In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled
On an overlay with index=on,nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory
crashes the kernel once an LSM has started to deny CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
to the mounter, the task that mounted the overlay. The mount and the LSM
policy change require root. After that, any user who can write to a
directory that exists only in a lower layer triggers the oops by doing
so.
Before a file or directory that exists only in a lower layer is changed
for the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer.
This is called copy up.
On copy up, ovl_get_origin_fh() encodes the file handle of the lower
inode, called the origin. It returns NULL if ovl_can_decode_fh() says
that the lower filesystem cannot decode handles. Whether the callers can
handle NULL depends on the index option:
- Without an index, NULL is fine: the callers store an empty origin
xattr.
- With index enabled, overlayfs keeps entries for copied up inodes in an
internal index directory. The name of an index entry is derived from
the handle, so ovl_get_origin_fh() must return a handle or an error.
The mount only enables the index if ovl_can_decode_fh() succeeds for all
layers, but the result can change later. The function checks the export
operations of the filesystem and capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH). Copy up
runs with the mounter's credentials, and an LSM can start to deny the
capability to those credentials after the mount. ovl_get_origin_fh()
then returns NULL with index enabled.
This goes wrong in two callers:
- With nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory creates an index entry for
the directory. ovl_create_index() passes the NULL handle to
ovl_get_index_name_fh(), which dereferences it.
- If the result changes while mount(2) is still running,
ovl_get_indexdir() passes a NULL from ovl_get_origin_fh() to
ovl_verify_set_fh() in the same way.
Before the commit in the Fixes tag, these two callers encoded the handle
themselves, without consulting ovl_can_decode_fh().
Reproduced with a BPF LSM program that started to deny the capability
after the mount. An unprivileged touch in a directory that had not been
copied up yet oopsed in ovl_get_index_name_fh(). With this patch the
touch succeeds and the directory gets its index entry.
Fix this by calling ovl_can_decode_fh() in ovl_get_origin_fh() only when
index is disabled.
ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled
On an overlay with index=on,nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory
crashes the kernel once an LSM has started to deny CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
to the mounter, the task that mounted the overlay. The mount and the LSM
policy change require root. After that, any user who can write to a
directory that exists only in a lower layer triggers the oops by doing
so.
Before a file or directory that exists only in a lower layer is changed
for the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer.
This is called copy up.
On copy up, ovl_get_origin_fh() encodes the file handle of the lower
inode, called the origin. It returns NULL if ovl_can_decode_fh() says
that the lower filesystem cannot decode handles. Whether the callers can
handle NULL depends on the index option:
- Without an index, NULL is fine: the callers store an empty origin
xattr.
- With index enabled, overlayfs keeps entries for copied up inodes in an
internal index directory. The name of an index entry is derived from
the handle, so ovl_get_origin_fh() must return a handle or an error.
The mount only enables the index if ovl_can_decode_fh() succeeds for all
layers, but the result can change later. The function checks the export
operations of the filesystem and capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH). Copy up
runs with the mounter's credentials, and an LSM can start to deny the
capability to those credentials after the mount. ovl_get_origin_fh()
then returns NULL with index enabled.
This goes wrong in two callers:
- With nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory creates an index entry for
the directory. ovl_create_index() passes the NULL handle to
ovl_get_index_name_fh(), which dereferences it.
- If the result changes while mount(2) is still running,
ovl_get_indexdir() passes a NULL from ovl_get_origin_fh() to
ovl_verify_set_fh() in the same way.
Before the commit in the Fixes tag, these two callers encoded the handle
themselves, without consulting ovl_can_decode_fh().
Reproduced with a BPF LSM program that started to deny the capability
after the mount. An unprivileged touch in a directory that had not been
copied up yet oopsed in ovl_get_index_name_fh(). With this patch the
touch succeeds and the directory gets its index entry.
Fix this by calling ovl_can_decode_fh() in ovl_get_origin_fh() only when
index is disabled.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Thu, 19 Nov 2026 14:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled On an overlay with index=on,nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory crashes the kernel once an LSM has started to deny CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH to the mounter, the task that mounted the overlay. The mount and the LSM policy change require root. After that, any user who can write to a directory that exists only in a lower layer triggers the oops by doing so. Before a file or directory that exists only in a lower layer is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up. On copy up, ovl_get_origin_fh() encodes the file handle of the lower inode, called the origin. It returns NULL if ovl_can_decode_fh() says that the lower filesystem cannot decode handles. Whether the callers can handle NULL depends on the index option: - Without an index, NULL is fine: the callers store an empty origin xattr. - With index enabled, overlayfs keeps entries for copied up inodes in an internal index directory. The name of an index entry is derived from the handle, so ovl_get_origin_fh() must return a handle or an error. The mount only enables the index if ovl_can_decode_fh() succeeds for all layers, but the result can change later. The function checks the export operations of the filesystem and capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH). Copy up runs with the mounter's credentials, and an LSM can start to deny the capability to those credentials after the mount. ovl_get_origin_fh() then returns NULL with index enabled. This goes wrong in two callers: - With nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory creates an index entry for the directory. ovl_create_index() passes the NULL handle to ovl_get_index_name_fh(), which dereferences it. - If the result changes while mount(2) is still running, ovl_get_indexdir() passes a NULL from ovl_get_origin_fh() to ovl_verify_set_fh() in the same way. Before the commit in the Fixes tag, these two callers encoded the handle themselves, without consulting ovl_can_decode_fh(). Reproduced with a BPF LSM program that started to deny the capability after the mount. An unprivileged touch in a directory that had not been copied up yet oopsed in ovl_get_index_name_fh(). With this patch the touch succeeds and the directory gets its index entry. Fix this by calling ovl_can_decode_fh() in ovl_get_origin_fh() only when index is disabled. | |
| Title | ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-19T14:40:23.633Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.413Z
Link: CVE-2026-99421
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-19T15:17:54.990
Modified: 2026-11-19T15:17:54.990
Link: CVE-2026-99421
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.