| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Missing Authorization in RDT400 in SICK APU allows an unprivileged remote attacker to modify data via HTTP requests that no not require authentication.
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Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (’Cross-site Scripting’) in RDT400 in SICK APU allows an unprivileged remote attacker to run arbitrary code in the clients
browser via injecting code into the website.
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Improper Access Control in SICK APU allows an unprivileged remote attacker to
download as well as upload arbitrary files via anonymous access to the FTP server.
|
| The Tungstenite crate before 0.20.1 for Rust allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (minutes of CPU consumption) via an excessive length of an HTTP header in a client handshake. The length affects both how many times a parse is attempted (e.g., thousands of times) and the average amount of data for each parse attempt (e.g., millions of bytes). |
| ShokoServer is a media server which specializes in organizing anime. In affected versions the `/api/Image/WithPath` endpoint is accessible without authentication and is supposed to return default server images. The endpoint accepts the parameter `serverImagePath`, which is not sanitized in any way before being passed to `System.IO.File.OpenRead`, which results in an arbitrary file read. This issue may lead to an arbitrary file read which is exacerbated in the windows installer which installs the ShokoServer as administrator. Any unauthenticated attacker may be able to access sensitive information and read files stored on the server. The `/api/Image/WithPath` endpoint has been removed in commit `6c57ba0f0` which will be included in subsequent releases. Users should limit access to the `/api/Image/WithPath` endpoint or manually patch their installations until a patched release is made. This issue was discovered by the GitHub Security lab and is also indexed as GHSL-2023-191. |
| Cachet, the open-source status page system. Prior to the 2.4 branch, a template functionality which allows users to create templates allows them to execute any code on the server during the bad filtration and old twig version. Commit 6fb043e109d2a262ce3974e863c54e9e5f5e0587 of the 2.4 branch contains a patch for this issue. |
| Discourse is an open source platform for community discussion. Improper escaping of user input allowed for Cross-site Scripting attacks via the digest email preview UI. This issue only affects sites with CSP disabled. This issue has been patched in the 3.1.1 stable release as well as the 3.2.0.beta1 release. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure CSP is enabled on the forum.
|
| dicourse-calendar is a plugin for the Discourse messaging platform which adds the ability to create a dynamic calendar in the first post of a topic. Improper escaping of event titles could lead to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) within the 'email preview' UI when a site has CSP disabled. Having CSP disabled is a non-default configuration, so the vast majority of sites are unaffected. This problem is resolved in the latest version of the discourse-calendar plugin. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure CSP is enabled on the forum. |
| discourse-encrypt is a plugin that provides a secure communication channel through Discourse. Improper escaping of encrypted topic titles could lead to a cross site scripting (XSS) issue when a site has content security policy (CSP) headers disabled. Having CSP disabled is a non-default configuration, and having it disabled with discourse-encrypt installed will result in a warning in the Discourse admin dashboard. This has been fixed in commit `9c75810af9` which is included in the latest version of the discourse-encrypt plugin. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that CSP headers are enabled and properly configured. |
| get-func-name is a module to retrieve a function's name securely and consistently both in NodeJS and the browser. Versions prior to 2.0.1 are subject to a regular expression denial of service (redos) vulnerability which may lead to a denial of service when parsing malicious input. This vulnerability can be exploited when there is an imbalance in parentheses, which results in excessive backtracking and subsequently increases the CPU load and processing time significantly. This vulnerability can be triggered using the following input: '\t'.repeat(54773) + '\t/function/i'. This issue has been addressed in commit `f934b228b` which has been included in releases from 2.0.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. |
| snappy-java is a Java port of the snappy, a fast C++ compresser/decompresser developed by Google. The SnappyInputStream was found to be vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks when decompressing data with a too large chunk size. Due to missing upper bound check on chunk length, an unrecoverable fatal error can occur. All versions of snappy-java including the latest released version 1.1.10.3 are vulnerable to this issue. A fix has been introduced in commit `9f8c3cf74` which will be included in the 1.1.10.4 release. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should only accept compressed data from trusted sources. |
|
Due to the implementation of "deriveVaultKey", prior to version 7.10, the generated vault key
would always have the last 16 bytes predetermined to be "arfoobarfoobarfo".
This issue happens because "deriveVaultKey" calls "retrieveCloudKey" (which will always
return "foobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfo" as the key), and then merges the 32byte
randomly generated key with this key (by takeing 16bytes from each, see "mergeKeys").
This makes the key a lot weaker.
This issue does not persist in devices that were initialized on/after version 7.10, but devices
that were initialized before that and updated to a newer version still have this issue.
Roll an update that enforces the full 32bytes key usage.
|
|
In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing
the encrypted data located in the vault.
As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot
process will change if any of their respective parts are changed.
This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline,
initrd, and more.
However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the
filesystem and gain control over the system.
As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4,
which is easily changeable.
This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes
in it and replace the partition altogether.
This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the
“mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs).
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot. |
|
Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs
The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism.
Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique
value for each PCR entry.
These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to
encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory.
This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should
be protected.
This mechanism is noted in Zededa’s documentation as the “measured boot” mechanism,
designed to protect said “vault”.
The code that’s responsible for generating and fetching the key from the TPM assumes that
SHA256 PCRs are used in order to seal/unseal the key, and as such their presence is being
checked.
The issue here is that the key is not sealed using SHA256 PCRs, but using SHA1 PCRs.
This leads to several issues:
• Machines that have their SHA256 PCRs enabled but SHA1 PCRs disabled, as well
as not sealing their keys at all, meaning the “vault” is not protected from an attacker.
• SHA1 is considered insecure and reduces the complexity level required to unseal the
key in machines which have their SHA1 PCRs enabled.
An attacker can very easily retrieve the contents of the “vault”, which will effectively render
the “measured boot” mechanism meaningless.
|
|
When sealing/unsealing the “vault” key, a list of PCRs is used, which defines which PCRs
are used.
In a previous project, CYMOTIVE found that the configuration is not protected by the secure
boot, and in response Zededa implemented measurements on the config partition that was
mapped to PCR 13.
In that process, PCR 13 was added to the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the key.
In commit “56e589749c6ff58ded862d39535d43253b249acf”, the config partition
measurement moved from PCR 13 to PCR 14, but PCR 14 was not added to the list of
PCRs that seal/unseal the key.
This change makes the measurement of PCR 14 effectively redundant as it would not affect
the sealing/unsealing of the key.
An attacker could modify the config partition without triggering the measured boot, this could
result in the attacker gaining full control over the device with full access to the contents of the
encrypted “vault”
|
|
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of
“/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”.
If the file exists, it overrides the existing configuration on the device on boot.
This allows an attacker to change the system’s configuration, which also includes some
debug functions.
This could be used to unlock the ssh with custom “authorized_keys” via the
“debug.enable.ssh” key, similar to the “authorized_keys” finding that was noted before.
Other usages include unlocking the usb to enable the keyboard via the “debug.enable.usb”
key, allowing VNC access via the “app.allow.vnc” key, and more.
An attacker could easily enable these debug functionalities without triggering the “measured
boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD”
(“Unknown Update Detected”).
This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable and it
is not encrypted in any way.
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thereby not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot. |
|
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of
“/config/authorized_keys”.
If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open
port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login.
An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system without
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking
the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”).
This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable, and
it is not encrypted in any way.
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot. |
| PCR14 is not in the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the “vault” key, but
due to the change that was implemented in commit
“7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, fixing this issue alone would not solve the
problem of the config partition not being measured correctly.
Also, the “vault” key is sealed/unsealed with SHA1 PCRs instead of
SHA256.
This issue was somewhat mitigated due to all of the PCR extend functions
updating both the values of SHA256 and SHA1 for a given PCR ID.
However, due to the change that was implemented in commit
“7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, this is no longer the case for PCR14, as
the code in “measurefs.go” explicitly updates only the SHA256 instance of PCR14, which
means that even if PCR14 were to be added to the list of PCRs sealing/unsealing the “vault”
key, changes to the config partition would still not be measured.
An attacker could modify the config partition without triggering the measured boot, this could
result in the attacker gaining full control over the device with full access to the contents of the
encrypted “vault”
|
| An issue was discovered in Croc through 9.6.5. A sender may place ANSI or CSI escape sequences in a filename to attack the terminal device of a receiver. |
| An issue was discovered in Croc through 9.6.5. A sender may send dangerous new files to a receiver, such as executable content or a .ssh/authorized_keys file. |
