MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.
parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.
An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.
parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.
An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
Upgrade to MojoX-Authentication 0.006 or later.
Workaround
For deployments that cannot upgrade, install Net::SAML2 0.86 or later. SAML login then fails rather than accepting a forged assertion.
References
History
Mon, 07 Sep 2026 08:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Perl
Perl mojox::authentication |
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| Vendors & Products |
Perl
Perl mojox::authentication |
Sun, 06 Sep 2026 22:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor. parse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries. An attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries. | |
| Title | MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-347 | |
| References |
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CPANSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-06T22:24:19.368Z
Reserved: 2026-09-06T17:59:12.036Z
Link: CVE-2026-86304
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-06T23:17:39.483
Modified: 2026-09-06T23:17:39.483
Link: CVE-2026-86304
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-09-07T08:24:28Z
Weaknesses