{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-13481", "assignerOrgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "zephyr", "dateReserved": "2026-06-27T13:33:57.600Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-26T14:03:49.820Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-26T15:45:52.137Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad", "shortName": "zephyr", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-26T14:03:49.820Z"}, "title": "Out-of-bounds read in PTP management TLV TIME parsing in Zephyr net PTP", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv->data to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check.\n\nThe length passed in is the management data size (tlv->length - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv->length > 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.\n\nThe over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv->data lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message's parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device's parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption.\n\nThe fix adds if (length < sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp)) { return -EBADMSG; } before the cast, matching the other management-id cases and fully closing the receive-path defect."}], "affected": [{"vendor": "zephyrproject", "product": "zephyr", "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr", "packageName": "zephyr", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "programFiles": ["subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c"], "versions": [{"version": "3.7.0", "status": "affected", "versionType": "semver", "lessThan": "4.4.2"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/de98c3721a0e21ca269313997736f4f6193909ef", "name": "Fix commit", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-mh5r-jxh8-hxwx", "name": "GHSA-mh5r-jxh8-hxwx"}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N", "baseScore": 5.4, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM"}}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "description": "bounds", "cweId": "CWE-125", "type": "CWE"}]}], "x_generator": {"engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"}}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-08-26T15:45:34.258604Z", "id": "CVE-2026-13481", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-26T15:45:52.137Z"}}]}}

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "containers": {"adp": [{"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"id": "CVE-2026-13481", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-08-26T15:45:34.258604Z"}}}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-26T15:45:49.383Z"}}], "cna": {"title": "Out-of-bounds read in PTP management TLV TIME parsing in Zephyr net PTP", "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "baseScore": 5.4, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"}}], "affected": [{"vendor": "zephyrproject", "product": "zephyr", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "3.7.0", "lessThan": "4.4.2", "versionType": "semver"}], "packageName": "zephyr", "programFiles": ["subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c"], "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr", "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/de98c3721a0e21ca269313997736f4f6193909ef", "name": "Fix commit", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-mh5r-jxh8-hxwx", "name": "GHSA-mh5r-jxh8-hxwx"}], "x_generator": {"engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv->data to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check.\n\nThe length passed in is the management data size (tlv->length - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv->length > 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.\n\nThe over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv->data lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message's parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device's parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption.\n\nThe fix adds if (length < sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp)) { return -EBADMSG; } before the cast, matching the other management-id cases and fully closing the receive-path defect."}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-125", "description": "bounds"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad", "shortName": "zephyr", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-26T14:03:49.820Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-13481", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-26T15:45:52.137Z", "dateReserved": "2026-06-27T13:33:57.600Z", "assignerOrgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad", "datePublished": "2026-08-26T14:03:49.820Z", "assignerShortName": "zephyr"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "packageName": "zephyr", "product": "zephyr", "programFiles": ["subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c"], "vendor": "zephyrproject", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4.4.2", "status": "affected", "version": "3.7.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "source": "[email protected]"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv->data to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check.\n\nThe length passed in is the management data size (tlv->length - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv->length > 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.\n\nThe over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv->data lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message's parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device's parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption.\n\nThe fix adds if (length < sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp)) { return -EBADMSG; } before the cast, matching the other management-id cases and fully closing the receive-path defect."}], "id": "CVE-2026-13481", "lastModified": "2026-08-26T16:59:23.267", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 5.4, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "impactScore": 2.5, "source": "[email protected]", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-13481", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-08-26T15:45:34.258604Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-08-26T15:16:42.953", "references": [{"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/de98c3721a0e21ca269313997736f4f6193909ef"}, {"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-mh5r-jxh8-hxwx"}], "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]", "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-125"}], "source": "[email protected]", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[3.7.0,4.4.2)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 100.0, "confidence_source": "matching", "scores": [{"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "zephyr", "source": "cna", "vendor": "zephyrproject"}, "product": "zephyr", "vendor": "zephyrproject"}], "created": "2026-08-26T17:15:04.616763+00:00", "updated": "2026-08-26T19:30:05.028005+00:00", "vendors": ["zephyrproject", "zephyrproject$PRODUCT$zephyr"]}