Total
349 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-12919 | 2025-11-09 | 3.7 Low | ||
| A vulnerability was detected in EverShop up to 2.0.1. Affected is an unknown function of the file /src/modules/oms/graphql/types/Order/Order.resolvers.js of the component Order Handler. The manipulation of the argument uuid results in improper control of resource identifiers. The attack may be performed from remote. This attack is characterized by high complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. | ||||
| CVE-2025-12918 | 2025-11-09 | 3.1 Low | ||
| A security flaw has been discovered in yungifez Skuul School Management System up to 2.6.5. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /dashboard/fees/fee-invoices/ of the component View Fee Invoice. Performing manipulation of the argument invoice_id results in improper control of resource identifiers. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is regarded as difficult. The exploit has been released to the public and may be exploited. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. | ||||
| CVE-2025-39688 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-06 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: allow SC_STATUS_FREEABLE when searching via nfs4_lookup_stateid() The pynfs DELEG8 test fails when run against nfsd. It acquires a delegation and then lets the lease time out. It then tries to use the deleg stateid and expects to see NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED, but it gets bad NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID instead. When a delegation is revoked, it's initially marked with SC_STATUS_REVOKED, or SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED and later, it's marked with the SC_STATUS_FREEABLE flag, which denotes that it is waiting for s FREE_STATEID call. nfs4_lookup_stateid() accepts a statusmask that includes the status flags that a found stateid is allowed to have. Currently, that mask never includes SC_STATUS_FREEABLE, which means that revoked delegations are (almost) never found. Add SC_STATUS_FREEABLE to the always-allowed status flags, and remove it from nfsd4_delegreturn() since it's now always implied. | ||||
| CVE-2025-39989 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-06 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mce: use is_copy_from_user() to determine copy-from-user context Patch series "mm/hwpoison: Fix regressions in memory failure handling", v4. ## 1. What am I trying to do: This patchset resolves two critical regressions related to memory failure handling that have appeared in the upstream kernel since version 5.17, as compared to 5.10 LTS. - copyin case: poison found in user page while kernel copying from user space - instr case: poison found while instruction fetching in user space ## 2. What is the expected outcome and why - For copyin case: Kernel can recover from poison found where kernel is doing get_user() or copy_from_user() if those places get an error return and the kernel return -EFAULT to the process instead of crashing. More specifily, MCE handler checks the fixup handler type to decide whether an in kernel #MC can be recovered. When EX_TYPE_UACCESS is found, the PC jumps to recovery code specified in _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT() and return a -EFAULT to user space. - For instr case: If a poison found while instruction fetching in user space, full recovery is possible. User process takes #PF, Linux allocates a new page and fills by reading from storage. ## 3. What actually happens and why - For copyin case: kernel panic since v5.17 Commit 4c132d1d844a ("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage") introduced a new extable fixup type, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, and later patches updated the extable fixup type for copy-from-user operations, changing it from EX_TYPE_UACCESS to EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG. It breaks previous EX_TYPE_UACCESS handling when posion found in get_user() or copy_from_user(). - For instr case: user process is killed by a SIGBUS signal due to #CMCI and #MCE race When an uncorrected memory error is consumed there is a race between the CMCI from the memory controller reporting an uncorrected error with a UCNA signature, and the core reporting and SRAR signature machine check when the data is about to be consumed. ### Background: why *UN*corrected errors tied to *C*MCI in Intel platform [1] Prior to Icelake memory controllers reported patrol scrub events that detected a previously unseen uncorrected error in memory by signaling a broadcast machine check with an SRAO (Software Recoverable Action Optional) signature in the machine check bank. This was overkill because it's not an urgent problem that no core is on the verge of consuming that bad data. It's also found that multi SRAO UCE may cause nested MCE interrupts and finally become an IERR. Hence, Intel downgrades the machine check bank signature of patrol scrub from SRAO to UCNA (Uncorrected, No Action required), and signal changed to #CMCI. Just to add to the confusion, Linux does take an action (in uc_decode_notifier()) to try to offline the page despite the UC*NA* signature name. ### Background: why #CMCI and #MCE race when poison is consuming in Intel platform [1] Having decided that CMCI/UCNA is the best action for patrol scrub errors, the memory controller uses it for reads too. But the memory controller is executing asynchronously from the core, and can't tell the difference between a "real" read and a speculative read. So it will do CMCI/UCNA if an error is found in any read. Thus: 1) Core is clever and thinks address A is needed soon, issues a speculative read. 2) Core finds it is going to use address A soon after sending the read request 3) The CMCI from the memory controller is in a race with MCE from the core that will soon try to retire the load from address A. Quite often (because speculation has got better) the CMCI from the memory controller is delivered before the core is committed to the instruction reading address A, so the interrupt is taken, and Linux offlines the page (marking it as poison). ## Why user process is killed for instr case Commit 046545a661af ("mm/hwpoison: fix error page recovered but reported "not ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2025-23149 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-06 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm: do not start chip while suspended Checking TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED after the call to tpm_find_get_ops() can lead to a spurious tpm_chip_start() call: [35985.503771] i2c i2c-1: Transfer while suspended [35985.503796] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 74 at drivers/i2c/i2c-core.h:56 __i2c_transfer+0xbe/0x810 [35985.503802] Modules linked in: [35985.503808] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 74 Comm: hwrng Tainted: G W 6.13.0-next-20250203-00005-gfa0cb5642941 #19 9c3d7f78192f2d38e32010ac9c90fdc71109ef6f [35985.503814] Tainted: [W]=WARN [35985.503817] Hardware name: Google Morphius/Morphius, BIOS Google_Morphius.13434.858.0 10/26/2023 [35985.503819] RIP: 0010:__i2c_transfer+0xbe/0x810 [35985.503825] Code: 30 01 00 00 4c 89 f7 e8 40 fe d8 ff 48 8b 93 80 01 00 00 48 85 d2 75 03 49 8b 16 48 c7 c7 0a fb 7c a7 48 89 c6 e8 32 ad b0 fe <0f> 0b b8 94 ff ff ff e9 33 04 00 00 be 02 00 00 00 83 fd 02 0f 5 [35985.503828] RSP: 0018:ffffa106c0333d30 EFLAGS: 00010246 [35985.503833] RAX: 074ba64aa20f7000 RBX: ffff8aa4c1167120 RCX: 0000000000000000 [35985.503836] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa77ab0e4 RDI: 0000000000000001 [35985.503838] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [35985.503841] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 00000001000313d5 R12: ffff8aa4c10f1820 [35985.503843] R13: ffff8aa4c0e243c0 R14: ffff8aa4c1167250 R15: ffff8aa4c1167120 [35985.503846] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8aa4eae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [35985.503849] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [35985.503852] CR2: 00007fab0aaf1000 CR3: 0000000105328000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 [35985.503855] Call Trace: [35985.503859] <TASK> [35985.503863] ? __warn+0xd4/0x260 [35985.503868] ? __i2c_transfer+0xbe/0x810 [35985.503874] ? report_bug+0xf3/0x210 [35985.503882] ? handle_bug+0x63/0xb0 [35985.503887] ? exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x50 [35985.503892] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [35985.503904] ? __i2c_transfer+0xbe/0x810 [35985.503913] tpm_cr50_i2c_transfer_message+0x24/0xf0 [35985.503920] tpm_cr50_i2c_read+0x8e/0x120 [35985.503928] tpm_cr50_request_locality+0x75/0x170 [35985.503935] tpm_chip_start+0x116/0x160 [35985.503942] tpm_try_get_ops+0x57/0x90 [35985.503948] tpm_find_get_ops+0x26/0xd0 [35985.503955] tpm_get_random+0x2d/0x80 Don't move forward with tpm_chip_start() inside tpm_try_get_ops(), unless TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED is not set. tpm_find_get_ops() will return NULL in such a failure case. | ||||
| CVE-2025-38089 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-04 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: handle SVC_GARBAGE during svc auth processing as auth error tianshuo han reported a remotely-triggerable crash if the client sends a kernel RPC server a specially crafted packet. If decoding the RPC reply fails in such a way that SVC_GARBAGE is returned without setting the rq_accept_statp pointer, then that pointer can be dereferenced and a value stored there. If it's the first time the thread has processed an RPC, then that pointer will be set to NULL and the kernel will crash. In other cases, it could create a memory scribble. The server sunrpc code treats a SVC_GARBAGE return from svc_authenticate or pg_authenticate as if it should send a GARBAGE_ARGS reply. RFC 5531 says that if authentication fails that the RPC should be rejected instead with a status of AUTH_ERR. Handle a SVC_GARBAGE return as an AUTH_ERROR, with a reason of AUTH_BADCRED instead of returning GARBAGE_ARGS in that case. This sidesteps the whole problem of touching the rpc_accept_statp pointer in this situation and avoids the crash. | ||||
| CVE-2024-36357 | 2025-11-04 | 5.6 Medium | ||
| A transient execution vulnerability in some AMD processors may allow an attacker to infer data in the L1D cache, potentially resulting in the leakage of sensitive information across privileged boundaries. | ||||
| CVE-2024-36350 | 2025-11-04 | 5.6 Medium | ||
| A transient execution vulnerability in some AMD processors may allow an attacker to infer data from previous stores, potentially resulting in the leakage of privileged information. | ||||
| CVE-2025-21988 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/netfs/read_collect: add to next->prev_donated If multiple subrequests donate data to the same "next" request (depending on the subrequest completion order), each of them would overwrite the `prev_donated` field, causing data corruption and a BUG() crash ("Can't donate prior to front"). | ||||
| CVE-2024-38637 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: greybus: lights: check return of get_channel_from_mode If channel for the given node is not found we return null from get_channel_from_mode. Make sure we validate the return pointer before using it in two of the missing places. This was originally reported in [0]: Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] | ||||
| CVE-2024-38618 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-11-04 | 5.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: timer: Set lower bound of start tick time Currently ALSA timer doesn't have the lower limit of the start tick time, and it allows a very small size, e.g. 1 tick with 1ns resolution for hrtimer. Such a situation may lead to an unexpected RCU stall, where the callback repeatedly queuing the expire update, as reported by fuzzer. This patch introduces a sanity check of the timer start tick time, so that the system returns an error when a too small start size is set. As of this patch, the lower limit is hard-coded to 100us, which is small enough but can still work somehow. | ||||
| CVE-2024-38579 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-11-04 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: bcm - Fix pointer arithmetic In spu2_dump_omd() value of ptr is increased by ciph_key_len instead of hash_iv_len which could lead to going beyond the buffer boundaries. Fix this bug by changing ciph_key_len to hash_iv_len. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. | ||||
| CVE-2024-38565 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-04 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ar5523: enable proper endpoint verification Syzkaller reports [1] hitting a warning about an endpoint in use not having an expected type to it. Fix the issue by checking for the existence of all proper endpoints with their according types intact. Sadly, this patch has not been tested on real hardware. [1] Syzkaller report: ------------[ cut here ]------------ usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3643 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 usb_submit_urb+0xed6/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ar5523_cmd+0x41b/0x780 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c:275 ar5523_cmd_read drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c:302 [inline] ar5523_host_available drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c:1376 [inline] ar5523_probe+0x14b0/0x1d10 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c:1655 usb_probe_interface+0x30f/0x7f0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:560 [inline] really_probe+0x249/0xb90 drivers/base/dd.c:639 __driver_probe_device+0x1df/0x4d0 drivers/base/dd.c:778 driver_probe_device+0x4c/0x1a0 drivers/base/dd.c:808 __device_attach_driver+0x1d4/0x2e0 drivers/base/dd.c:936 bus_for_each_drv+0x163/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:427 __device_attach+0x1e4/0x530 drivers/base/dd.c:1008 bus_probe_device+0x1e8/0x2a0 drivers/base/bus.c:487 device_add+0xbd9/0x1e90 drivers/base/core.c:3517 usb_set_configuration+0x101d/0x1900 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170 usb_generic_driver_probe+0xbe/0x100 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238 usb_probe_device+0xd8/0x2c0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:560 [inline] really_probe+0x249/0xb90 drivers/base/dd.c:639 __driver_probe_device+0x1df/0x4d0 drivers/base/dd.c:778 driver_probe_device+0x4c/0x1a0 drivers/base/dd.c:808 __device_attach_driver+0x1d4/0x2e0 drivers/base/dd.c:936 bus_for_each_drv+0x163/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:427 __device_attach+0x1e4/0x530 drivers/base/dd.c:1008 bus_probe_device+0x1e8/0x2a0 drivers/base/bus.c:487 device_add+0xbd9/0x1e90 drivers/base/core.c:3517 usb_new_device.cold+0x685/0x10ad drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2573 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5353 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5497 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5653 [inline] hub_event+0x26cb/0x45d0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5735 process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x669/0x1090 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e8/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306 </TASK> | ||||
| CVE-2024-38381 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-04 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_rx_work syzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1] nci_rx_work() parses received packet from ndev->rx_q. It should be validated header size, payload size and total packet size before processing the packet. If an invalid packet is detected, it should be silently discarded. | ||||
| CVE-2024-53138 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: kTLS, Fix incorrect page refcounting The kTLS tx handling code is using a mix of get_page() and page_ref_inc() APIs to increment the page reference. But on the release path (mlx5e_ktls_tx_handle_resync_dump_comp()), only put_page() is used. This is an issue when using pages from large folios: the get_page() references are stored on the folio page while the page_ref_inc() references are stored directly in the given page. On release the folio page will be dereferenced too many times. This was found while doing kTLS testing with sendfile() + ZC when the served file was read from NFS on a kernel with NFS large folios support (commit 49b29a573da8 ("nfs: add support for large folios")). | ||||
| CVE-2024-53135 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Bury Intel PT virtualization (guest/host mode) behind CONFIG_BROKEN Hide KVM's pt_mode module param behind CONFIG_BROKEN, i.e. disable support for virtualizing Intel PT via guest/host mode unless BROKEN=y. There are myriad bugs in the implementation, some of which are fatal to the guest, and others which put the stability and health of the host at risk. For guest fatalities, the most glaring issue is that KVM fails to ensure tracing is disabled, and *stays* disabled prior to VM-Enter, which is necessary as hardware disallows loading (the guest's) RTIT_CTL if tracing is enabled (enforced via a VMX consistency check). Per the SDM: If the logical processor is operating with Intel PT enabled (if IA32_RTIT_CTL.TraceEn = 1) at the time of VM entry, the "load IA32_RTIT_CTL" VM-entry control must be 0. On the host side, KVM doesn't validate the guest CPUID configuration provided by userspace, and even worse, uses the guest configuration to decide what MSRs to save/load at VM-Enter and VM-Exit. E.g. configuring guest CPUID to enumerate more address ranges than are supported in hardware will result in KVM trying to passthrough, save, and load non-existent MSRs, which generates a variety of WARNs, ToPA ERRORs in the host, a potential deadlock, etc. | ||||
| CVE-2024-53096 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-11-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour The mmap_region() function is somewhat terrifying, with spaghetti-like control flow and numerous means by which issues can arise and incomplete state, memory leaks and other unpleasantness can occur. A large amount of the complexity arises from trying to handle errors late in the process of mapping a VMA, which forms the basis of recently observed issues with resource leaks and observable inconsistent state. Taking advantage of previous patches in this series we move a number of checks earlier in the code, simplifying things by moving the core of the logic into a static internal function __mmap_region(). Doing this allows us to perform a number of checks up front before we do any real work, and allows us to unwind the writable unmap check unconditionally as required and to perform a CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_MAPLE_TREE validation unconditionally also. We move a number of things here: 1. We preallocate memory for the iterator before we call the file-backed memory hook, allowing us to exit early and avoid having to perform complicated and error-prone close/free logic. We carefully free iterator state on both success and error paths. 2. The enclosing mmap_region() function handles the mapping_map_writable() logic early. Previously the logic had the mapping_map_writable() at the point of mapping a newly allocated file-backed VMA, and a matching mapping_unmap_writable() on success and error paths. We now do this unconditionally if this is a file-backed, shared writable mapping. If a driver changes the flags to eliminate VM_MAYWRITE, however doing so does not invalidate the seal check we just performed, and we in any case always decrement the counter in the wrapper. We perform a debug assert to ensure a driver does not attempt to do the opposite. 3. We also move arch_validate_flags() up into the mmap_region() function. This is only relevant on arm64 and sparc64, and the check is only meaningful for SPARC with ADI enabled. We explicitly add a warning for this arch if a driver invalidates this check, though the code ought eventually to be fixed to eliminate the need for this. With all of these measures in place, we no longer need to explicitly close the VMA on error paths, as we place all checks which might fail prior to a call to any driver mmap hook. This eliminates an entire class of errors, makes the code easier to reason about and more robust. | ||||
| CVE-2024-50242 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2025-11-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: Additional check in ntfs_file_release | ||||
| CVE-2024-50201 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-11-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/radeon: Fix encoder->possible_clones Include the encoder itself in its possible_clones bitmask. In the past nothing validated that drivers were populating possible_clones correctly, but that changed in commit 74d2aacbe840 ("drm: Validate encoder->possible_clones"). Looks like radeon never got the memo and is still not following the rules 100% correctly. This results in some warnings during driver initialization: Bogus possible_clones: [ENCODER:46:TV-46] possible_clones=0x4 (full encoder mask=0x7) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 170 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c:615 drm_mode_config_validate+0x113/0x39c ... (cherry picked from commit 3b6e7d40649c0d75572039aff9d0911864c689db) | ||||
| CVE-2024-50200 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2025-11-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: maple_tree: correct tree corruption on spanning store Patch series "maple_tree: correct tree corruption on spanning store", v3. There has been a nasty yet subtle maple tree corruption bug that appears to have been in existence since the inception of the algorithm. This bug seems far more likely to happen since commit f8d112a4e657 ("mm/mmap: avoid zeroing vma tree in mmap_region()"), which is the point at which reports started to be submitted concerning this bug. We were made definitely aware of the bug thanks to the kind efforts of Bert Karwatzki who helped enormously in my being able to track this down and identify the cause of it. The bug arises when an attempt is made to perform a spanning store across two leaf nodes, where the right leaf node is the rightmost child of the shared parent, AND the store completely consumes the right-mode node. This results in mas_wr_spanning_store() mitakenly duplicating the new and existing entries at the maximum pivot within the range, and thus maple tree corruption. The fix patch corrects this by detecting this scenario and disallowing the mistaken duplicate copy. The fix patch commit message goes into great detail as to how this occurs. This series also includes a test which reliably reproduces the issue, and asserts that the fix works correctly. Bert has kindly tested the fix and confirmed it resolved his issues. Also Mikhail Gavrilov kindly reported what appears to be precisely the same bug, which this fix should also resolve. This patch (of 2): There has been a subtle bug present in the maple tree implementation from its inception. This arises from how stores are performed - when a store occurs, it will overwrite overlapping ranges and adjust the tree as necessary to accommodate this. A range may always ultimately span two leaf nodes. In this instance we walk the two leaf nodes, determine which elements are not overwritten to the left and to the right of the start and end of the ranges respectively and then rebalance the tree to contain these entries and the newly inserted one. This kind of store is dubbed a 'spanning store' and is implemented by mas_wr_spanning_store(). In order to reach this stage, mas_store_gfp() invokes mas_wr_preallocate(), mas_wr_store_type() and mas_wr_walk() in turn to walk the tree and update the object (mas) to traverse to the location where the write should be performed, determining its store type. When a spanning store is required, this function returns false stopping at the parent node which contains the target range, and mas_wr_store_type() marks the mas->store_type as wr_spanning_store to denote this fact. When we go to perform the store in mas_wr_spanning_store(), we first determine the elements AFTER the END of the range we wish to store (that is, to the right of the entry to be inserted) - we do this by walking to the NEXT pivot in the tree (i.e. r_mas.last + 1), starting at the node we have just determined contains the range over which we intend to write. We then turn our attention to the entries to the left of the entry we are inserting, whose state is represented by l_mas, and copy these into a 'big node', which is a special node which contains enough slots to contain two leaf node's worth of data. We then copy the entry we wish to store immediately after this - the copy and the insertion of the new entry is performed by mas_store_b_node(). After this we copy the elements to the right of the end of the range which we are inserting, if we have not exceeded the length of the node (i.e. r_mas.offset <= r_mas.end). Herein lies the bug - under very specific circumstances, this logic can break and corrupt the maple tree. Consider the following tree: Height 0 Root Node / \ pivot = 0xffff / \ pivot = ULONG_MAX / ---truncated--- | ||||