadAgentFromFile method uses the js-yaml library to parse YAML files without disabling dangerous tags (such as !!js/function and !!js/undefined). This allows an attacker to craft a malicious YAML file that, when parsed, executes arbitrary JavaScript code. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by uploading a malicious agent definition file via the API endpoint, leading to remote code execution (RCE) on the server. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.115. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.15 to before version 4.5.69, the --mcp CLI argument is passed directly to shlex.split() and forwarded through the call chain to anyio.open_process() with no validation, allowlist check, or sanitization at any hop, allowing arbitrary OS command execution as the process user. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.69. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.90, the get_all_user_threads function constructs raw SQL queries using f-strings with unescaped thread IDs fetched from the database. An attacker stores a malicious thread ID via update_thread. When the application loads the thread list, the injected payload executes and grants full database access. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.90. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.90, passthrough() and apassthrough() in praisonai accept a caller-controlled api_base parameter that is concatenated with endpoint and passed directly to httpx.Client.request() when the litellm primary path raises AttributeError. No URL scheme validation, private IP filtering, or domain allowlist is applied, allowing requests to any host reachable from the server. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.90. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 1.5.90, run_python() in praisonai constructs a shell command string by interpolating user-controlled code into python3 -c "<code>" and passing it to subprocess.run(..., shell=True). The escaping logic only handles \ and ", leaving $() and backtick substitutions unescaped, allowing arbitrary OS command execution before Python is invoked. This issue has been patched in version 1.5.90. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 1.5.90, execute_code() in praisonai-agents runs attacker-controlled Python inside a three-layer sandbox that can be fully bypassed by passing a str subclass with an overridden startswith() method to the _safe_getattr wrapper, achieving arbitrary OS command execution on the host. This issue has been patched in version 1.5.90. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.97, SubprocessSandbox in all modes (BASIC, STRICT, NETWORK_ISOLATED) calls subprocess.run() with shell=True and relies solely on string-pattern matching to block dangerous commands. The blocklist does not include sh or bash as standalone executables, allowing trivial sandbox escape in STRICT mode via sh -c '<command>'. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.97. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., MCP("npx -y @smithery/cli ...")). These commands are executed through Python’s subprocess module. By default, the implementation forwards the entire parent process environment to the spawned subprocess. As a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials. This behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as npx -y, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions below 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents, the browser bridge (praisonai browser start) is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote session hijacking due to missing authentication and a bypassable origin check on its /ws WebSocket endpoint. The server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and only validates the Origin header when one is present, meaning any non-browser client that omits the header is accepted without restriction. An unauthenticated network attacker can connect, send a start_session message, and the server will route it to the first idle browser-extension WebSocket (effectively hijacking that session) and then broadcast all resulting automation actions and outputs back to the attacker. This enables unauthorized remote control of connected browser automation sessions, leakage of sensitive page context and automation results, and misuse of model-backed browser actions in any environment where the bridge is network-reachable. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 1.5.95, FileTools.download_file() in praisonaiagents validates the destination path but performs no validation on the url parameter, passing it directly to httpx.stream() with follow_redirects=True. An attacker who controls the URL can reach any host accessible from the server including cloud metadata services and internal network services. This issue has been patched in version 1.5.95. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.133, there is an SQL identifier injection vulnerability in SQLiteConversationStore where the table_prefix configuration value is directly concatenated into SQL queries via f-strings without any validation or sanitization. Since SQL identifiers cannot be safely parameterized, an attacker who controls the table_prefix value (e.g., through from_yaml or from_dict configuration input) can inject arbitrary SQL fragments that alter query structure. This enables unauthorized data access, such as reading internal SQLite tables like sqlite_master, and manipulation of query results through techniques like UNION-based injection. The vulnerability propagates from configuration input in config.py, through factory.py, to the SQL query construction in sqlite.py. Exploitation requires the ability to influence configuration input, and successful exploitation leads to internal schema disclosure and full query result tampering. This issue has been fixed in version 4.5.133. |
