| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: avoid leaking refcount when cifs_sb_tlink() fails
cifs_oplock_break() takes over the reference that
cifs_queue_oplock_break() acquired when it queued the work, and drops it
with _cifsFileInfo_put() once the break has been processed.
Only in setups with "-o multiuser", cifs_sb_tlink() may fail, at which
point cifs_oplock_break() returns without putting the file reference,
mirroring the reference leak we already fixed in the companion patch to
cifs_queue_oplock_break().
This would trigger a crash due to busy inodes on the next unmount:
BUG: Dentry ... still in use (1) [unmount of cifs cifs]
VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of cifs (cifs)
Drop the reference on that path as well. Doing so before the out label
mirrors the normal path, which also puts the reference before
cifs_done_oplock_break().
Found by Sashiko code review. The failure path was not exercised at
runtime. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fail DACL rewrite when the new DACL exceeds 64K
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() and set_chmod_dacl() accumulate the size of
the DACL they build in a u16. That accumulator can wrap.
validate_dacl() caps num_aces at (dacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) /
20, i.e. 3276 for a maximally sized DACL, while each rewritten ACE can
grow to sizeof(struct smb_ace) (76 bytes) once its SID is replaced with
one carrying SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES sub-authorities. The worst case is
therefore sizeof(struct smb_acl) + 3276 * 76 = 248984 bytes, far beyond
what a u16 can hold. A wraparound is reached with 863 ACEs.
After the wraparound, ndacl_ptr->size becomes meaningless and the offset
will point anywhere in the ACE array. As a result, we will see
corruption of the DACL, which then gets sent to the server. This is not
an out-of-bounds write as the allocation now covers the worst-case
expansion, so writes will always go into the buffer.
Adjust the code to use a u32 internally and return -EOVERFLOW in the
overflow case. The operation must be refused, because a DACL can only
hold 2^16-1 bytes on the wire and larger DACLs cannot be represented.
set_chmod_dacl() carries the same pattern and is fixed the same way. It
only wraps once the source DACL comes within roughly 380 bytes of the
64K ceiling, but the failure mode is identical. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: kernel: drop pending ADD_ADDR when removing ID0
The in-kernel MPTCP path manager can leave a stale ADD_ADDR announcement
entry alive when removing the id 0 endpoint. This happens because the id 0
removal path does not tear down pending announcements, unlike the non-zero
id path.
When the PM later reselects id 0 after adding another signal endpoint, it
finds the stale anno_list entry and hits WARN_ON_ONCE(mptcp_pm_is_kernel())
in mptcp_pm_announced_alloc().
Root cause: asymmetry between removal paths.
- Non-zero id path: mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_signal_addr() calls
mptcp_pm_remove_announced() to clean up.
- Id 0 path: mptcp_nl_remove_id_zero_address() skips cleanup entirely.
Fix by making the id 0 path symmetric: call mptcp_pm_announced_remove()
and decrement add_addr_signaled before queuing the RM_ADDR.
Subtle detail: signal endpoints are stored in anno_list with port 0, but
msk_local carries the connection's local port. In other words, entries
linked to ID0 paths should have port == 0. A follow-up patch will ensure
that. mptcp_pm_announced_remove() uses use_port=true for comparison. So
clear the port before the lookup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Prevent queue stop with deferred completions
When the driver receives a burst of packets, it can mark a BD with the
NO_CMPL bit to defer completions. The expectation is that the last
packet in the ring will have this bit unset and the completion generated
by that packet will cleanup that packet and the ones preceding it. This
helps to reduce the number of completions fired.
The suppressed completions are controlled by the driver and the number
of packets with suppressed completions scales with the size of the ring.
SW USO packets, on the other hand, have an upper bound on the maximum
number of BDs which can be consumed which does not scale with the ring
size.
So, for small rings it is possible that: a burst of packets is handed to
the driver, the driver defers completions for all of the packets because
the number of free descriptors stays above the threshold in the driver.
Then, a USO packet arrives, but the number of BDs available is not
enough and the USO code exits early.
In this case, you end up in a state where the ring is full of packets
with their completions suppressed, which can cause the queue to stop and
never be restarted.
Assuming default CONFIG_MAX_SKB_FRAGS, this is only possible for small
rings (<= 457 descriptors, below the driver default value) when
a burst of packets fills the ring, followed by a large USO packet that
can't fit. For larger rings, the delta between the completion
suppression threshold and the BDs required for SW USO is large enough
that completions will fire and this case is unreachable.
This issue was pointed out by Sashiko and while it seems fairly unlikely
given that the queue size must be small to trigger this, it is indeed
possible.
Fix this by tracking the last BD which deferred completions and
centralizing the logic for deciding when to ring the doorbell. The NO_CMPL
bit is now cleared in bnxt_txr_db_kick(), so every doorbell site is
covered, including the SW USO early exit. This guarantees the ring always
ends in a BD which generates a completion to clean it and wake the queue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: v4l2-ctrls: validate HEVC tile counts
The stateless HEVC decoders read num_tile_columns_minus1 + 1 entries from
column_width_minus1[] and num_tile_rows_minus1 + 1 from row_height_minus1[]
and use them as tile-loop bounds, but std_validate_compound() does not
bound these u8 counts. Reject a V4L2_CTRL_TYPE_HEVC_PPS with tiling
enabled whose tile counts exceed the uAPI array capacity, mirroring the
existing compound-control range checks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Validate BSG request_len before reading vendor_cmd[]
The FC BSG transport allocates job->request via memdup_user() using the
exact user-supplied request_len. For FC_BSG_HST_VENDOR,
fc_bsg_host_dispatch() only guarantees request_len covers msgcode and
vendor_id; it does not account for the vendor_cmd[] flexible array.
qla2xxx then reads the command selector vendor_cmd[0] and, in several
sub-handlers, vendor_cmd[1]/[2] or structures overlaid on the vendor
command area without verifying request_len. A caller holding
CAP_SYS_RAWIO can submit a short request whose vendor_id matches the
host, triggering out-of-bounds heap reads (KASAN-detectable, and able to
mis-select a command or panic).
Add a central guard in qla2x00_process_vendor_specific() so the selector
is always in bounds, restrict the early vendor_cmd[0] read in
qla24xx_bsg_request() to sufficiently long vendor messages, and add
request_len checks to the sub-handlers that read further:
qla24xx_proc_fcp_prio_cfg_cmd(), qla2x00_process_loopback(),
qla84xx_reset(), qla84xx_updatefw(), qla2x00_read_optrom(),
qla2x00_update_optrom(), qlafx00_mgmt_cmd() and
qla28xx_validate_flash_image(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: accurately adjust free_sections during free_segment_range
In free_segment_range(), MAIN_SECS(sbi) is temporarily reduced by `secs`
to restrict block allocation to the safe remaining main area while valid
blocks in the truncated range are evacuated by GC.
However, FREE_I(sbi)->free_sections tracks the total number of free
sections across the whole filesystem. If any sections within the
truncated range were already free upon entering free_segment_range(),
failing to deduct them from free_sections causes the filesystem to
overestimate available free sections in the active, reduced main area.
This leads to inconsistent free section accounting during GC data
migration and can trigger unexpected allocation failures or assertion
errors when space is tight.
Fix this by calculating the number of already-free sections in the
truncated range, deducting them from free_sections upon entering
free_segment_range(), and restoring them on exit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix queue teardown NULL dma_free and bitmap locking
qla25xx_free_req_que() and qla25xx_free_rsp_que() have two pre-existing
bugs exposed on the error path of qla25xx_create_{req,rsp}_que():
1. When dma_alloc_coherent() fails during queue creation, the error
path calls the free function with req->ring / rsp->ring still NULL
(from kzalloc). The unconditional dma_free_coherent() with a NULL
cpu_addr is undefined behavior and can panic.
2. The free functions clear req_qid_map / rsp_qid_map under vport_lock,
but the create functions protect the same bitmaps with mq_lock.
This provides no mutual exclusion. Additionally, the create error
path clears the bit and releases mq_lock before calling the free
function, creating a window where another thread can allocate the
same que_id and have its ha->req_q_map entry clobbered by the
subsequent lockless NULL assignment in the free function.
Fix by:
- Guarding dma_free_coherent() with a NULL check on the ring pointer.
- Using mq_lock (the lock held by all creators) in the free functions
to atomically NULL the map entry and clear the bitmap bit.
- Removing the now-redundant clear_bit blocks from the create error
paths since the free functions handle it atomically. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath9k_htc: don't store usb_device_id
usb_device_id is not guaranteed to live longer than probe due to presence
of dynamic ID. All information apart from driver_data can be easily
retrieved from usb_device, so just store driver_data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't leak dqacct if rhashtable insertion fails
LOLLM observes that xqcheck_mod_live_ino_dqtrx doesn't free the newly
allocated dqa object if rhashtable insertion fails. Fix this leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Don't free the live ring's TPA state on queue restart failure
bnxt_queue_mem_alloc() shallow copies the live RX ring into the clone:
memcpy(clone, rxr, sizeof(*rxr));
the code currently clears pointers that the clone owns (such as
rx_agg_bmap), but rx_tpa and rx_tpa_idx_map are left pointing at memory
of the live ring that was cloned.
If an allocation failure happens later and the err_free_tpa_info label
is taken, the live ring's memory can be freed while still in use.
Fix this by initializing the clone's pointers to NULL to prevent live
ring state from being freed inadvertently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: hantro: bound G2 HEVC tile loop to the buffer capacity
prepare_tile_info_buffer() writes one entry per tile into the tile_sizes
DMA buffer, sized for a grid equal to the PPS uAPI array capacity. Use the
bounded v4l2_hevc_pps_num_tile_columns() / v4l2_hevc_pps_num_tile_rows()
helpers so the loops stay inside the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: autofs: fix memory leak in autofs_fill_super()
In autofs_fill_super(), we create a new inode using
autofs_new_ino(), however, if we fail to create root_inode,
(that is, root_inode failure path), we return -ENOMEM without
freeing the new inode(ino) that we created causing a memory leak.
Fix this by adding autofs_free_ino() to free the inode we created
in root_inode failure path before returning ENOMEM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: use option bits for CFM/MRP frame handlers
CFM and MRP register a global br_frame_type whose hlist_node is linked
into the per-bridge frame_type_list when the first MEP/MRP instance is
created. Enabling the protocol on multiple bridges therefore inserts the
same node into multiple lists. Unregistering it on one bridge then
corrupts list state belonging to another.
These handlers can only be installed once per bridge, and they are
uncommon. Track their per-bridge enable state with net_bridge option
bits, which already live on the Rx hot cache line, and dispatch the
matching handler directly from the receive path. Check both bits
together first as an unlikely case.
Remove the generic frame_type_list and br_frame_type helpers, which
have had no other users since CFM and MRP were added. That shrinks
struct net_bridge by 8 bytes and drops the list walk from the fast
path. When neither protocol is compiled in, BR_CFM_MRP_OPTS is 0 and
the compiler prunes the branch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't leak new_bp if xfs_btree_bload_drop_buf fails
LOLLM observes that in xfs_btree_bload_prep_block,
xfs_btree_bload_drop_buf can hit an IO error if writing the delwri
buffer list to disk fails. In this case, we fail to release new_bp,
which means we lose a locked buffer. Fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix under-reservation of blocks when repairing sf directories
Whilst running QA on XFS for-next as of 7.3-rc2 with MKFS_OPTIONS="-n
size=8192", I observed the following (trimmed) dmesg splat:
XFS: Assertion failed: args->total >= dp->i_nblocks - nblks, file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_btree.c, line: 2387
WARNING: fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:104 at assfail+0x46/0x4a [xfs], CPU#0: xfs_scrub/1426511
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1426511 Comm: xfs_scrub Tainted: G W 7.3.0-rc2-djwx #rc2 PREEMPT(lazy) 6e418570b606a39783b0e7e7b30dc407b965f9e8
Tainted: [W]=WARN
RIP: 0010:assfail+0x46/0x4a [xfs]
RSP: 0018:ffffc900010d7890 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000ffffffd1
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000021 RDI: ffffffffa059fd38
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000000000000000a R11: 000000007fffffff R12: ffffc900010d7940
R13: ffff888368d8f980 R14: ffffc900010d7a48 R15: ffffc900010d78d0
FS: 00007f445c5ce680(0000) GS:ffff8884a97ea000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f443803b9a8 CR3: 0000000107a4b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
xfs_da_grow_inode_int+0x2e0/0x300 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xfs_dir2_grow_inode+0x6e/0x150 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xfs_dir2_sf_to_block+0x149/0x870 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xrep_dir_swap_prep+0xe2/0x110 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xrep_dir_swap+0xfb/0x2f0 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xrep_dir_rebuild_tree+0x99/0x100 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xrep_directory+0x83/0x1c0 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xrep_attempt+0x4f/0x1e0 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xfs_scrub_metadata+0x393/0x5b0 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x306/0x570 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
xfs_file_ioctl+0xa4f/0x1150 [xfs 5de2257e14108c136f11317e6bbb8ac77efd392c]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x76/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x7a/0x3b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
This is a consequence of commit 0fe77e57588b98, which added the
following assertion to xfs_da_grow_inode_int:
ASSERT(args->total >= dp->i_nblocks - nblks);
Tracing this back to xrep_dir_swap_prep, I noticed that the xfs_da_args
object that's passed to xfs_dir2_sf_to_block sets args->total to 1.
This is incorrect because mkfs set the directory block size to 8k and
the filesystem block size to 4k. In other words, args->total should be
2 here, not 1.
Dave Chinner tripped over the same problem with the same branch through
a different channel -- his test setup set the fs block size to 1k, in
which case the directory block size is still set to 4k. Here,
args->total should be 4.
Changing the assignment of args->total to sc->mp->m_dir_geo->fsbcount
makes the assertion go away, but that isn't a complete fix. In
xrep_tempexch_estimate, we also incorrectly assume that a shortform
conversion requires 1 fsblock when it should be m_dir_geo->fsbcount.
Without that, we can under-reserve space in the transaction and cause a
filesystem shutdown.
Note that the xfs_dabuf_nfsb helper will compute the correct value for
directories and xattr, so we use that instead of open-coding the logic.
Also fix xrep_xattr_swap_prep to assign args->total via xfs_dabuf_nfsb
to avoid one logic bomb if we ever support multi-fsblock attrs.
Tripped-by: 0fe77e57588b98 ("xfs: assert the reservation covers each da fork growth") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: initialise error in xfs_defer_finish_one()
xfs_defer_finish_one() declares error without an initialiser and only
assigns it inside the loop over dfp->dfp_work. When that list is empty
the loop body never runs, control falls through to the "Done with the
dfp, free it" path, and the function returns an indeterminate value.
An item-less pending item reaches this through xfs_defer_add_barrier(),
which xfs_reap_ag_blocks() uses on any CONFIG_XFS_ONLINE_REPAIR kernel.
xfs_defer_finish_noroll() treats any non-EAGAIN return as fatal, so a
non-zero stack value turns a successful barrier into a
SHUTDOWN_CORRUPT_INCORE in the middle of a repair. Zero is the correct
result: reaching the free path means the item loop drained without a
non-zero error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rw: end write accounting from ->ki_complete
Commit b000145e9907 moved both the fsnotify calls and the write
accounting out of the kiocb completion handler and into the
io_req_rw_complete() task_work. However, only the fsnotify part actually
needed to move as it may sleep. Ending the write accounting is just a
percpu_up_read() on the superblock writers sem.
Deferring it is a problem, because it makes dropping SB_FREEZE_WRITE
protection depend on the ring owner getting to running task_work. But
the task may be blocked in freeze_super(), causing it to never get to
that:
task io-wq worker
--------------------------------------------------------------
io_write()
io_kiocb_start_write() (takes sb_writers, hidden from
lockdep by __sb_writers_release)
write_iter() -> -EIOCBQUEUED
ioctl(FS_IOC_SHUTDOWN)
bdev_freeze()
freeze_super()
percpu_down_write() <- waits for the reader above
io_write()
kiocb_start_write()
percpu_down_read() <- queued
behind the
writer
<bio completes>
io_complete_rw()
queues io_req_rw_complete() <- never runs, task is in D state
End the write from io_complete_rw() instead, and leave only the fsnotify
calls in task_work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix cifsFileInfo reference leak in deferred close
When cifs_close() defers a close, it hands the cifsFileInfo reference
of the closing struct file to the queued work. Each execution of
smb2_deferred_work_close() drops one such reference.
deferred_close_scheduled can be false while the work is pending: the
workqueue clears PENDING when the callback starts to run, before the
callback clears the flag under deferred_lock. A close in that
interval requeues the running work, and the callback then clears the
flag, leaving the requeued work pending with the flag down. A later
cifs_open() can reuse the handle and its cifs_close() reaches the
same branch: queue_delayed_work() fails because the work is still
pending, but cifs_close() returns without dropping the closing file's
reference. The cifsFileInfo count stays pinned and its tlink, dentry
and server handle are leaked.
Check the return value and hand off the reference only when work was
actually queued. Otherwise, use the shared _cifsFileInfo_put(), like
the mod_delayed_work() branch above: the pending execution already
owns its reference.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: honor forceuid/forcegid when mapping SIDs to uid/gid
When the administrator mounts with forceuid or forcegid (uid=/gid=
mount options), they expect all files to appear owned by the specified
user/group. However, several code paths unconditionally called
sid_to_id() to overwrite cf_uid/cf_gid with server-provided values,
ignoring the administrator's explicit override:
- smb311_posix_info_to_fattr() (stat via POSIX extensions)
- cifs_posix_to_fattr() (readdir via POSIX extensions)
- parse_sec_desc() (CIFS ACL ownership mapping)
This allowed an untrusted server to dictate local file ownership even
when the mount was configured to force specific uid/gid values.
Fix all three call sites to check CIFS_MOUNT_OVERR_UID and
CIFS_MOUNT_OVERR_GID before calling sid_to_id(), following the
same pattern already used by cifs_unix_basic_to_fattr() for unix
extensions. |
