PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.87 to before version 4.6.61, PraisonAI recipe execution has a dangerous-tool policy that is supposed to block default-denied tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. That policy only checks tools declared in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools. For steps-based recipes, the actual execution path loads workflow.yaml with YAMLWorkflowParser. That parser resolves agent-level tools: declarations and preserves top-level approve:. Workflow.start() then installs those YAML-approved tools into the approval context. As a result, an untrusted recipe can omit execute_command from TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools, declare it in workflow.yaml agents.*.tools, and add top-level approve: [execute_command]. The caller did not set allow_dangerous_tools=True, but the recipe policy allows the recipe and the workflow approval path self-approves the critical shell tool. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.
Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-7qw2-w5rc-37x2 PraisonAI recipe workflow policy can be bypassed by declaring and YAML-approving dangerous tools outside TEMPLATE.yaml
Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai
Vendors & Products Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai

Fri, 23 Oct 2026 12:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.87 to before version 4.6.61, PraisonAI recipe execution has a dangerous-tool policy that is supposed to block default-denied tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. That policy only checks tools declared in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools. For steps-based recipes, the actual execution path loads workflow.yaml with YAMLWorkflowParser. That parser resolves agent-level tools: declarations and preserves top-level approve:. Workflow.start() then installs those YAML-approved tools into the approval context. As a result, an untrusted recipe can omit execute_command from TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools, declare it in workflow.yaml agents.*.tools, and add top-level approve: [execute_command]. The caller did not set allow_dangerous_tools=True, but the recipe policy allows the recipe and the workflow approval path self-approves the critical shell tool. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.
Title PraisonAI recipe workflow policy can be bypassed by declaring and YAML-approving dangerous tools outside TEMPLATE.yaml
Weaknesses CWE-78
CWE-863
CWE-94
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-23T12:07:46.547Z

Reserved: 2026-06-24T01:45:48.697Z

Link: CVE-2026-57142

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2026-10-23T13:17:11.210

Modified: 2026-10-23T13:17:11.330

Link: CVE-2026-57142

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-23T13:45:17Z

Weaknesses