msgpack_unpacker_expand_buffer in src/unpack.c, reached through the public msgpack_unpacker_reserve_buffer API, computes its new buffer size using an unchecked size_t addition of the requested size and the amount already used. The doubling loop guards its own multiplication against overflow, but the addition in the loop condition is unguarded, so a request near SIZE_MAX wraps: the loop condition is already satisfied, the allocation is performed at the small pre-wrap size, and the function returns true. The caller is told the requested capacity was reserved when it was not, so a subsequent write of the requested length overflows the heap buffer. The library's own example/lib_buffer_unpack.c demonstrates the reserve-then-write pattern, and its defensive assert comparing capacity against the request is compiled out under NDEBUG. msgpack-c's own decode entry points do not derive the reservation size from untrusted input, so reaching this requires an integration that passes an attacker-influenced length to the reservation API, such as a length-prefixed streaming transport.
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History

Thu, 20 Aug 2026 19:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Thu, 20 Aug 2026 18:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description msgpack_unpacker_expand_buffer in src/unpack.c, reached through the public msgpack_unpacker_reserve_buffer API, computes its new buffer size using an unchecked size_t addition of the requested size and the amount already used. The doubling loop guards its own multiplication against overflow, but the addition in the loop condition is unguarded, so a request near SIZE_MAX wraps: the loop condition is already satisfied, the allocation is performed at the small pre-wrap size, and the function returns true. The caller is told the requested capacity was reserved when it was not, so a subsequent write of the requested length overflows the heap buffer. The library's own example/lib_buffer_unpack.c demonstrates the reserve-then-write pattern, and its defensive assert comparing capacity against the request is compiled out under NDEBUG. msgpack-c's own decode entry points do not derive the reservation size from untrusted input, so reaching this requires an integration that passes an attacker-influenced length to the reservation API, such as a length-prefixed streaming transport.
Title msgpack-c Integer Overflow in msgpack_unpacker_expand_buffer Causes a False-Success Undersized Reservation
Weaknesses CWE-190
CWE-787
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 5.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: VulnCheck

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-20T18:53:26.891Z

Reserved: 2026-08-10T15:16:31.371Z

Link: CVE-2026-72854

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-08-20T18:53:19.871Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-20T19:17:01.040

Modified: 2026-08-20T19:17:01.040

Link: CVE-2026-72854

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses