{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-115477", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-10-22T15:06:52.738Z", "datePublished": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-285", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-285: Improper Authorization", "type": "CWE"}]}, {"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-863", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV4_0": {"attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.1, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "version": "4.0"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"}, {"name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967", "tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967"}, {"name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969", "tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969"}, {"name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71", "tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71"}, {"name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md", "tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md"}, {"name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4", "tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "The-40-Thieves", "product": "obsidian-tc", "versions": [{"version": ">= 1.13.0, < 1.31.4", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

{}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"product": "obsidian-tc", "vendor": "The-40-Thieves", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": ">= 1.13.0, < 1.31.4"}]}], "source": "[email protected]"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4."}], "id": "CVE-2026-115477", "lastModified": "2026-10-23T15:17:29.967", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV40": [{"cvssData": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 7.1, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "source": "[email protected]", "type": "Secondary"}]}, "published": "2026-10-23T15:17:29.840", "references": [{"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md"}, {"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71"}, {"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967"}, {"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969"}, {"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4"}, {"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"}], "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]", "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-285"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-863"}], "source": "[email protected]", "type": "Primary"}]}

{}

{"created": "2026-10-23T16:00:18.681465+00:00", "updated": "2026-10-23T16:00:18.681471+00:00", "vendors": []}