Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address.
Advisories

No advisories yet.

Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Mon, 10 Aug 2026 12:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time — a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection. Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address.
Title Memos - Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext() Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext()

Mon, 10 Aug 2026 11:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext() Memos - Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext()

Wed, 05 Aug 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Wed, 05 Aug 2026 15:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Usememos
Usememos memos
Vendors & Products Usememos
Usememos memos

Wed, 05 Aug 2026 13:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time — a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection.
Title Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext()
Weaknesses CWE-367
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N'}


Projects

Sign in to view the affected projects.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: TuranSec

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-10T11:46:48.194Z

Reserved: 2026-08-05T12:23:34.967Z

Link: CVE-2026-71272

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-08-05T15:54:38.292Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-05T13:24:51.573

Modified: 2026-08-10T12:17:29.693

Link: CVE-2026-71272

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-10T21:15:07Z

Weaknesses