In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key()
Sashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the
following flow:
dm-inlinecrypt ctor # first use of the fallback
├─ blk_crypto_init_key() # succeeds, ctx->key.size != 0
├─ blk_crypto_start_using_key()
│ ├─ hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP
│ │ # profile never allocated (NULL)
│ └─ raw key: fallback_start_using_mode()
│ └─ blk_crypto_fallback_init() fails
│ └─ kfree(profile) # not NULLed
├─ goto bad
└─ inlinecrypt_dtr() # evicts whenever key.size is set
└─ blk_crypto_evict_key()
└─ blk_crypto_config_supported_natively() = false
└─ blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key()
└─ __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile)
└─ profile->num_slots # BOOM!!!
This issue can be reproduced using the following commands:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64
LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing)
SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP)
KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')
dmsetup create ic --table "0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 \
$KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped"
And the following oops is triggered:
==================================================================
blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f]
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
RIP: 0010:__blk_crypto_evict_key+0x2e/0x3b0
Call Trace:
blk_crypto_evict_key+0x24c/0x320
inlinecrypt_dtr+0xf6/0x160
inlinecrypt_ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0
dm_table_add_target+0x661/0xf40
table_load+0x1c4/0x490
ctl_ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0
dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20
==================================================================
dm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never
started, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it.
Fix this by returning early from blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() when
tfms_inited[] is not set for the key's mode. tfms_inited[] is only set
after blk_crypto_fallback_init() has successfully initialized the
profile, so the crash above is no longer reachable.
The bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae ("blk-crypto:
dynamically allocate fallback profile") was merged in v6.5, and only
became actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 ("dm-inlinecrypt:
add target for inline block device encryption") was merged in v7.2.
blk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key()
Sashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the
following flow:
dm-inlinecrypt ctor # first use of the fallback
├─ blk_crypto_init_key() # succeeds, ctx->key.size != 0
├─ blk_crypto_start_using_key()
│ ├─ hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP
│ │ # profile never allocated (NULL)
│ └─ raw key: fallback_start_using_mode()
│ └─ blk_crypto_fallback_init() fails
│ └─ kfree(profile) # not NULLed
├─ goto bad
└─ inlinecrypt_dtr() # evicts whenever key.size is set
└─ blk_crypto_evict_key()
└─ blk_crypto_config_supported_natively() = false
└─ blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key()
└─ __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile)
└─ profile->num_slots # BOOM!!!
This issue can be reproduced using the following commands:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64
LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing)
SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP)
KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')
dmsetup create ic --table "0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 \
$KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped"
And the following oops is triggered:
==================================================================
blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f]
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
RIP: 0010:__blk_crypto_evict_key+0x2e/0x3b0
Call Trace:
blk_crypto_evict_key+0x24c/0x320
inlinecrypt_dtr+0xf6/0x160
inlinecrypt_ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0
dm_table_add_target+0x661/0xf40
table_load+0x1c4/0x490
ctl_ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0
dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20
==================================================================
dm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never
started, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it.
Fix this by returning early from blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() when
tfms_inited[] is not set for the key's mode. tfms_inited[] is only set
after blk_crypto_fallback_init() has successfully initialized the
profile, so the crash above is no longer reachable.
The bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae ("blk-crypto:
dynamically allocate fallback profile") was merged in v6.5, and only
became actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 ("dm-inlinecrypt:
add target for inline block device encryption") was merged in v7.2.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key() Sashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the following flow: dm-inlinecrypt ctor # first use of the fallback ├─ blk_crypto_init_key() # succeeds, ctx->key.size != 0 ├─ blk_crypto_start_using_key() │ ├─ hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP │ │ # profile never allocated (NULL) │ └─ raw key: fallback_start_using_mode() │ └─ blk_crypto_fallback_init() fails │ └─ kfree(profile) # not NULLed ├─ goto bad └─ inlinecrypt_dtr() # evicts whenever key.size is set └─ blk_crypto_evict_key() └─ blk_crypto_config_supported_natively() = false └─ blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() └─ __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile) └─ profile->num_slots # BOOM!!! This issue can be reproduced using the following commands: dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64 LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing) SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP) KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n') dmsetup create ic --table "0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 \ $KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped" And the following oops is triggered: ================================================================== blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:__blk_crypto_evict_key+0x2e/0x3b0 Call Trace: blk_crypto_evict_key+0x24c/0x320 inlinecrypt_dtr+0xf6/0x160 inlinecrypt_ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0 dm_table_add_target+0x661/0xf40 table_load+0x1c4/0x490 ctl_ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20 ================================================================== dm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never started, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it. Fix this by returning early from blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() when tfms_inited[] is not set for the key's mode. tfms_inited[] is only set after blk_crypto_fallback_init() has successfully initialized the profile, so the crash above is no longer reachable. The bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae ("blk-crypto: dynamically allocate fallback profile") was merged in v6.5, and only became actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 ("dm-inlinecrypt: add target for inline block device encryption") was merged in v7.2. | |
| Title | blk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key() | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-19T14:45:29.873Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.422Z
Link: CVE-2026-99558
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-19T15:18:12.367
Modified: 2026-11-19T15:18:12.367
Link: CVE-2026-99558
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.