InvoicePlane is a self-hosted open source application for managing invoices, clients, and payments. In version 1.7.2, an authorization guard to Users::change_password(), was added to address a previous authorization flaw that allowed a secondary administrator (user_type=1, user_id != 1) to directly change the password of the primary administrator (user_id=1) through users/change_password/{id}. That remediation, however, protects only the direct password-change operation. It does not protect the identity attribute that password recovery actually trusts: user_email. Users::form() applies no equivalent object-level authorization check when editing the primary administrator's account, and user_email is not included in PROTECTED_FIELDS. A secondary administrator can therefore rewrite the primary administrator's email address, then drive the public password-recovery flow — which resolves the account by user_email — to receive the reset token and take over user_id=1. The result is an alternate attack path that achieves the same impact PR #1638 was intended to prevent: cross-administrator full account takeover of the primary administrator. This issue has been patched via commit 8616fa4.
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Mon, 28 Sep 2026 20:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | InvoicePlane is a self-hosted open source application for managing invoices, clients, and payments. In version 1.7.2, an authorization guard to Users::change_password(), was added to address a previous authorization flaw that allowed a secondary administrator (user_type=1, user_id != 1) to directly change the password of the primary administrator (user_id=1) through users/change_password/{id}. That remediation, however, protects only the direct password-change operation. It does not protect the identity attribute that password recovery actually trusts: user_email. Users::form() applies no equivalent object-level authorization check when editing the primary administrator's account, and user_email is not included in PROTECTED_FIELDS. A secondary administrator can therefore rewrite the primary administrator's email address, then drive the public password-recovery flow — which resolves the account by user_email — to receive the reset token and take over user_id=1. The result is an alternate attack path that achieves the same impact PR #1638 was intended to prevent: cross-administrator full account takeover of the primary administrator. This issue has been patched via commit 8616fa4. | |
| Title | InvoicePlane: Incomplete Authorization Remediation in Users::form() Enables Primary Administrator Account Takeover via Email Reassignment and Password Recovery | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-863 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-28T20:15:17.155Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T19:19:54.699Z
Link: CVE-2026-100371
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-28T21:17:11.653
Modified: 2026-09-28T21:17:11.653
Link: CVE-2026-100371
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-09-28T21:30:07Z
Weaknesses