| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A vulnerability in misp-stix could allow a crafted STIX document to influence security-sensitive MISP attribute metadata during import.
The STIX import logic automatically selected between the internal MISP parser and the external STIX parser based on metadata contained in the STIX document itself. For STIX2, the presence of MISP-specific tool labels could cause a document to be classified as originating from MISP; similarly, STIX1 relied on the document title. These classification indicators are fully controlled by the STIX producer and therefore cannot constitute a trusted indication of the document's origin. The accompanying fix explicitly notes that the parser choice was previously based solely on labels or header titles that any producer could write, and introduces an explicit classification parameter allowing callers to override this detection.
When STIX2 content was handled as an internal MISP export, attributes contained in an x-misp-object were converted by copying the complete x_misp_attributes dictionary and passing it directly to misp_object.add_attribute(). Consequently, a crafted STIX bundle could supply fields that were not part of the expected STIX-to-MISP round-trip format, including security-sensitive properties such as distribution, sharing_group_id, tags, or other MISP attribute fields.
An attacker able to provide a STIX document for import could therefore spoof the markers used to identify MISP-generated content and inject additional attribute properties. This could alter the distribution, sharing restrictions, classification, or semantic metadata of imported attributes, potentially causing information to be shared contrary to the importing organization's policy or influencing downstream processing and automation based on attacker-controlled tags or metadata.
The vulnerability results from dynamically assigning externally supplied object properties without restricting them to an expected set of attributes, matching CWE-915. MITRE specifically describes this weakness as accepting externally influenced fields without controlling which object attributes may be modified and recommends an allow-list, which is the approach implemented by the patch. The parser-selection issue additionally corresponds to CWE-807, because an untrusted value was used to make a security-relevant trust/classification decision.
The attack is also consistent with CAPEC-153 (Input Data Manipulation), in which an attacker controls the structure or flags of supplied data so that the target selects a different processing path or interprets the content differently than intended. |
| A denial-of-service vulnerability was identified in misp-stix when processing attacker-controlled STIX 1 or STIX 2 documents.
The STIX import code used sys.exit() to handle several parsing and loading failures. Because SystemExit inherits from BaseException rather than Exception, these failures bypassed the exception handlers used by callers of the library. As a result, a malformed STIX document could terminate a long-running importer process instead of returning a recoverable parsing error.
Additionally, no limit was imposed on the size of STIX documents before parsing. A submitted document was therefore read and materialised in memory before its validity or type was evaluated. Depending on the document and parsing path, processing could consume approximately two to seven times the input size in memory, allowing a sufficiently large STIX document to cause excessive memory and CPU consumption and potentially terminate or severely degrade the importing service.
An attacker able to provide STIX content to a MISP-STIX import workflow could exploit either condition to affect availability. A malformed document could cause abnormal process termination through an uncaught SystemExit, while a large document could exhaust resources during deserialisation and conversion.
The fixes replace process-terminating sys.exit() calls with catchable exceptions such as STIXLoadingError and MissingSTIXContentError, and extend exception handling around the complete STIX detection and conversion process. The importer also now enforces an input-size limit before parsing. The default maximum is 100 MB, can be adjusted by callers, and can explicitly be disabled when required. STIX 1 inputs are additionally checked for the expected root element before the complete XML tree is constructed.
ImpactSuccessful exploitation can cause:
* termination of a long-running MISP-STIX importer;
* excessive memory allocation;
* excessive CPU consumption;
* degradation or temporary unavailability of services relying on the converter;
* interruption of batch or automated STIX ingestion workflows. |
| A parser state isolation vulnerability in misp-stix could cause data from a previously processed STIX document to be retained and incorporated into the MISP event generated from a subsequent document when the same parser instance is reused.
Several STIX 1 and STIX 2 parser components maintained per-document state that was not completely cleared between conversions. In the STIX 2 parser, galaxy and galaxy-cluster information, including custom galaxy clusters, could survive a parser reset and subsequently be associated with objects from another bundle.
The STIX 1 parsers were affected by the same underlying state-management issue. Depending on the parser type, retained information could include galaxies, references, passive DNS bookkeeping, package titles, dates, and timestamps. As a result, parsing a second STIX package with an already-used parser could produce a MISP event containing information that was present only in the previously processed package. For example, a generated event could inherit passive DNS records from an earlier document, reference unrelated galaxy information, combine titles from different packages, or use timestamps originating from another conversion.
The issue primarily affects applications using the misp-stix API directly and reusing parser instances across independent STIX documents. Normal conversion entry points that instantiate a new parser for each file are not affected by this particular reuse scenario.
An attacker able to influence documents processed by such a long-lived parser could potentially cause information from one conversion to contaminate a subsequent MISP event. This can affect the integrity of generated threat intelligence, resulting in incorrect associations, misleading contextual information, or unrelated indicators being attributed to an event. In environments where consecutive documents have different access controls or distribution scopes, the retained state could additionally result in limited disclosure of information from a previously processed document.
Successful exploitation depends on the consuming application reusing the same parser instance and on the ordering of processed documents, which increases attack complexity. No direct availability impact or code execution is involved. |
| A path traversal vulnerability existed in the handling of MISP object template names during STIX 2 import and MISP-to-STIX 2 export.
MISP object names are passed to PyMISP's object-template resolution mechanism, which constructs a filesystem path by joining the configured MISP object-template directory, the object name, and definition.json. An object name originating from untrusted STIX or MISP content was not sufficiently restricted before being used in this filesystem path.
An attacker able to supply a crafted object name containing path separators or traversal sequences such as ../ could therefore cause template resolution to escape the expected template directory and attempt to load a definition.json file from another location accessible to the process.
During STIX 2 import, an attacker-controlled x_misp_name from a custom STIX object could directly reach this template-resolution mechanism.
The issue could also become persistent. A malicious object name stored in a MISP event could later be processed again during STIX 2 export. Consequently, content originally introduced in one security context could trigger filesystem access later when the event is exported by a process operating with different or greater privileges.
If a suitable definition.json file exists outside the intended template directory, its contents may be interpreted as a MISP object template and fields from that file copied into the converted object. This can result in unintended disclosure of locally accessible data represented by the template file and modification of the resulting object's metadata or semantics.
The patches introduce strict validation of object-template names. Valid names are restricted to a single path component containing letters, digits, hyphens, or underscores. Names that do not meet these requirements are replaced with the generic unknown-template name before reaching PyMISP template resolution. The original rejected name is preserved in the object's comment and a warning is generated, preventing traversal while retaining the source information. |
| Affected versions of MISP cti-transmute expose several state-changing account operations as GET requests:
*
/account/follow
*
/account/delete_notification
*
/account/mark_notification_read
*
/account/mark_all_read
These endpoints require authentication, but before the fix they could be invoked with simple GET requests. That makes them susceptible to cross-site request forgery because a third-party site can induce the victim’s browser to send authenticated GET requests automatically.
The patch converts the actions to POST or DELETE and updates the frontend to include an X-CSRFToken header, providing explicit CSRF protection for those state-changing operations. |
| Affected versions of cti-transmute improperly handle conversion-table values passed through the search highlighting feature. The highlight() function previously returned the underlying text directly when no search query was supplied, or performed a regex replacement that inserted <mark> tags without first escaping the original content. Because the resulting value is used by an HTML-rendering sink, malicious markup contained in conversion data could be interpreted as HTML rather than displayed as text.
The fix introduces a shared highlightMatches() helper that first converts special characters such as <, >, &, and quotes into HTML entities. Only after escaping does the code insert the application-controlled <mark> element used for search highlighting. |
| Affected versions of cti-transmute fail to apply comment-level access-control rules when generating evaluation report exports. Although normal comment retrieval filters comments according to conversion visibility, comment privacy, ownership, authorship, and administrative privileges, build_evaluation_report() previously included all evaluation comments without applying those rules.
Consequently, a user who was authorized to view a conversion could export its evaluation report as Markdown or PDF and obtain private evaluation comments that should only have been visible to the conversion owner, the comment author, or an administrator. The leaked report data also contained the comment author's name. The fix passes the requesting user into the report builder and filters every evaluation comment using the shared access.can_see_comment() authorization function. |
| Affected versions of cti-transmute allow authenticated users to add or remove emoji reactions on comments without first checking whether those users are authorized to view the target comment.
The vulnerable react() handler passed an attacker-controlled comment_id directly to comments_repo.toggle_reaction() after only validating that the ID existed syntactically and that the requested emoji was permitted. Because comment-level visibility was not enforced, a user who could identify the ID of a private or otherwise inaccessible comment could modify reaction state on that comment despite lacking permission to access it.
The fix retrieves the target comment, rejects missing or deleted comments, retrieves its associated conversion, and enforces access.can_see_comment(current_user, comment, conversion). Unauthorized requests now receive HTTP 403. |
| Affected versions of cti-transmute fail to HTML-escape attacker-controlled values used in ECharts Sunburst and Treemap tooltip formatters. Slice names may originate directly from STIX or MISP data, including STIX types, relationship_type, pattern prefixes, and MISP category/type values. Since ECharts interprets the formatter return value as HTML, crafted values can inject markup or script-capable content into the tooltip.
An attacker who can cause malicious conversion data to be processed can therefore inject content that executes when another user views the visualization and hovers over the affected slice. The patch replaces direct interpolation with dedicated formatter functions that call escapeHtml() on p.name, p.data.value, and p.value. |
| Affected versions of cti-transmute render data obtained from a remote MISP instance into the event-browser interface using HTML interpolation. Because fields such as event IDs, event information, organization names, tags, tag colors, TLP labels, distribution labels, and error/flash text may be controlled by the remote MISP server, a malicious or compromised remote instance could return crafted values that inject HTML or script-capable content into the cti-transmute interface.
The patch explicitly notes that remote-derived values must not reach innerHTML, and replaces string-built rows and badges with DOM nodes populated through textContent. It also restricts remote-controlled tag colors to six-digit hexadecimal values, preventing malicious CSS values such as url(...). |
| Affected versions of cti-transmute insufficiently validate saved graph configuration data. Graph configurations can contain style properties that are later consumed by Pivotick, and Pivotick interprets svgIcon as HTML. Because saved configurations may be created by one user and later displayed to other users—including administrators—a malicious user could store a crafted svgIcon value that executes script in another viewer’s browser.
The fix introduces a strict configuration schema on both the server and client. Only known properties are accepted, style entries are limited to shape, color, and size, and dangerous properties such as svgIcon and iconClass are explicitly rejected. Existing stored configurations are also sanitized when listed and again before being applied in the browser. |
| Affected versions of cti-transmute allow a tag's icon value to be stored and later interpolated into HTML through Vue's v-html. The helper mapIcon() previously constructed an HTML string directly from the icon value:
<i class="fas fa-${name}"></i>
Because the icon is user-supplied, a crafted value could break out of the intended markup and inject attacker-controlled HTML. When the affected tag was later rendered, including on the administrative triage interface, the payload could execute in the viewer's browser.
The patch mitigates the issue at multiple layers: v-html is replaced with Vue :class binding, mapIcon() now returns only a constrained FontAwesome class string, and the backend validates icons against the FontAwesome catalogue or a strict [a-z0-9-]{1,40} slug pattern before storing them. |
| Affected versions of cti-transmute contain an SSRF vulnerability in the /fetch_misp_event and /misp_search_events endpoints.
The URL validation routine checked whether a supplied hostname was itself an IP literal and rejected private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. However, ordinary domain names were accepted without resolving them first. An attacker could therefore use a hostname whose DNS record pointed to an internal address and cause the cti-transmute server to issue requests into its internal network. The commit explicitly states that anonymous callers could make the server request the internal target and read the response.
The fix resolves hostnames using socket.getaddrinfo(), checks that every resolved address is globally routable, and additionally places @login_required on both affected MISP fetch/search routes. |
| Affected versions of MISP cti-transmute disclose users' email addresses through the account following-list endpoint. When an authenticated user follows another account, get_following() includes the followed user's email field in the API response alongside their name, user ID, and follow date. Because the email address is not required for the functionality and other related user lists omit it, an authenticated attacker could systematically follow users and collect their email addresses. The fix removes user.email from the returned object. |
| CTI-Transmute is affected by a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the conversion graph used to visualise converted MISP and STIX content.
Attacker-controlled values originating from converted CTI data were passed to multiple HTML-parsing sinks in the graph user interface without sufficient neutralisation. In particular, node labels, node sublabels, edge labels, node properties, edge properties, and node types could contain crafted HTML or JavaScript content.
The Pivotick graph library renders some of these values through HTML-parsing operations. Consequently, a malicious value such as an HTML element containing an event handler could be interpreted as markup rather than displayed as plain text. The first remediation explicitly notes that Pivotick rendered node and edge labels as HTML and therefore introduced escaping before data was handed to the graph renderer.
A separate vulnerable sink was present in the Open raw JSON functionality. The raw object associated with a graph node was inserted into a new document using document.write() and an interpolated HTML string. Crafted JSON content could therefore break out of the intended <pre> element and inject executable markup. The fix replaced this construction with DOM APIs and assigns the JSON using textContent.
The initial correction did not cover all Pivotick rendering paths. A subsequent patch addressed additional XSS vectors in the graph properties panel. Values derived from the original CTI object—including property names, property values, hash algorithm names, child attributes, edge properties, and STIX object types—could still reach Pivotick's HTML resolver. According to the patch, Pivotick's tryResolveHTMLElement processes string values using template.innerHTML, allowing malicious markup to execute when a graph node is hovered over or selected.
The complete remediation therefore:
* HTML-escapes node labels, node sublabels, and edge labels before they are passed to Pivotick.
* Restricts graph node type values to a safe identifier character set.
* Wraps node and edge property values in DOM elements populated through textContent, preventing Pivotick from treating attacker-controlled strings as HTML.
* Replaces the raw-JSON popup's interpolated document.write() with DOM construction and textContent. |
| In affected versions of MISP cti-transmute, the conversion-history details endpoint performs an incomplete authorization check. When a history record references a deleted conversion, the associated conversion lookup returns None. The previous logic only denied access when the conversion object existed and the visibility check failed. As a result, deleted conversions bypassed the authorization check and their retained history input/output could be disclosed to a user able to request the corresponding history entry. The July 22, 2026 commit changes the logic to deny access whenever the conversion is missing or the requester lacks permission |
| CTI-Transmute contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability caused by insufficient neutralization of Vue template expression delimiters in server-rendered user-controlled data.
An unauthenticated attacker can create a public conversion whose name or description contains a malicious Vue expression using the application's configured [[ ... ]] delimiters. User profile names may provide an additional injection vector. Although Jinja HTML escaping is applied, the resulting value is subsequently included in a DOM region compiled by Vue.
Vue interprets the attacker-controlled value as a template expression rather than ordinary text. By accessing the JavaScript Function constructor from within the expression, an attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the security context of the CTI-Transmute origin. The application's nonce-based Content Security Policy does not prevent exploitation because the Vue runtime compiler requires the unsafe-eval policy exception.
The malicious payload is stored by the application and executed whenever another user opens an affected page, such as the public conversion detail page. The victim may be a normal user or an administrator. Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to:
* Access data available to the victim through the application.
* Extract API keys, tokens, or other sensitive information exposed to the page.
* Perform authenticated actions using the victim's session.
* Modify conversions or other application data.
* Escalate the impact by targeting an administrator.
A demonstrated payload can use [].constructor.constructor(...) to obtain the JavaScript Function constructor and execute arbitrary code. The regression tests also show that a short first-stage payload could retrieve an uncapped conversion description and evaluate a larger second-stage payload.
The patch addresses the vulnerability by registering a global Jinja finalize hook that inserts a zero-width Unicode word joiner inside every Vue delimiter found in server-rendered values. This prevents Vue from recognizing the values as template expressions while preserving their visible representation. |
| CTI-Transmute contained a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the administrative user deletion functionality. The /account/delete/<id> endpoint accepted HTTP GET requests for an operation that modified application state.
An unauthenticated remote attacker could construct a malicious link or embed a request targeting this endpoint and induce an authenticated CTI-Transmute administrator to visit the attacker-controlled content. If the administrator had an active session, the browser would automatically include the administrator’s session credentials, causing the selected user account to be deleted without the administrator intentionally confirming the operation.
Successful exploitation requires interaction from a currently authenticated administrator who has permission to delete users. The attacker does not need a CTI-Transmute account or administrative privileges because the forged request executes using the victim administrator’s session.
The vulnerability could allow an attacker to delete arbitrary user accounts, resulting in unauthorized modification of application state and denial of access for affected users. Depending on whether administrators can delete other administrators or the final administrative account, exploitation could also disrupt administration of the CTI-Transmute instance.
The patch resolves the issue by restricting the deletion endpoint to HTTP POST requests and submitting the deletion through a form containing a CSRF token. |
| CTI-Transmute is affected by a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the evaluation report PDF-generation functionality.
User-controlled CTI content, including conversion names, descriptions, and comments, is converted from Markdown to HTML and rendered as a PDF using WeasyPrint. Before the patch, the renderer used WeasyPrint’s default URL-fetching behavior without restricting the protocols or destinations that could be referenced by the generated HTML.
An attacker able to supply content included in an evaluation report could inject crafted resource references using schemes such as http://, https://, or file://. When the report was rendered, CTI-Transmute could fetch these resources using the application server’s network connectivity and filesystem privileges.
Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to:
* access services available only from the CTI-Transmute server or its internal network;
* probe internal hosts and service endpoints;
* retrieve local files readable by the application process; and
* expose fetched content through the generated PDF, depending on the referenced resource type and rendering context.
The vulnerability is corrected by providing WeasyPrint with a restrictive URL fetcher that permits only self-contained data: URIs. The externally hosted Google Fonts stylesheet was also removed so that PDF generation performs no intentional network or filesystem fetches. |
| CTI-Transmute contains an uncontrolled resource-consumption vulnerability in the unauthenticated /activity_timeline endpoint. The endpoint accepts a user-controlled days query parameter that was not restricted to a reasonable range.
A remote, unauthenticated attacker could submit an excessively large value for this parameter, causing the application to retrieve and process activity data over an arbitrarily large period. This could consume excessive database, CPU, or memory resources, delay the processing of concurrent requests, or trigger an internal server error. Repeated requests could further degrade the availability of the CTI-Transmute website.
The vulnerability is corrected by clamping the requested timeline range to a minimum of one day and a maximum of 1,095 days. |
