| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| reset_password.html parses query string parameters and uses the 'url' parameter as a redirection target (window.location = url) after password reset, optionally delayed by a 'delay' parameter. No validation or allowlisting is performed on url, enabling an attacker to redirect users to an arbitrary external site after completion of the password-reset workflow. |
| URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect') vulnerability in ash-project ash_typescript allows an attacker who controls a path-parameter value to redirect a generated client's request, and the credentials attached to it, to an unintended route or an external origin.
The URL builders in lib/ash_typescript/typed_controller/codegen/route_renderer.ex replace each :param placeholder with a bare template interpolation and never call encodeURIComponent, so the value reaches executeTypedControllerRequest raw. A value containing ../ is normalised away by the fetch URL resolver and reaches a different route, while ? or # truncates the path and can smuggle or override query parameters. For a route whose path begins with a parameter, a value such as /evil.example.com/x yields the protocol-relative URL //evil.example.com/x, sending the request and the credentials from TypedControllerConfig to an attacker-controlled host. Nothing constrains the value at runtime: get_path_param_type/2 emits only a TypeScript type, which is erased.
The query-string path is unaffected, since URLSearchParams.set encodes its own values.
This issue affects ash_typescript: from 0.15.0 before 0.18.0. |
| The MasterStudy LMS WordPress Plugin WordPress plugin before 3.7.43 does not validate a redirect parameter supplied during user registration before using it, allowing unauthenticated attackers to redirect users to arbitrary external URLs. |
| pac4j-core before 6.5.6 contains an open redirect vulnerability in DefaultLogoutLogic.perform() that accepts backslash-prefixed logout redirect targets matching logoutUrlPattern. Attackers can craft logout links with backslash-prefixed external hosts that browsers normalize into network-path references, redirecting victims to attacker-controlled sites after logout. |
| NSP is vulnerable to an open redirect due to insufficient server-side validation of the URL (or redirect) parameter. |
| Joomla Extension - joomshaper.com - Open Redirect via Base64 Return Parameter in Helix Ultimate < 2.2.10 - Return redirect parameters accepted arbitrary Base64 strings without verifying whether the resolved target was an internal site URL via Uri::isInternal. |
| Rodauth before 2.47.0 fails to validate protocol-relative return-to paths in confirm_password, login_return_to_requested_location, and two_factor_auth_return_to_requested_location features. Attackers can craft paths with leading double slashes that browsers resolve as protocol-relative URLs, redirecting authenticated users to attacker-controlled sites after login or password confirmation. |
| Open redirect vulnerability exists in Multiple laser printers and MFPs which implement Ricoh Web Image Monitor. When accessing a specially crafted URL, the user may be redirected to an arbitrary website. As a result, the user may become a victim of a phishing attack. |
| Stalwart Mail Server does not compare an OAuth redirect target against any registered destination in its default configuration. The validation routine in crates/http/src/auth/oauth/registration.rs returns success immediately when the client-authentication requirement is disabled, and that requirement is false in the shipped settings, so the supplied redirect value is neither matched against a registered client nor otherwise constrained. The value is stored with the authorization code, and the login page reads it back and sends the browser to it with the code attached. A request naming a destination the attacker controls therefore delivers a valid authorization code there once the account holder authenticates, and because the token endpoint checks only that the redirect presented at exchange matches the one recorded with the code, the same party can exchange it for access and refresh tokens and read the account's mail. |
| Coroot's unauthenticated MCP OAuth dynamic client registration endpoint accepts any syntactically valid redirect URI without validation, allowing attackers to register clients pointing to attacker-controlled hosts. Attackers can send authorization URLs to signed-in users, capture their authorization codes upon consent approval, and exchange them for access tokens to hijack MCP sessions. |
| Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.ts reads the redirect_uri query parameter and frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.svelte uses the raw callbackURL in redirectWithError when prompt=none cannot complete silent authorization. The client-side path only blocks javascript and data schemes and does not invoke the backend callback allow-list validation, so an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid client_id can redirect a victim browser to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS origin for phishing or OIDC error and state smuggling. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0. |
| Twenty through 2.35.0 contains an open redirect vulnerability in the OAuthPropagatorController.propagateOAuthCallback endpoint that treats the state query parameter as a redirect URL. Attackers can craft malicious requests to redirect users to arbitrary hosts while forwarding OAuth authorization codes, bypassing domain validation when IS_MULTIWORKSPACE_ENABLED is disabled. |
| Punk::OAuth2 versions before 0.03 for Perl allow an attacker-chosen off-site redirect after login because same_origin_path accepts a backslash or tab in the return parameter.
oauth2_login reads the return parameter from the initiation request, runs same_origin_path over it, and stores the survivor in the session flow record as the post-login redirect target. That check rejects a value that does not begin with a slash, one with a slash as its second byte, and one containing CR or LF. A backslash and a tab pass. The URL Standard treats a backslash as equivalent to a slash for special schemes, so `/\evil.example` parses with the authority `evil.example`. It also strips ASCII tab before parsing, so a tab between two leading slashes leaves `//evil.example`.
A crafted link to the application's own login route lands the victim on the attacker's site after a genuine authentication. The redirect carries no authorization code or access token. |
| Kimai before 2.53.0 contains an open redirect vulnerability in the SAML authentication success handler that accepts unvalidated RelayState POST parameters as redirect destinations. Attackers with IdP access can supply malicious RelayState values to redirect authenticated users to attacker-controlled URLs for credential theft or phishing attacks. |
| Jenkins 2.567 and earlier, LTS 2.555.2 and earlier improperly determines that a redirect URL after login is legitimately pointing to Jenkins when it contains tab or newline characters between `//`, allowing attackers to perform phishing attacks. |
| OpenMetadata accepts a caller-supplied post-authentication redirect target and appends the issued token to it. SamlLoginServlet reads the callback request parameter and stores it in the HTTP session without comparing it against any configured or registered destination, and the assertion consumer servlet later formats that stored value into a URL carrying the freshly issued JWT together with the account's email and name before sending the redirect. The OIDC and OAuth2 handler follows the same pattern with its own redirect parameter and the issued identity token. A request naming a destination the attacker controls therefore causes the server to deliver a valid token for whoever completes the login to that destination. Because the token authenticates API calls as that account, a user who follows such a link and authenticates hands over control of their account. Version 2.0.0 removes the caller-supplied callback parameter; no 1.x release validates it. |
| Ech0 through 4.5.6 contains an OAuth redirect URI validation vulnerability in parseAndValidateClientRedirect (internal/service/auth/auth.go) that compares only the scheme and host of the client-supplied redirect_uri against the admin-configured allowlist, ignoring path, query, and fragment components. The redirect_uri is embedded into the signed state JWT at login time without validation. An attacker can craft a redirect_uri whose host matches an allowed origin but whose path is attacker-influenced; after the OAuth exchange the victim is redirected to that path with a one-time exchange code in the query string. If the code leaks (e.g., via Referer, analytics, or an open redirect on that host), the attacker can trade it at the public POST /api/auth/exchange endpoint for the victim's access and refresh tokens. Fixed in 4.7.3. |
| The unstructured library provides open-source components for ingesting and pre-processing images and text documents, such as PDFs, HTML, Word docs, and many more. From 0.4.7 until 0.24.0, the url argument of partition, partition_html, and partition_md is fetched without host validation in unstructured/partition/auto.py, unstructured/partition/html/partition.py, and unstructured/partition/md.py. An attacker who controls that URL can make a server-side ingestion service request loopback addresses, internal HTTP services, or cloud metadata endpoints through direct targets, redirects, or DNS rebinding. The response body is returned as Element text, allowing internal response disclosure, and side-effecting GET endpoints may also be triggered. This issue is fixed in version 0.24.0. |
| WebOb provides objects for HTTP requests and responses. Prior to 1.8.11, Response._make_location_absolute() in src/webob/response.py checks a Location value for a URI scheme or leading double slash before urllib.parse.urljoin() strips leading C0 control characters and spaces. An attacker-controlled value such as a space followed by a protocol-relative or absolute URL can therefore bypass SCHEME_RE and startswith("//") checks and be normalized to an off-host redirect. Request.relative_url() and webob.exc._HTTPMove subclasses, including HTTPFound, are also affected because they use the same unsafe URL joining behavior or bypass the earlier normalization path. An unauthenticated attacker who can influence an application's redirect target can send users to an attacker-controlled host for phishing or OAuth and SSO token theft, but exploitation requires the user to follow the redirect. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.11. |
| Miniflux 2 is an open source feed reader. Prior to 2.3.1, IsRelativePath in internal/urllib/url.go accepts redirect targets containing backslashes because Go URL parsing treats them as path characters. Browser backslash normalization converts them to forward slashes. An unauthenticated attacker can provide such a redirect_url value to the login flow, bypass the relative-path and host checks, and redirect a victim to an attacker-controlled external site. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.1. |