| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows DWM Core Library allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows GDI allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Remote Access API allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Remote Access API allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows NTFS allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Desktop Window Manager allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Desktop Window Manager allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Storage Port Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Key Guard allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| A Heap-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability [CWE-122] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiClientWindows 7.4.0 through 7.4.3, FortiClientWindows 7.2.0 through 7.2.8 may allow an authenticated local IPSec user to execute arbitrary code or commands via "fortips_74.sys". The attacker would need to bypass the Windows heap integrity protections |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atm: reject out-of-range traffic classes in QoS validation
Reject ATM traffic classes above ATM_ANYCLASS in check_tp().
SO_ATMQOS stores the supplied QoS after check_qos() succeeds, so
accepting larger values leaves invalid traffic_class values in
vcc->qos.
That bad state later reaches pvc_info(), which indexes class_name[]
with vcc->qos.{rx,tp}.traffic_class. Values above ATM_ANYCLASS cause
an out-of-bounds read when /proc/net/atm/pvc is read.
Tighten the existing QoS validation so invalid traffic_class values
are rejected at the point where user supplied QoS is accepted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-rdma: handle inline data with a nonzero offset
nvmet_rdma_use_inline_sg() maps the host-controlled inline data offset
into the per-command inline scatterlist. The bounds check admits any
offset with off + len <= inline_data_size, but the mapping still assumes
the data begins in the first inline page:
sg->offset = off;
sg->length = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
When a port is configured with inline_data_size > PAGE_SIZE (settable up
to max(SZ_16K, PAGE_SIZE)), an offset in (PAGE_SIZE, inline_data_size]
makes "PAGE_SIZE - off" underflow, so sg->length is set to ~4 GiB and
the block backend reads far past the first inline page. num_pages(len)
also ignores the offset, so an in-bounds offset whose [off, off+len)
span crosses a page boundary under-counts the scatterlist.
Map the offset properly: split it into a page index and an in-page
offset, start the scatterlist at that page, and size the page count from
page_off + len. Because the request scatterlist may now start at
inline_sg[page_idx] rather than inline_sg[0], generalize the inline-SGL
identity test in nvmet_rdma_release_rsp() to a range test; otherwise the
persistent inline scatterlist is mistaken for an allocated one and
nvmet_req_free_sgls() frees an inline page (and warns in
free_large_kmalloc()). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: nat_keepalive: avoid double free on send error
nat_keepalive_send() frees the keepalive skb whenever the IPv4 or IPv6
send helper reports an error.
That cleanup is only correct before the skb is handed to the output
path. Once ip_build_and_send_pkt() or ip6_xmit() takes ownership, the
networking stack may already have consumed the skb before returning an
error, so freeing it again is unsafe.
Handle the pre-handoff failure cases inside nat_keepalive_send_ipv4()
and nat_keepalive_send_ipv6(), where the caller still owns the skb, and
keep nat_keepalive_send() responsible only for family dispatch and the
unsupported-family cleanup path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: keep the readdir entry size 64-bit in fill_from_part()
fill_from_part() computes the size of a directory entry in size_t but
stores it in a __u32. An entry length near U32_MAX wraps it to a small
value, bypasses the bounds check, and is then used to index the entry,
reading far past the directory part -- an out-of-bounds read that oopses
the kernel.
Compute the size as a u64 so it cannot truncate; the bounds check then
rejects the entry. The trailer is supplied by the userspace client. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject negative const offsets for buffer pointers
The verifier rejects variable offsets for PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF
accesses, but it currently accepts a constant negative offset produced by
pointer arithmetic.
Commit 022ac0750883 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for
pointers") moved constant pointer offsets from reg->off to reg->var_off.
However, __check_buffer_access() continued to check only the instruction
offset. An access with reg->var_off equal to -8 and an instruction offset
of zero therefore passes verification.
For writable raw tracepoints, the access end is also calculated from the
unsigned reg->var_off.value. An eight-byte access starting at -8 wraps
the calculated end to zero, allowing the program to load and attach
without increasing max_tp_access.
After ensuring that reg->var_off is constant, calculate the effective
access start using signed arithmetic and reject it when it is negative.
Use the validated start to calculate the access end for both
PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: Fix division by zero in initialize_timer()
A userspace-driven ALSA timer (SND_UTIMER) lets an unprivileged user set
the backing snd_timer's hardware resolution to an arbitrary 64-bit value
via SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CREATE. snd_utimer_create() only rejects zero.
When such a timer is bound to a sequencer queue, initialize_timer()
computes the tick period as
tmr->ticks = 1000000000 / (r * freq);
where r is that user-controlled resolution and freq is the sequencer
update rate in Hz, clamped to MIN_FREQUENCY..MAX_FREQUENCY (10..6250).
A resolution of 2^63 makes the 64-bit product r * freq wrap to zero for
any even freq, including DEFAULT_FREQUENCY (1000), so the division faults
with a divide-by-zero.
The division runs under tmr->lock with interrupts disabled, so the oops
leaves the spinlock held and hangs the CPU. It is reachable by an
unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/timer and /dev/snd/seq.
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 456 Comm: alsa_seq_utimer Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4+
RIP: 0010:initialize_timer.constprop.0+0x20a/0x2d0
snd_seq_timer_start+0x15e/0x2b0
snd_seq_control_queue+0x56f/0xba0
snd_seq_write+0x3e0/0x730
Reject an overflowing product with check_mul_overflow() and fall back to
a single tick, which also avoids feeding a wrapped-but-nonzero divisor
(e.g. 2^63 * 1000 mod 2^64 == 0, or other resolutions wrapping to a small
value) into the period computation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7925: validate skb length in testmode query
In mt7925_tm_query(), the response skb from mt76_mcu_send_and_get_msg()
is used in a memcpy without validating its length:
memcpy(evt_resp, skb->data + 8, MT7925_EVT_RSP_LEN);
where MT7925_EVT_RSP_LEN is 512. If the firmware returns a response
shorter than 520 bytes (8 + 512), this reads beyond the skb data
buffer. The over-read data is then returned to userspace via nla_put()
in mt7925_testmode_dump().
Add a length check before the memcpy to ensure the skb contains
sufficient data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: most: video: avoid double free on video register failure
comp_register_videodev() allocates a video_device with
video_device_alloc() and releases it if video_register_device() fails.
This can double free the video_device when __video_register_device()
reaches device_register() and that call fails:
video_register_device()
-> __video_register_device()
-> device_register() fails
-> put_device(&vdev->dev)
-> v4l2_device_release()
-> vdev->release(vdev)
-> video_device_release(vdev)
comp_register_videodev()
-> video_device_release(mdev->vdev)
Use video_device_release_empty() while registering the device so that
registration failure paths do not free mdev->vdev through vdev->release().
comp_register_videodev() then releases mdev->vdev exactly once on failure.
Restore video_device_release() after successful registration so the
registered device keeps its normal lifetime handling.
This issue was found by a static analysis tool I am developing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: dma-axi-dmac: Properly free struct axi_dmac_desc
Use axi_dmac_free_desc() to free fully the descriptor at fail path when
call axi_dmac_alloc_desc() in axi_dmac_prep_peripheral_dma_vec(). |
