| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm thin metadata: fix metadata snapshot consistency on commit failure
__reserve_metadata_snap() and __release_metadata_snap() modify the
superblock's held_root directly in the block_manager's buffer. If the
subsequent metadata commit fails, the held_root gets flushed to disk
through the abort_transaction path, resulting in inconsistent metadata.
Reproducer 1: __reserve_metadata_snap()
1. Create a 2 MiB metadata device and make the region after the 14th
block inaccessible, to trigger metadata commit failure in the
subsequent reserve_metadata_snap operation. The 14th block will be
the shadow destination for the index block.
dmsetup create tmeta --table "0 112 linear /dev/sdc 0
112 3984 error"
2. Create a 16 MiB thin-pool
dmsetup create tdata --table "0 32768 zero"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/tmeta bs=4k count=1
dmsetup create tpool --table "0 32768 thin-pool /dev/mapper/tmeta \
/dev/mapper/tdata 128 0 1 skip_block_zeroing"
3. Take a metadata snapshot to trigger metadata commit failure and
transaction abort. However, the held_root is written to disk,
breaking metadata consistency.
dmsetup message tpool 0 "reserve_metadata_snap"
thin_check v1.2.2 result:
Bad reference count for metadata block 6. Expected 2, but space map contains 1.
Bad reference count for metadata block 7. Expected 2, but space map contains 1.
Bad reference count for metadata block 13. Expected 1, but space map contains 0.
Reproducer 2: __release_metadata_snap()
1. Create a 2 MiB metadata device and make the region after the 16th
block inaccessible, to trigger metadata commit failure in the
subsequent release_metadata_snap operation. The 16th block will be
the shadow destination for the index block.
dmsetup create tmeta --table "0 128 linear /dev/sdc 0
128 3968 error"
2. Create a 16 MiB thin-pool
dmsetup create tdata --table "0 32768 zero"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/tmeta bs=4k count=1
dmsetup create tpool --table "0 32768 thin-pool /dev/mapper/tmeta \
/dev/mapper/tdata 128 0 1 skip_block_zeroing"
3. Reserve then release the metadata snapshot, to trigger metadata
commit failure and transaction abort. The held_root gets removed
from the on-disk superblock, causing inconsistent metadata.
dmsetup message tpool 0 "reserve_metadata_snap"
dmsetup message tpool 0 "release_metadata_snap"
thin_check v1.2.2 result:
Bad reference count for metadata block 6. Expected 1, but space map contains 2.
Bad reference count for metadata block 7. Expected 1, but space map contains 2.
1 metadata blocks have leaked.
Fix by deferring the held_root update to commit time.
Additionally, move the existing-snapshot check in __reserve_metadata_snap
before the shadow operation to avoid unnecessary work. In
__release_metadata_snap, clear pmd->held_root before btree deletion so
partial failure leaks blocks rather than leaving a stale reference, and
unlock the snapshot block before decrementing its refcount. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf,fork: wipe ->bpf_storage before bailouts that access it
Currently, copy_process() can bail out to free_task() before p->bpf_storage
has been initialized, with this call graph (shown here for the
!CONFIG_MEMCG case):
copy_process
dup_task_struct
arch_dup_task_struct
[copies the entire task_struct, including ->bpf_storage member]
[RLIMIT_NPROC check fails]
delayed_free_task
free_task
bpf_task_storage_free
rcu_dereference(task->bpf_storage)
bpf_local_storage_destroy
In this case, the nascent task's ->bpf_storage member that
bpf_local_storage_destroy() operates on is a plain copy of the parent's
->bpf_storage pointer, not a real initialized pointer.
This leads to badness (kernel hangs, UAF).
This is reachable as long as the process calling fork() has been inserted
into a task storage map. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reset register bounds before narrowing retval range in check_mem_access()
When the BPF verifier processes a context load of an LSM hook return
value, it calls __mark_reg_s32_range() to narrow the register to the
hook's valid range. However, __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects the new
range with the register's existing bounds using max_t()/min_t() rather
than replacing them.
If the destination register carries stale bounds from a prior instruction
(e.g. BPF_MOV64_IMM), the intersection can produce a range narrower than
reality. The verifier then believes it knows the register's exact value,
while at runtime the actual hook return value is loaded, creating a
verifier/runtime mismatch that can be used to bypass BPF memory safety
checks.
The else branch already calls mark_reg_unknown() to reset register state
before any narrowing. Apply the same reset in the is_retval path so
stale bounds are cleared before __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops
io_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side
(ctx->bpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops->priv
unconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past
BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be
registered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring
via fget(ops->ring_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the
same ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE
calls.
The second registration passes the ctx->bpf_ops check (the new ctx has
none) and overwrites ops->priv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown
(io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops->priv, so
the orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx->loop_step keeps pointing
into the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A
later io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling
ctx->loop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed
executable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON.
Reject registration when ops->priv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg()
does for its struct_ops. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: validate frame length in bcm_rx_setup() for RTR replies
bcm_tx_setup() validates cf->len against the CAN/CAN FD DLC limits
before installing frames for TX_SETUP, but bcm_rx_setup() never did
the same for the RTR-reply frame configured via RX_SETUP with
RX_RTR_FRAME. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: peak_usb: peak_usb_start(): fix double free of transfer buffer on URB submit error
In peak_usb_start(), each RX URB transfer buffer is allocated with kmalloc()
and the URB is flagged URB_FREE_BUFFER so that the final usb_free_urb() also
frees the transfer buffer.
If usb_submit_urb() fails, the error path frees the buffer explicitly with
kfree(buf) and then calls usb_free_urb(urb). Because URB_FREE_BUFFER is set,
usb_free_urb() -> urb_destroy() frees the same buffer a second time, a double
free of the transfer buffer.
BUG: KASAN: double-free in usb_free_urb.part.0+0x91/0xb0
Free of addr ffff8881069ccb80 by task trigger.sh/285
Call Trace:
kfree+0x113/0x3c0
usb_free_urb.part.0+0x91/0xb0
Drop the redundant kfree(buf); usb_free_urb() already releases the transfer
buffer. This mirrors commit 03819abbeb11 ("net: usb: lan78xx: Fix double free
issue with interrupt buffer allocation"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write
resp_report_zones() sizes the reply buffer from the CDB allocation
length. The v3 fix rounds alloc_len up with ALIGN() before deriving the
descriptor count:
rep_max_zones = (ALIGN((u64)alloc_len, RZONES_DESC_HD) -
RZONES_DESC_HD) >> ilog2(RZONES_DESC_HD);
arr_len = (u64)RZONES_DESC_HD * (rep_max_zones + 1);
For alloc_len in 0xFFFFFFC1..0xFFFFFFFF, ALIGN() rounds up to
0x100000000, so arr_len is 4 GB. On 32-bit, kzalloc()'s size_t is 32-bit
and truncates 0x100000000 to 0; kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which
passes the !arr check, and desc = arr + 64 is then dereferenced in the
loop -> out-of-bounds write / panic.
Clamp rep_max_zones to devip->nr_zones. The loop already stops at
sdebug_capacity (after nr_zones zones), so a report can never hold more
than nr_zones descriptors; the clamp does not change the report, it only
bounds arr_len to (nr_zones + 1) * RZONES_DESC_HD, a real device
property that can never reach 0x100000000. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: mgmt: fix pending command UAF in EIR updates
MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME is handled asynchronously on powered controllers
and can run set_name_sync(). When the controller is BR/EDR capable,
set_name_sync() updates the local name and then rebuilds EIR data through
eir_create(). The EIR builder walks hdev->uuids, but the UUID list can
be changed and entries can be freed by MGMT_OP_ADD_UUID and
MGMT_OP_REMOVE_UUID.
pending_eir_or_class() is meant to serialize management commands that
can change EIR or the class of device, but it did not include
MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME. In addition, it walked hdev->mgmt_pending
without hdev->mgmt_pending_lock even though pending commands are added
and removed under that mutex. A racing command completion can therefore
remove and free a pending command while pending_eir_or_class() is still
inspecting it, leading to a use-after-free in the pending-command list or
allowing a local name update to rebuild EIR while UUID entries are being
removed.
Take hdev->mgmt_pending_lock while scanning hdev->mgmt_pending and treat
MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME as an EIR/class-affecting pending command on the
powered asynchronous path. Check for a conflicting pending command before
copying the new short name so a rejected SET_LOCAL_NAME request does not
modify hdev->short_name. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: devicetree: don't free uninitialized dev_name on error path
dt_remember_or_free_map() duplicates dev_name for each map entry. If
kstrdup_const() fails, dt_free_map() frees dev_name in all num_maps
entries, including entries that have not been initialized.
Some pinctrl drivers, including pinctrl-imx, allocate the map with
kmalloc() and leave dev_name for the core to initialize. The untouched
entries therefore contain uninitialized data which is passed to
kfree_const().
Reproduced on qemu's mcimx6ul-evk (pinctrl-imx) with failslab injection
while binding the pinctrl-consuming device, under KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: double-free in dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4
Free of addr c425a900 by task init/1
kfree from dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4
dt_free_map from dt_remember_or_free_map+0x184/0x198
dt_remember_or_free_map from pinctrl_dt_to_map+0x33c/0x4c8
pinctrl_dt_to_map from create_pinctrl+0x9c/0x5c0
Initialize all dev_name fields to NULL before duplicating the device
name, making the full-map cleanup safe after a partial failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: algif_skcipher - force synchronous processing on trees without ctx->state
The AIO/async path in skcipher_recvmsg() passes the socket-wide ctx->iv
directly into the skcipher request. After io_submit() the socket lock is
dropped and the request is processed asynchronously, so a concurrent
sendmsg(ALG_SET_IV) can overwrite ctx->iv and make the in-flight request
run under an attacker-controlled IV. For CTR/stream modes this is
IV/keystream reuse and lets an unprivileged user recover the plaintext of
a concurrent operation.
Snapshotting ctx->iv into per-request storage for the async path is not
sufficient. For ciphers with statesize == 0 - which includes cbc and ctr -
the MSG_MORE inter-chunk IV chaining is carried solely by the in-place
req->iv writeback, which a snapshot redirects into per-request memory that
af_alg_free_resources() releases on completion, silently producing wrong
output. Writing the IV back from the completion callback instead is not
possible either: that would require lock_sock() there, but the callback can
run in softirq/atomic context, so it must not sleep.
Make the operation synchronous instead, which removes both the IV race and
any writeback race. This is equivalent to the upstream resolution, commit
fcc77d33a34c ("net: Remove support for AIO on sockets"), which removed the
AIO socket path across net/ entirely and so produces the same end state for
this file. This patch deviates from that commit deliberately: rather than
removing AIO socket support tree-wide, which would be far too invasive for
stable, it removes only the AIO branch in crypto/algif_skcipher.c.
io_submit() now completes synchronously; AF_ALG async is rarely used in
practice.
The -EIOCBQUEUED check in skcipher_recvmsg() is now dead but harmless,
and is left alone to keep the fix minimal.
Tested on 6.6.y: attacker IV injection dropped from 2296/200000 to 0/200000
after the change; MSG_MORE chunked CTR output bit-identical to single-shot. |
| An issue in ACME mini_httpd 1.30 and prior allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the HTTP request header parser in the handle_request() function |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: track a single source interface for ANYDEV timeout/throttle ops
An ANYDEV rx op (ifindex == 0) with an active RX timeout and/or
throttle timer has no defined semantics when matching frames arrive
from several interfaces: bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently for
the same op on different CPUs, racing hrtimer_cancel()/
bcm_rx_starttimer() against bcm_rx_timeout_handler() and causing
spurious RX_TIMEOUT notifications and last_frames corruption. The
same concurrency lets throttled multiplex frames from different
interfaces clobber the single rx_ifindex/rx_stamp fields shared by
the op.
Add op->if_detected to track the first interface that delivers a
matching frame while a timeout/throttle timer is configured, and
reject frames from any other interface for that op. The claim is
decided in bcm_rx_handler() before hrtimer_cancel() touches
op->timer, so a rejected frame can never disturb the claimed
interface's watchdog. RTR-mode ops are excluded via RX_RTR_FRAME,
independent of kt_ival1/kt_ival2, since those may briefly hold a
stale value from an earlier non-RTR configuration.
The claim is released in bcm_notify() on NETDEV_UNREGISTER and in
bcm_rx_setup() when SETTIMER reconfigures the timer values.
A (re-)claim is only possible on CAN devices in NETREG_REGISTERED
dev->reg_state to cover the release in bcm_notify() where reg_state
becomes NETREG_UNREGISTERING until synchronize_net(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: fix stale rx/tx ops after device removal
RX: an RX_SETUP update(!) for an existing op skipped can_rx_register()
unconditionally, even when a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER had already
torn down its registration (op->rx_reg_dev == NULL). This silently
did not re-enable frame delivery for that updated filter. bcm_rx_setup()
now re-registers in that case, while leaving rx_ops with ifindex = 0
(all CAN devices) which never carry a tracked rx_reg_dev registered as-is.
TX: bcm_notify() only handled bo->rx_ops on NETDEV_UNREGISTER, leaving
tx_ops with an active cyclic transmission re-arming its hrtimer
indefinitely to execute bcm_tx_timeout_handler(). Cancelling the hrtimer
prevents the runaway timer and any injection into a later reused ifindex,
since nothing else calls bcm_can_tx() for the op until an explicit
TX_SETUP update re-arms it.
Unlike bcm_rx_unreg(), which clears the tracked rx_reg_dev for rx_ops,
the ifindex is intentionally left unchanged for tx_ops. bcm_tx_setup()
always rejects ifindex 0, so clearing it would strand the op: neither a
later TX_SETUP (bcm_find_op()) nor TX_DELETE (bcm_delete_tx_op()) could
ever find it again, since both require an exact ifindex match. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics
KCSAN detected a data race within the bcm_rx_handler() when two CAN frames
have been simultaneously received and processed in a single rx op by two
different CPUs.
Use atomic operations with (signed) long data types to access the
statistics in the hot path to fix the KCSAN complaint.
Additionally simplify the update and check of statistics overflow by
using the atomic operations in separate bcm_update_[rx|tx]_stats()
functions. The rx variant runs under bcm_rx_update_lock to prevent
races when resetting the two rx counters; the tx variant runs under
bcm_tx_lock and only needs to guard its own counter's overflow.
As the rx path resets its values already at LONG_MAX / 100, there is
no conflict between the two locking domains (bcm_rx_update_lock vs.
bcm_tx_lock) even for ops that use both paths.
The rx statistics update and the frames_filtered update in
bcm_rx_changed() were previously performed in two separate
bcm_rx_update_lock sections. For an rx op subscribed on all interfaces
(ifindex == 0), bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently on different
CPUs, so a counter reset by one CPU between these two sections could
leave frames_filtered larger than frames_abs on another CPU, producing
a bogus (even negative) reduction percentage in procfs. Update the
statistics in the same critical section as bcm_rx_changed() to close
this gap, which also removes the now unneeded extra lock/unlock pair
around the traffic_flags calculation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values
KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be
overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content
while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler()
run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic.
Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter
(nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new
per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX
handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the
lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock.
hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since
bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a
running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller.
Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the
stored reply frame's can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the
frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler()
could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that
normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged
buffer for updates, directly on op->frames pre-registration for new
ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent.
bcm_rx_handler()'s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected
snapshot of op->flags before deciding whether to call bcm_can_tx(),
but does not hold the lock across that call.
Also take a lock-protected snapshot of the currframe in bcm_can_tx()
to avoid partly overwrites by content updates in bcm_tx_setup().
Finally check if a TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX/SETTIMER might have reset
op->currframe between the two locked sections in bcm_can_tx().
Omit calling hrtimer_forward() with zero interval in bcm_rx_thr_handler().
kt_ival2 may have been concurrently cleared by bcm_rx_setup() before it
cancels this timer, so check kt_ival2 inside the bcm_rx_update_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure
bcm_sendmsg() reads bo->ifindex and checks bo->bound before taking
lock_sock(), while bcm_notify(), bcm_connect() and bcm_release() all
mutate both fields under that same lock. Because the lockless reads
and the locked writes are unordered with respect to each other, a
racing bcm_notify() (device unregister) or bcm_connect() (concurrent
bind on another thread sharing the socket) can make bcm_sendmsg()
observe an inconsistent combination, e.g. a stale bound=1 together
with the now-cleared ifindex=0, silently turning a socket bound to a
specific CAN interface into one that also matches "any" interface.
Keep the lockless bo->bound check purely as a fast-path reject, and
move the ifindex read (and a bo->bound re-check) into the locked
section, where every writer already serializes. This removes the
possibility of observing the two fields torn against each other,
rather than trying to fix it with more READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() pairs
on two independently updated fields. Annotate the now-purely-lockless
bo->bound accesses consistently across all its write sites.
Also fix bcm_rx_setup() silently returning success when the target
device disappears concurrently instead of reporting -ENODEV, so a
broken RX op is no longer left registered as if it had succeeded. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so->rx_lock
The TX state machine (so->tx.state) is driven from three contexts:
sendmsg() claiming and progressing a transfer, the RX path consuming
Flow Control/echo frames, and two hrtimers timing out a stalled
transfer. Mixing a lock-free cmpxchg() claim in sendmsg() with
hrtimer_cancel() calls made under so->rx_lock elsewhere left windows
where a frame or timer callback could act on a state that had already
moved on, corrupting an unrelated transfer.
so->rx_lock now covers the full lifecycle of a TX claim: sendmsg()
takes it to check so->tx.state is ISOTP_IDLE, switch it to
ISOTP_SENDING, bump so->tx_gen and drain the previous transfer's
timers - all as one critical section. isotp_rcv_fc()/isotp_rcv_cf()
already run under this lock via isotp_rcv(), and isotp_rcv_echo() now
takes it itself, so none of them can ever observe a transfer mid-claim.
This also means a transfer can no longer be handed to sendmsg()'s
cleanup paths (signal or send error) while another thread is
concurrently claiming or finishing it, so those paths can cancel
timers and reset the state unconditionally.
isotp_release() claims the socket the same way, so a racing sendmsg()
sees a consistent ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and skips arming its timer or sending.
Only the hrtimer callbacks stay outside so->rx_lock, since they run
under so->rx_lock's cancellation elsewhere and taking it themselves
would deadlock. so->tx_gen lets them recognize whether the transfer
they timed out is still the one currently active, so they don't
report an error against a transfer that has since completed or been
superseded. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netdev-genl: report NAPI thread PID in the caller's pid namespace
netdev_nl_napi_fill_one() reports the NAPI kthread PID in NETDEV_A_NAPI_PID
using task_pid_nr(), which returns the PID in the initial pid namespace.
NETDEV_CMD_NAPI_GET does not have GENL_ADMIN_PERM and the netdev genl family
is netnsok, so a caller in a child pid namespace can issue it. That caller
then sees the kthread's global PID, even though the kthread is not visible
in its pid namespace, where the value should be 0.
Translate the PID through the caller's pid namespace, the same way commit
3799c2570982 ("io_uring/fdinfo: translate SqThread PID through caller's
pid_ns") did for the io_uring SQPOLL thread. The doit and dumpit paths both
run synchronously in the caller's context, so task_active_pid_ns(current) is
the caller's pid namespace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: fix refcount leak in nvmet_sq_create()
In nvmet_sq_create(), a reference on the ctrl is taken
via kref_get_unless_zero() before calling nvmet_check_sqid().
If nvmet_check_sqid() fails, the function returns the error
directly without releasing the reference, leading to a leak.
Fix this by jumping to the "ctrl_put" label, which already
performs the necessary nvmet_ctrl_put(ctrl). This ensures the
reference is properly released on this error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Check return value of __register_event() in trace_module_add_events()
trace_module_add_events() ignores the return value of __register_event()
and unconditionally calls __add_event_to_tracers() for each event.
If __register_event() fails (for example, if event_init() fails), the
trace_event_call is not added to ftrace_events list, but
__add_event_to_tracers() still creates a trace_event_file pointing to it.
If module loading subsequently fails and module memory is freed, tracing
state retains a stale trace_event_call pointer in trace_event_file,
leading to a use-after-free when tracefs or tracing subsystem operations
are later executed.
Fix this by checking the return value of __register_event() and only
calling __add_event_to_tracers() if event registration succeeded. |
