| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 contains a brute-force vulnerability in the two-factor authentication step where the failure counter is session-scoped and reset on each successful password re-authentication. Attackers with a valid password can bypass the five-attempt limit by obtaining a fresh session cookie and repeatedly re-authenticating to reset the counter, enabling unbounded TOTP code guessing. |
| Plainpad through 1.1.1, fixed in commit d3823fc, contains a missing rate limiting vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to send unbounded login requests to the POST /v1/sessions endpoint due to dead code in App\Http\Kernel.php that is never instantiated under the Laravel 11+ skeleton, leaving the API throttle configuration unattached to any route. Attackers can exploit this by sending unlimited credential attempts with no lockout or CAPTCHA enforcement, and additionally trigger CPU exhaustion by forcing repeated bcrypt comparisons on each request. |
| SiYuan before 3.7.4 contains an improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts vulnerability in the authFilePublishAccess endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to brute-force per-notebook publish passwords. Attackers can submit unbounded password guesses without rate limiting or CAPTCHA to gain access to password-protected published notebooks. |
| SiYuan kernel versions before 3.7.4 contain an improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts vulnerability in the CheckAuth() middleware. The middleware accepts the API token (Conf.Api.Token) via an Authorization header (Token/Bearer) or a ?token= query parameter, and neither path is protected by the application's CAPTCHA/lockout mechanism (NeedCaptcha/WrongAuthCount). As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can perform unlimited automated guesses of the API token, particularly when a short or weak custom token has been configured, and upon success gains full RoleAdministrator access enabling arbitrary file operations and SQL queries. |
| UnixAuth lacks brute-force protection in Apache Ranger versions <= 2.8.0.
Note: UnixAuth is NOT a recommended option for production deployments.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.9.0, which fixes this issue. |
| SiYuan before v3.7.4 improperly restricts excessive authentication attempts in the CheckAuth() middleware. The HTTP Basic Authentication branch, which guards nearly the entire /api/* surface, accepts the workspace access code (Conf.AccessAuthCode) as the Basic Auth password but never consults the CAPTCHA/lockout gate or increments the failure counter used by the cookie/session login path. This allows unauthenticated remote attackers to brute-force the admin access code with unlimited automated requests and obtain full RoleAdministrator access to the kernel. A secondary weakness exists because the access code is compared using a non-constant-time string comparison. |
| A vulnerability was detected in opensourcepos Open Source Point of Sale up to 3.4.2. This affects the function Login::index of the file app/Config/Filters.php of the component Login Endpoint. The manipulation results in improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts. The attack may be launched remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. It is indicated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit is now public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| HCL AION is affected by a vulnerability where certain endpoints lack sufficient anti-automation controls. Automated or scripted requests may be submitted without adequate rate limiting or challenge mechanisms, potentially resulting in unintended behavior or security impact under certain conditions. |
| The Mira cloud authentication endpoints do not enforce per-account rate limiting, per-IP throttling, or account lockout after repeated failed login attempts. An attacker can use brute-force methods to obtain gain access to user accounts. |
| Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Typemill's login endpoint (POST /tm/login, ControllerWebAuth::login) performs no rate-limiting, failed-attempt counting, or account lockout when captcha is disabled, which is the default configuration. An unauthenticated attacker can send unlimited password-guessing requests against any account, including administrators, with no throttling. |
| changedetection.io's /login route checks the submitted password against a single PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 hash with no per-IP or per-session rate limiting, failed-attempt counter, or lockout (no rate-limiting library is present in requirements.txt). |
| Nexxt Solutions Nebula 300+ firmware through version 12.01.01.37 does not implement rate limiting or account lockout mechanisms on authentication interfaces. An attacker can perform unlimited authentication attempts against endpoints that rely on credential validation, enabling brute-force attacks to guess administrative credentials without restriction. |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.4, the PIN-type challenge throttle uses `emailHash` as the only key. The throttle rows live in the central `challenge_throttle` table, which is shared across all tenants. Every tenant's `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/verify-challenge` endpoint increments the same row when a PIN response fails, and every tenant's `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/challenge` endpoint reads the same row when deciding whether to issue a new challenge. When the same `emailHash` exists in multiple tenants on the same OpenReception instance (the same patient holding tunnels in two different clinics that share the platform), an attacker who knows the patient's email can lock out that patient on tenant B by issuing failed challenge responses against tenant A. The attacker needs no relationship to tenant B; the lockout propagates through the shared throttle row. The lockout escalates with repeated failures. The first lockout triggers at 4 failed attempts and lasts approximately 60 seconds. Subsequent failures escalate the lockout duration to 5 minutes, 30 minutes, and 60 minutes per the throttle service's escalation logic. Repeated bursts produce sustained denial of service against the targeted email. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue. |
| The miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin before 6.2.8 does not correctly limit the number of second-factor verification attempts, tracking them against a client-supplied identifier that is reissued on every login, allowing an attacker who already knows a user's password to guess the one-time code without limit and take over the account. |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Versions prior to 1.0.2 don't throttle failed passphrase login attempts. An attacker can submit unlimited wrong passphrase guesses against any known email address, capped only by the Argon2 verification cost (about 100 milliseconds per attempt on the tested host, giving 10 attempts per second sustained). The same backend implements a working per-account throttle on the WebAuthn challenge endpoint, which returns HTTP 429 after roughly 19 attempts. The passphrase branch simply does not invoke that throttle, leaving a supported high-value login path unprotected against credential stuffing and dictionary attacks. The asymmetry confirms this is an oversight rather than a design choice. The throttle infrastructure exists, is wired into the same auth backend, and works on the WebAuthn path. The passphrase branch in `/api/auth/login` was not updated to record failed attempts. Combined with the application's minimum-passphrase policy (12 characters, no entropy or dictionary checks), accounts using common base patterns such as `Spring2026!XX` or words from a leak corpus are realistically reachable in days on a single CPU, hours on a small GPU farm. Version 1.0.2 patches the issue. |
| PaperCut NG/MF does not properly restrict excessive authentication attempts within its login component. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform unrestricted brute-force or credential-stuffing attacks without triggering account lockout or rate-limiting mechanisms in some configurations. |
| A race condition in the account lockout mechanism in Delphix Continous Data allowed the lockout threshold to be bypassed through concurrent authentication requests. Parallel login attempts were processed before the failed-login counter and lockout status were updated, defeating brute-force protections and enabling continued password guessing against a targeted account. |
| @fastify/rate-limit before 11.2.0 keys rate-limit buckets by the verbatim client IP string returned from request.ip. Because a single IPv6 client can control a large address range (a /64 holds 2^64 distinct addresses) and the same address has multiple valid textual representations, an IPv6 capable client can defeat the rate-limit boundary by rotating addresses or by rewriting the same address in different forms. Applications that use @fastify/rate-limit to protect endpoints such as authentication, password reset, OTP delivery, or expensive API calls can be bypassed by IPv6 clients behind a proxy that surfaces IPv6 to the origin when trustProxy is enabled. The issue is fixed in @fastify/rate-limit 11.2.0, where the default key generator normalizes IPv6 addresses to their canonical form, collapses IPv4 mapped IPv6 to IPv4, and applies a configurable prefix mask (default /64) via a new ipv6Subnet option. |
| InvoicePlane 1.5.11 doesn't have any rate-limiting for password reset and the reset token is generated using a weak mechanism that is predictable. |
