In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices

In a CoCo VM the host is untrusted. Since the VMBus ring buffer read and
write indices live in shared memory, the guest has to treat both as
potentially malicious.

hv_ringbuffer_write() copies into the ring at write_index with no bounds
checking, so the host can make the guest write packet data at any offset
up to 4 GiB past the start of the ring buffer. read_index matters too:
the available space derived from both indices is the only bound on how
much is copied, and an out-of-range index can make it far larger than
the ring.

The fix is to validate both indices before use and to use the validated
snapshot instead of re-accessing. For invalid indices,
hv_ringbuffer_write() logs and returns -EIO.

One re-read of write_index is left unchecked in this patch:
hv_get_ring_bufferindices() fetches it again for the prev_indices
trailer. The value is only returned to the host and is not used as an
offset or length for indexing. Since this is not a security issue, it is
addressed later in the series.

Open-coding the bytes available arithmetic keeps the fix free of
prerequisites; a later patch refactors it into a helper function.
Advisories

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Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices In a CoCo VM the host is untrusted. Since the VMBus ring buffer read and write indices live in shared memory, the guest has to treat both as potentially malicious. hv_ringbuffer_write() copies into the ring at write_index with no bounds checking, so the host can make the guest write packet data at any offset up to 4 GiB past the start of the ring buffer. read_index matters too: the available space derived from both indices is the only bound on how much is copied, and an out-of-range index can make it far larger than the ring. The fix is to validate both indices before use and to use the validated snapshot instead of re-accessing. For invalid indices, hv_ringbuffer_write() logs and returns -EIO. One re-read of write_index is left unchecked in this patch: hv_get_ring_bufferindices() fetches it again for the prev_indices trailer. The value is only returned to the host and is not used as an offset or length for indexing. Since this is not a security issue, it is addressed later in the series. Open-coding the bytes available arithmetic keeps the fix free of prerequisites; a later patch refactors it into a helper function.
Title Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-19T14:45:02.316Z

Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.421Z

Link: CVE-2026-99544

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-11-19T15:18:10.540

Modified: 2026-11-19T15:18:10.540

Link: CVE-2026-99544

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses

No weakness.