| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| compose-lint is a Docker Compose security linter that identifies dangerous misconfigurations before deployment. From version 0.30.0 until 0.32.0, the compose-lint GitHub Action prints the resolved directory from a failed sarif-file subdirectory creation without effective command suppression. Version 0.30.0 has no stop-commands window, while version 0.31.0 prints this error outside its stop-commands window. A pull request can place a committed symlink on that path to a directory whose name contains a newline followed by a workflow command, causing the SARIF-directory error to issue commands in the job log. Only the Action with sarif-file pointing into a subdirectory is affected; a workspace-root SARIF file, the compose-lint package, the pre-commit hook, and the Docker image do not expose this message. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0. |
| compose-lint is a Docker Compose security linter that identifies dangerous misconfigurations before deployment. In version 0.31.0, compose-lint does not neutralize the Azure Pipelines ##vso[ logging-command opener on any output path. A pull request can place that opener in a Compose value or file name, allowing output from the package, pre-commit hook, or Docker image to issue logging commands when printed to an Azure Pipelines job log. The maintainer did not reproduce the behavior on an Azure Pipelines agent. The GitHub Action is not affected because it runs only on GitHub Actions, and releases before 0.31.0 are outside this advisory because they did not claim Azure Pipelines coverage. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0. |
| compose-lint is a Docker Compose security linter that identifies dangerous misconfigurations before deployment. In version 0.31.0, compose-lint's argument parser writes rejected repository paths to stderr without the output sanitizer when a path is passed without a preceding -- separator. A pull request can supply a path containing workflow-command syntax; a carriage return can position that command at the start of a new line recognized by the GitHub Actions runner, allowing the package, Docker image, or a pre-commit hook with misconfigured args to issue the command in the job log. The default pre-commit configuration includes -- and is not affected, the GitHub Action is not affected, and the lint pass or fail result is unchanged. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0. |
| compose-lint is a Docker Compose security linter that identifies dangerous misconfigurations before deployment. In version 0.31.0, compose-lint does not sanitize the ##[ workflow-command opener inside strings written by --format json or --format sarif to stdout. A pull request can place that opener in a service name or other Compose value, and the GitHub Actions runner recognizes it even in the middle of a serialized line when the package, pre-commit hook, or Docker image prints JSON or SARIF to the job log. Writing the output to a file and using the compose-lint GitHub Action are not affected, and the flaw does not change the lint pass or fail result. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0. |
| compose-lint is a Docker Compose security linter that identifies dangerous misconfigurations before deployment. In version 0.31.0, compose-lint escapes GitHub Actions workflow-command openers only after ASCII spaces and tabs, while the runner strips all leading Unicode whitespace before interpreting a line. Untrusted Compose values or repository paths beginning with Unicode whitespace followed by :: can therefore reach the text report, fix guidance, the fix dry-run diff, and stderr diagnostics as workflow commands when the package, pre-commit hook, or Docker image runs directly in CI. The GitHub Action is not affected because it disables command processing, and the flaw does not change the lint pass or fail result. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0. |
| http.cookies.Morsel.js_output() returns an inline <script> snippet and only escapes " for JavaScript string context. It does not neutralize the HTML parser-sensitive sequence </script> inside the generated script element. Mitigation base64-encodes the cookie value to disallow escaping using cookie value. |
| compose-lint is a Docker Compose security linter that identifies dangerous misconfigurations before deployment. Prior to 0.31.0, compose-lint prints attacker-controlled service names, environment keys, file lines, and other Compose text without neutralizing GitHub Actions and Azure Pipelines workflow-command openers. When a workflow processes a pull request, legacy ##[ commands or a line-leading double-colon command can create false annotations, hide log regions, mask selected strings, or invoke other commands recognized by the runner. The affected text report paths do not alter the compose-lint exit code or pass or fail result, but they can misrepresent the CI output presented to reviewers. This issue is fixed in version 0.31.0. |
| A vulnerability was identified in nushell up to 0.116.1. Impacted is the function escape_bytes of the file crates/nu-json/src/ser.rs of the component Data Conversion Handler. The manipulation leads to improper neutralization of escape, meta, or control sequences. The attack must be carried out locally. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance. |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 command execution was possible via control characters in terminal command completion |
| Canop dysk before 3.8.2 contains a terminal escape sequence injection vulnerability that allows local users to inject control sequences by crafting mount metadata rendered unsanitized in table and CSV output. Attackers can create FUSE mounts with ESC/OSC sequences in mount-point names or fsname, causing spoofed or hidden output and window-title changes when another user runs dysk. |
| Ember is a real-time terminal dashboard for Caddy servers with FrankenPHP support. Prior to 1.4.2, interactive TUI row formatters pass Caddy access-log fields, particularly the request URI, through the `fitCellLeft` render helper without neutralizing terminal escape or control sequences. An unauthenticated remote client can place ANSI, OSC, or CSI control bytes in an ordinary HTTP request target. Caddy JSON-escapes those bytes, `ParseLogLine` decodes them back into raw controls, and the formatters concatenate them into `View()` output reaching `os.Stdout`. When the operator views the default `Logs` tab, the terminal interprets these sequences, allowing monitoring-dashboard spoofing, clipboard hijacking through `OSC 52`, and window-title spoofing through `OSC 0/2`. This works even with a loopback-only log listener because the input arrives through normal Caddy access logs. `Certificates` and `Routes` share secondary unneutralized render sinks. The `--json`, `--once`, and daemon `--expose` modes are unaffected because they do not render an interactive terminal. Consequences depend on the terminal emulator and usually require further operator action to escalate; this is not general-purpose remote code execution. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.2. |
| OpenPrinting CUPS is an open source printing system for Linux and other Unix-like operating systems. Prior to 2.4.20, the cupsdCreateJob option-string builder in scheduler/job.c maps attacker-controlled destination-uri and pre-dial-string values from a configured fax queue to the phone and faxPrefix options. Unlike ordinary IPP job attributes, these mapped fax values bypass the control-character sanitizer and are copied directly into the filter options argument. A user permitted to submit a job can therefore inject control characters into the downstream option stream. The reporter states that a downstream fax filter passing these values to a shell or modem command could execute code as lp, while the maintainer states that CUPS has no confidentiality or integrity impact because the only known code-executing filter is optional Foomatic and addressed separately, leaving possible disruption of the affected queue. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.20. |
| Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences vulnerability in hexpm hex allows a malicious package publisher or a hostile repository server to inject terminal control sequences into the output of Mix tasks.
Hex prints strings supplied by the package repository and the documentation search service straight to the terminal through Hex.Shell.info/1 and Hex.Shell.error/1, neutralizing no control characters. Affected sinks span package metadata and configuration snippets in mix hex.info, search results in mix hex.package search and mix hex.search, owner and organization listings, publish and sponsor URLs, the authenticated username in mix hex.user, policy identities in mix hex.policy, and API error bodies rendered by Hex.Utils.print_error_result/1. A malicious package can embed ANSI escape sequences (cursor movement, line erase, carriage returns, OSC 52 clipboard writes) or Unicode bidirectional overrides in any of those fields, so the bytes reach the terminal unchanged, forging displayed URLs, package descriptions and suggested commands, concealing real output, or writing to the clipboard. No authentication or privileged position is required; only publishing a package.
This issue affects hex: from 0.0.1 before 2.5.2. |
| openapi-python-client generates Python clients from OpenAPI documents. Prior to 0.29.1, the generator does not safely neutralize malicious OpenAPI document content before rendering string, docstring, and f-string contexts in generated Python. The generated Python client can contain attacker-controlled Python that executes when a user imports the client, affecting the importing environment's integrity and potentially its confidentiality and availability. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.1. |
| In Sapling SCM prior to v0.2.20260929-102736, control characters were allowed to be embedded in Git subtree URLs. A maliciously constructed repository, if cloned by a target, could trigger code execution on otherwise read-only actions such as sl log/blame/annotate. |
| colmux in collectl before 4.3.20.2 does not sanitize ANSI/VT100 terminal escape sequences in data received from remote collectl instances before displaying it, allowing a local user on a monitored host to inject escape sequences into the terminal of an operator running colmux, via a crafted process name (argv[0]). |
| Flysystem is an open source file storage library for PHP. Prior to 3.35.3, the default WhitespacePathNormalizer in src/WhitespacePathNormalizer.php used by Filesystem across adapters calls preg_match with the u modifier and treats both false and 0 as falsy. A path containing malformed UTF-8 causes PCRE to return false, so paths that also contain control characters bypass CorruptedPathDetected::forPath() in normalizePath(). Filesystem::write() can store such names and Filesystem::listContents() can return the raw ANSI escape sequences, allowing hidden or spoofed terminal file listings when an administrator displays them. This issue is fixed in version 3.35.3. |
| onefetch through 2.28.1 writes repository information field values to the terminal without removing control characters, allowing terminal escape sequence injection. Attackers can embed ANSI/OSC escape sequences in project manifest version and name fields to manipulate terminal output, rewrite window titles, hide text, or trigger emulator-specific behavior when victims run onefetch. |
| spaceship-prompt through 4.22.5 fails to sanitize control characters from project manifest version fields before rendering them in the zsh prompt. Attackers can embed ANSI/OSC escape sequences in version fields of package manifests to manipulate terminal output, rewrite window titles, or spoof displayed text when victims enter the directory. |
| broot renders each file and directory name in its interactive tree view exactly as read from the filesystem. Names are converted with a plain to_string_lossy() call in src/tree_build/builder.rs and in TreeLine::unprune in src/tree/tree_line.rs, and no control-character filtering exists anywhere in the code, even though the doc comment on the TreeLine name field states that some characters may have been stripped. Any local user who can create a file can therefore place an escape sequence in its name and have it written unmodified to the terminal of anyone who browses that directory, between broot's own styling codes. A reported proof of concept used an OSC 52 clipboard-write sequence and captured the raw bytes broot wrote to its pty, confirming the sequence reaches the terminal unstripped. What an injected OSC or CSI sequence can then do depends on the terminal emulator in use. Browsing a directory is broot's primary function and carries no expectation that the content is trusted. |
