Hugo's security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Mon, 24 Aug 2026 11:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Gohugo
Gohugo hugo |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:gohugo:hugo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Gohugo
Gohugo hugo |
Mon, 24 Aug 2026 10:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Hugo's security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out. | |
| Title | Hugo 0.91.0 through 0.165.0 Server-Side Request Forgery via security.http.urls Lacking Destination Address Validation | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
|
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Projects
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: VulnCheck
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-24T11:13:11.477Z
Reserved: 2026-06-01T18:07:48.223Z
Link: CVE-2026-10582
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-24T11:16:38.233
Modified: 2026-08-24T11:16:38.233
Link: CVE-2026-10582
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-24T11:30:03Z
Weaknesses