In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback

The interrupt URB buffer is allocated in setup_port_interrupt_in() based
on the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize:

buffer_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd);
port->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);

When a USB device declares wMaxPacketSize = 8 on its interrupt IN
endpoint, the buffer is allocated from kmalloc-8 cache (exactly
8 bytes).

If the device sends a short packet (actual_length < wMaxPacketSize),
the URB completes with status == 0 and the callback proceeds to read:

data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)]

which evaluates to data[8], accessing 1 byte beyond the allocated 8-byte
buffer. This results in a slab out-of-bounds read.

Fix this by adding the missing bounds check: first verify that the
actual length is large enough to contain the struct usb_ctrlrequest
header before accessing req_pkt->bRequestType and req_pkt->bRequest,
and then verify that there is an additional byte for the modem signal
state before reading data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] inside the
conditional. Use sizeof(*req_pkt) instead of sizeof(struct
usb_ctrlrequest) for consistency.

[ johan: use dev_err(); split signals declaration and initialisation ]
Advisories

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Fixes

Solution

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Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Fri, 04 Sep 2026 19:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-125
CWE-20

Fri, 04 Sep 2026 16:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback The interrupt URB buffer is allocated in setup_port_interrupt_in() based on the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize: buffer_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd); port->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL); When a USB device declares wMaxPacketSize = 8 on its interrupt IN endpoint, the buffer is allocated from kmalloc-8 cache (exactly 8 bytes). If the device sends a short packet (actual_length < wMaxPacketSize), the URB completes with status == 0 and the callback proceeds to read: data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] which evaluates to data[8], accessing 1 byte beyond the allocated 8-byte buffer. This results in a slab out-of-bounds read. Fix this by adding the missing bounds check: first verify that the actual length is large enough to contain the struct usb_ctrlrequest header before accessing req_pkt->bRequestType and req_pkt->bRequest, and then verify that there is an additional byte for the modem signal state before reading data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] inside the conditional. Use sizeof(*req_pkt) instead of sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest) for consistency. [ johan: use dev_err(); split signals declaration and initialisation ]
Title USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-04T15:54:31.111Z

Reserved: 2026-08-26T14:34:25.795Z

Link: CVE-2026-80827

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-04T16:18:10.683

Modified: 2026-09-04T16:18:10.683

Link: CVE-2026-80827

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-05T00:45:05Z

Weaknesses