{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "cveMetadata": {"state": "PUBLISHED", "cveId": "CVE-2026-88592", "assignerOrgId": "8254265b-2729-46b6-b9e3-3dfca2d5bfca", "assignerShortName": "mitre", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T19:43:23.977Z", "dateReserved": "2026-09-10T00:00:00.000Z", "datePublished": "2026-09-16T00:00:00.000Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "8254265b-2729-46b6-b9e3-3dfca2d5bfca", "shortName": "mitre", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T19:43:23.977Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "kkFileView >= 4.2.0 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The cross-origin file proxy endpoint /getCorsFile is protected by TrustHostFilter against the trust.host whitelist. However, the URL parameter validated by the filter is not the same parameter the controller actually fetches: the filter validates the first non-empty parameter in a fixed priority order, while the controller only reads and fetches urlPath. By supplying both urlPath=<real target> and url=<whitelisted decoy address> in the same request, the decoy passes validation while the unvalidated real target is fetched server-side \u2014 and the response body is echoed back to the attacker."}], "affected": [{"vendor": "n/a", "product": "n/a", "versions": [{"version": "n/a", "status": "affected"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/sg-summer/cve/issues/2"}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"type": "text", "lang": "en", "description": "n/a"}]}]}}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"product": "n/a", "vendor": "n/a", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "n/a"}]}], "source": "[email protected]"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "kkFileView >= 4.2.0 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The cross-origin file proxy endpoint /getCorsFile is protected by TrustHostFilter against the trust.host whitelist. However, the URL parameter validated by the filter is not the same parameter the controller actually fetches: the filter validates the first non-empty parameter in a fixed priority order, while the controller only reads and fetches urlPath. By supplying both urlPath=<real target> and url=<whitelisted decoy address> in the same request, the decoy passes validation while the unvalidated real target is fetched server-side \u2014 and the response body is echoed back to the attacker."}], "id": "CVE-2026-88592", "lastModified": "2026-09-16T20:17:38.453", "metrics": {}, "published": "2026-09-16T20:17:38.453", "references": [{"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://github.com/sg-summer/cve/issues/2"}], "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]", "vulnStatus": "Received"}

{}

{}