Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in esaml_binding in dropbox esaml allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust the Erlang VM atom table and crash the node via a crafted SAMLResponse.
esaml_binding:decode_response/2 parses the decoded SAMLResponse with xmerl_scan:string/2, which interns every element name, attribute name, and namespace prefix it reads as a permanent atom. The SAML consume (ACS) and single-logout endpoints call it on unauthenticated requests before any signature check, so one well-formed document with thousands of distinct names mints thousands of atoms while staying inside the 128 KB request body limit. Atoms are never reclaimed and the VM caps the atom table at about one million entries, so a few dozen requests abort the node.
This issue affects esaml: from 0.1.0 onward.
esaml_binding:decode_response/2 parses the decoded SAMLResponse with xmerl_scan:string/2, which interns every element name, attribute name, and namespace prefix it reads as a permanent atom. The SAML consume (ACS) and single-logout endpoints call it on unauthenticated requests before any signature check, so one well-formed document with thousands of distinct names mints thousands of atoms while staying inside the 128 KB request body limit. Atoms are never reclaimed and the VM caps the atom table at about one million entries, so a few dozen requests abort the node.
This issue affects esaml: from 0.1.0 onward.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Thu, 22 Oct 2026 07:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in esaml_binding in dropbox esaml allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust the Erlang VM atom table and crash the node via a crafted SAMLResponse. esaml_binding:decode_response/2 parses the decoded SAMLResponse with xmerl_scan:string/2, which interns every element name, attribute name, and namespace prefix it reads as a permanent atom. The SAML consume (ACS) and single-logout endpoints call it on unauthenticated requests before any signature check, so one well-formed document with thousands of distinct names mints thousands of atoms while staying inside the 128 KB request body limit. Atoms are never reclaimed and the VM caps the atom table at about one million entries, so a few dozen requests abort the node. This issue affects esaml: from 0.1.0 onward. | |
| Title | Unbounded atom creation while parsing SAML messages in esaml allows atom table exhaustion | |
| First Time appeared |
Arekinath
Arekinath esaml Dropbox Dropbox esaml Handnot2 Handnot2 esaml |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-770 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:arekinath:esaml:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:esaml:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:a:handnot2:esaml:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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| Vendors & Products |
Arekinath
Arekinath esaml Dropbox Dropbox esaml Handnot2 Handnot2 esaml |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-22T06:58:43.034Z
Reserved: 2026-10-07T22:15:01.882Z
Link: CVE-2026-105270
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-22T07:16:40.940
Modified: 2026-10-22T07:16:40.940
Link: CVE-2026-105270
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-10-22T11:00:05Z
Weaknesses