In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
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History
Thu, 15 Oct 2026 13:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration. | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-290 CWE-644 |
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| References |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: eclipse
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-15T13:11:12.574Z
Reserved: 2026-10-14T14:52:28.420Z
Link: CVE-2026-110723
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-15T13:17:12.857
Modified: 2026-10-15T13:17:12.857
Link: CVE-2026-110723
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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