Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
No advisories yet.
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Mon, 10 Aug 2026 12:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time — a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection. | Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. |
| Title | Memos - Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext() | Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext() |
Mon, 10 Aug 2026 11:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext() | Memos - Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext() |
Wed, 05 Aug 2026 16:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Wed, 05 Aug 2026 15:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Usememos
Usememos memos |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Usememos
Usememos memos |
Wed, 05 Aug 2026 13:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time — a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection. | |
| Title | Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext() | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-367 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: TuranSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-10T11:46:48.194Z
Reserved: 2026-08-05T12:23:34.967Z
Link: CVE-2026-71272
Updated: 2026-08-05T15:54:38.292Z
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-05T13:24:51.573
Modified: 2026-08-10T12:17:29.693
Link: CVE-2026-71272
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-10T21:15:07Z