{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-100863", "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck", "dateReserved": "2026-09-27T00:20:54.407Z", "datePublished": "2026-09-27T01:28:52.561Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-27T01:28:52.561Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10", "shortName": "VulnCheck", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-27T01:28:52.561Z"}, "datePublic": "2026-08-15T00:00:00.000Z", "title": "Heym before 0.0.91 SSRF via image fetching and IPv6 validation", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports \"imageInput\": \"$userInput.body.imageUrl\", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms \u2014 the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) \u2014 could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright."}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "description": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "cweId": "CWE-918", "type": "CWE"}]}], "affected": [{"vendor": "heymrun", "product": "heym", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "versions": [{"version": "0", "status": "affected", "versionType": "semver", "lessThan": "0.0.91"}, {"version": "0.0.91", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "cvssV4_0": {"version": "4.0", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 5.3, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM"}}, {"format": "CVSS", "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 5, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM"}}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4", "tags": ["vendor-advisory"], "name": "GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4)"}, {"name": "VulnCheck Advisory: Heym before 0.0.91 SSRF via image fetching and IPv6 validation", "tags": ["third-party-advisory"], "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.91-ssrf-via-image-fetching-and-ipv6-validation"}], "x_generator": {"engine": "vulncheck-endgame"}}}}

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{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "heym", "vendor": "heymrun", "versions": [{"lessThan": "0.0.91", "status": "affected", "version": "0", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "unaffected", "version": "0.0.91", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "source": "[email protected]"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports \"imageInput\": \"$userInput.body.imageUrl\", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms \u2014 the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) \u2014 could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright."}], "id": "CVE-2026-100863", "lastModified": "2026-09-27T02:17:26.117", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 5.0, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 3.1, "impactScore": 1.4, "source": "[email protected]", "type": "Primary"}], "cvssMetricV40": [{"cvssData": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 5.3, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "source": "[email protected]", "type": "Secondary"}]}, "published": "2026-09-27T02:17:26.117", "references": [{"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4"}, {"source": "[email protected]", "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.91-ssrf-via-image-fetching-and-ipv6-validation"}], "sourceIdentifier": "[email protected]", "vulnStatus": "Received", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-918"}], "source": "[email protected]", "type": "Primary"}]}

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