| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Buffer over-read in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Buffer over-read in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| In Eclipse Ankaios versions 0.1.0 through 1.0.1, the agent does not limit the length declared by a workload in a length-delimited protobuf message received through the Control Interface FIFO. A workload granted Control Interface access can specify an excessive message length, causing an unbounded memory allocation that may abort the Ankaios agent process. This results in loss of orchestration services for workloads managed by the affected agent. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Word allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| SAP UI5 does not sufficiently validate the parent frame's origin against the configured allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker could host a malicious page to bypass framing restrictions. If an authenticated victim visits the attacker's page and interacts with it, the attacker could trick the victim into performing unintended actions, resulting in a low impact on integrity. There is no impact on confidentiality and availability. |
| Out-of-bounds read in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| A vulnerability was determined in Cesanta mJS up to 1.26. Affected is the function skip_spaces_and_comments of the file src/mjs_tok.c. Executing a manipulation can lead to heap-based buffer overflow. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Visual Studio allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Visual Studio allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to corrupt memory due to an integer underflow. |
| AshLua exposes Ash read actions to Lua scripts run through an eval action. A read call accepts an operation (list, min, max, first, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A script could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate instead of as a field. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The prior hardening only enforced the exposed-field allow-list (field visibility), which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_lua: from 0.1.0 before 0.2.2. |
| AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3. |
| libpcap BPF interpreter detects neither reaching the end of the filter program buffer due to lack of a return instruction nor executing a jump instruction with an offset that translates to a pointer outside of the buffer. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading the OS process memory in the 32GiB around the buffer on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures. |
| In BPF instructions that load/store a value from/to a scratch memory register the register index is an unsigned 32-bit integer and must not exceed 15, but libpcap BPF interpreter does not validate the value. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading and writing the OS process memory in the 16GiB starting at the current stack frame on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures. |
| The rpcap client code that processes a RPCAP_MSG_PACKET message received from the server incorrectly validates its headers. A malicious server can send a crafted message and cause the client to treat up to 20 bytes of the client process memory beyond the end of the buffer as if it was a part of the captured packet. |
| Net::IP::LPM versions before 1.12 for Perl accept malformed prefix lengths.
Non-numeric and non-ASCII prefix lengths are accepted and treated as 0. Integers over 31 bits are silently truncated. A single malformed mask will poison the lookup table.
The result is that the lookup will silently succeed for every address. An allow-list will allow every address, and a deny-list will block every address. |
