In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers
The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE
(256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not
zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before
handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp().
qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied
value:
if (len == 1)
opt |= BIT_0;
if (opt & BIT_0)
len = *sfp;
*sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow
up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool
buffer. Since only a small prefix was written
(e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU
status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and
writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device
flash.
Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C handlers
so any bytes beyond the initialized data are zero rather than stale heap
contents.
scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers
The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE
(256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not
zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before
handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp().
qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied
value:
if (len == 1)
opt |= BIT_0;
if (opt & BIT_0)
len = *sfp;
*sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow
up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool
buffer. Since only a small prefix was written
(e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU
status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and
writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device
flash.
Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C handlers
so any bytes beyond the initialized data are zero rather than stale heap
contents.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Wed, 16 Sep 2026 10:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE (256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp(). qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied value: if (len == 1) opt |= BIT_0; if (opt & BIT_0) len = *sfp; *sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool buffer. Since only a small prefix was written (e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device flash. Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C handlers so any bytes beyond the initialized data are zero rather than stale heap contents. | |
| Title | scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Projects
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-16T10:31:35.758Z
Reserved: 2026-09-11T19:38:34.771Z
Link: CVE-2026-89865
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-16T11:16:54.610
Modified: 2026-09-16T11:16:54.610
Link: CVE-2026-89865
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.