| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, and 1.6.1, the BACnet/SC message decoder walks the header-option list by following each option's MORE bit. Nothing rejects a list whose last option still has the MORE bit set, and the decode walk has no upper bound on how many options it processes. A single crafted BVLC-SC frame makes the walk advance one option past the end of the message and read message[message_len], one byte out of bounds. When the bytes after the message carry more MORE-set option markers, the walk keeps going: it runs past the fixed 4-entry option array and writes decoded option fields out of bounds. On the server that decode array is the static global bsc_dm, so the out-of-bounds write lands in adjacent BSS. Both faults are reachable before authentication, from the first frame a peer sends on a BACnet/SC connection, and the bytes that follow the message are the same peer's prior-frame data. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, and 1.6.1, bws_cli_connect() in ports/linux/websocket-cli.c loads the trusted CA cert into the libwebsockets context, then always sets LCCSCF_ALLOW_SELFSIGNED in the connection flags. So lws accepts any self-signed hub certificate, whether or not it chains to the loaded CA. A BACnet/SC node finishes the TLS handshake to a rogue hub that presents a self-signed cert. It then hands the attacker its identity (VMAC, UUID) and all later BACnet traffic. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, and 1.6.1, the BACnet/SC hub's Linux WebSocket server reassembles fragmented WebSocket messages into a per-connection fragment_buffer. It grows that buffer with realloc() on every non-final frame, with no upper bound. A peer that streams binary continuation fragments and never sets FIN keeps the hub reallocating until the box runs out of memory or the process is OOM-killed. The buffer starts at the maximum legal BVLC-SC NPDU size, but nothing after that ties its growth back to that limit. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. From versions 1.4.0 to before 1.4.6, 1.5.0 to before 1.5.1, and 1.6.0 to before 1.6.1, the BACnet MS/TP receive path decodes COBS frames into an output pointer inside the same fixed input buffer, but passes the full input-buffer size as the decode capacity. A long valid COBS payload can therefore write past the end of the actual remaining buffer. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.1, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to version 1.5.1, the BACnet FILE object implementation allows remote WriteProperty(PROP_FILE_SIZE) requests to change the size of a stream-access FILE object without checking whether that FILE is marked Read_Only. When the FILE backend is RAMFS, enlarging the file only performs realloc() and updates the stored size; the newly exposed tail region is not initialized before later reads. As a result, a remote client can enlarge a read-only RAMFS-backed stream-access FILE and then immediately retrieve the newly exposed region with AtomicReadFile(stream-access). Depending on the allocator and build configuration, the returned data may contain sanitizer fill bytes, stale heap contents, or other unintended process memory. Shrinking the file through the same path can also remotely truncate content that was intended to be read-only. This issue has been patched in versions 1.5.1 and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to version 1.5.1, the RAMFS-backed FILE object implementation stores appended records as NUL-terminated strings, but its record-counting logic later walks the buffer as if an additional terminating empty record were present. As a result, two consecutive AtomicWriteFile(record-access) append requests can cause record_count() to call bacnet_strnlen() on a pointer that is already one byte past the end of the heap allocation. This issue has been patched in versions 1.5.1 and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to version 1.5.1, the RAMFS-backed FILE implementation accepts AtomicWriteFile(record-access) requests that replace existing records with caller-controlled content. If a client replaces a record with shorter data, the backend can shrink the heap allocation and then continue processing with a trailing-copy length derived from the old layout. During that replace path, the RAMFS backend computes the trailing-copy length from the old file layout, then shrinks the heap allocation, and finally uses the stale length in memmove(). As a result, the source range of that memmove() can extend beyond the end of the reallocated heap buffer, producing a heap out-of-bounds read. This issue has been patched in versions 1.5.1 and 1.6.0. |
| AutoMapper is a convention-based object-object mapper in .NET. Prior to 15.1.4 and from 16.0.0 until 16.3.0, AutoMapper increments type depth only after creating the destination, so recursive mapping performed through constructor parameters occurs before MaxDepth is counted. Destinations built through positional records or other constructors, and recursive ConstructUsing mappings that call context.Mapper, can therefore bypass explicit MaxDepth values and the default limit of 64. Deep attacker-influenced input can throw an uncatchable StackOverflowException and terminate the process. This issue is fixed in versions 15.1.4 and 16.3.0. |
| AutoMapper is a convention-based object-object mapper in .NET. Prior to 15.1.4 and from 16.0.0 until 16.3.0, AutoMapper can recurse without an effective MaxDepth limit when mapping polymorphic graphs through Include or IncludeBase, runtime-typed object or interface members, nested Dictionary<string, object> or ExpandoObject sources, or recursive ConvertUsing type converters. Deep attacker-influenced graphs on these paths can throw an uncatchable StackOverflowException and terminate the process. This issue is fixed in versions 15.1.4 and 16.3.0. |
| Audition is affected by a Violation of Secure Design Principles vulnerability that could result in privilege escalation. A low-privileged attacker could leverage this vulnerability to gain elevated access. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction. Scope is changed. |
| Audition is affected by an out-of-bounds write vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| Audition is affected by an out-of-bounds write vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| A code injection vulnerability in promzard’s template-loading functionality allows an attacker who can control property names in the context object (ctx) to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the Node.js process. The library inserts context property names into a generated function’s parameter list without validation or escaping and evaluates the resulting source using `vm.runInThisContext()`. A crafted property name can escape the parameter list and inject JavaScript code, even when the template file is fully trusted. |
| The
third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect uses a static API
secret by default. The value can be changed by an administrator; however,
environments retaining the default value may allow unauthorized access to
extension API functionality, including the ability to send commands to managed
agents. This issue is specific to the third-party extension and does not affect
the ScreenConnect server or client.
Scope: This issue affects the third-party RMM+
extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect. Deployments without the extension are
not affected. ScreenConnect server or client software are not impacted. |
| OpenEMR 5.0.2 before 8.5.0 contains a missing authentication vulnerability in mfa_registrations.php and mfa_u2f.php that allows session hijackers to delete MFA factors or register U2F keys without password re-entry. Attackers holding a victim's authenticated session can remove all second factors or add their own U2F key, bypassing MFA at later logins with the password. |
| OpenEMR before 8.5.0 contains a stored SQL injection vulnerability in which History layout field identifiers saved through edit_layout.php, including HIS fields and LBF source-H fields, are placed unvalidated into an INSERT statement for patients without a history_data row. Users with admin/super and patients/med write access can trigger history_save.php or LBF saves to execute SQL functions like SLEEP, tying up database workers or accessing data beyond their privileges. |
| OpenEMR before 8.5.0 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in library/ajax/lists_touch.php that allows restricted authenticated users to mark another patient's clinical lists as reviewed. Attackers can submit arbitrary patient_id and type values to falsely record "None known" allergy, medication, or problem lists, misleading clinicians and skewing quality-measure calculations. |
| OpenEMR before 8.5.0 contains an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability that allows authenticated users with patients/med access to exhaust PHP workers via an unbounded count parameter. Attackers can send print_labels requests to labs_ajax.php with huge counts, forcing mPDF page and barcode generation that makes OpenEMR unavailable. |
| Dockhand before 1.0.55 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated users with stacks:edit to bypass the file-browser path guard by combining symlinks with '..' sequences. Attackers can read /proc/self/environ, the SQLite database, and the encryption key via /api/system/files/content, or move them using the stack relocate endpoint, exposing stored credentials. |
| A flaw was found in Grafana. The Recorded Queries remote-write target creation endpoint validates target connections using elevated credentials before verifying whether the caller has permission to access the underlying data source. An authenticated attacker with organization editor privileges can exploit this flaw to send authenticated HTTP requests to arbitrary paths on a connected data source host and infer sensitive information from upstream responses. |
