| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Disassociate vcpus from redistributor region on teardown
When tearing down a redistributor region, make sure we don't have
any dangling pointer to that region stored in a vcpu. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Revert "ACPICA: avoid Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine."
Undo the modifications made in commit d410ee5109a1 ("ACPICA: avoid
"Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.""). The initial
purpose of this commit was to stop memory mappings for operation
regions from overlapping page boundaries, as it can trigger warnings
if different page attributes are present.
However, it was found that when this situation arises, mapping
continues until the boundary's end, but there is still an attempt to
read/write the entire length of the map, leading to a NULL pointer
deference. For example, if a four-byte mapping request is made but
only one byte is mapped because it hits the current page boundary's
end, a four-byte read/write attempt is still made, resulting in a NULL
pointer deference.
Instead, map the entire length, as the ACPI specification does not
mandate that it must be within the same page boundary. It is
permissible for it to be mapped across different regions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: force a dst refcount before doing decryption
As it says in commit 3bc07321ccc2 ("xfrm: Force a dst refcount before
entering the xfrm type handlers"):
"Crypto requests might return asynchronous. In this case we leave the
rcu protected region, so force a refcount on the skb's destination
entry before we enter the xfrm type input/output handlers."
On TIPC decryption path it has the same problem, and skb_dst_force()
should be called before doing decryption to avoid a possible crash.
Shuang reported this issue when this warning is triggered:
[] WARNING: include/net/dst.h:337 tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]
[] Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W --------- - - 4.18.0-496.el8.x86_64+debug
[] Workqueue: crypto cryptd_queue_worker
[] RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]
[] Call Trace:
[] tipc_sk_mcast_rcv+0x548/0xea0 [tipc]
[] tipc_rcv+0xcf5/0x1060 [tipc]
[] tipc_aead_decrypt_done+0x215/0x2e0 [tipc]
[] cryptd_aead_crypt+0xdb/0x190
[] cryptd_queue_worker+0xed/0x190
[] process_one_work+0x93d/0x17e0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drop_monitor: replace spin_lock by raw_spin_lock
trace_drop_common() is called with preemption disabled, and it acquires
a spin_lock. This is problematic for RT kernels because spin_locks are
sleeping locks in this configuration, which causes the following splat:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 449, name: rcuc/47
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 2
5 locks held by rcuc/47/449:
#0: ff1100086ec30a60 ((softirq_ctrl.lock)){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0x105/0x210
#1: ffffffffb394a280 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rt_spin_lock+0xbf/0x130
#2: ffffffffb394a280 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0x11c/0x210
#3: ffffffffb394a160 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_do_batch+0x360/0xc70
#4: ff1100086ee07520 (&data->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0xb5/0x290
irq event stamp: 139909
hardirqs last enabled at (139908): [<ffffffffb1df2b33>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x63/0x80
hardirqs last disabled at (139909): [<ffffffffb19bd03d>] trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0x26d/0x290
softirqs last enabled at (139892): [<ffffffffb07a1083>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x103/0x170
softirqs last disabled at (139898): [<ffffffffb0909b33>] rcu_cpu_kthread+0x93/0x1f0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffffb1de786b>] rt_mutex_slowunlock+0xab/0x2e0
CPU: 47 PID: 449 Comm: rcuc/47 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-rt1+ #7
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R650/0Y2G81, BIOS 1.6.5 04/15/2022
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xd0
dump_stack+0x14/0x20
__might_resched+0x21e/0x2f0
rt_spin_lock+0x5e/0x130
? trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0xb5/0x290
? skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0xb5/0x290
? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4a/0x80
? __pfx_trace_drop_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
? rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x26a/0x2e0
? skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
? __pfx_rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x10/0x10
? skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
trace_kfree_skb_hit+0x15/0x20
trace_kfree_skb+0xe9/0x150
kfree_skb_reason+0x7b/0x110
skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x1bf/0x230
? __pfx_skb_queue_purge_reason.part.0+0x10/0x10
? mark_lock.part.0+0x8a/0x520
...
trace_drop_common() also disables interrupts, but this is a minor issue
because we could easily replace it with a local_lock.
Replace the spin_lock with raw_spin_lock to avoid sleeping in atomic
context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921s: fix potential hung tasks during chip recovery
During chip recovery (e.g. chip reset), there is a possible situation that
kernel worker reset_work is holding the lock and waiting for kernel thread
stat_worker to be parked, while stat_worker is waiting for the release of
the same lock.
It causes a deadlock resulting in the dumping of hung tasks messages and
possible rebooting of the device.
This patch prevents the execution of stat_worker during the chip recovery. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/lima: mask irqs in timeout path before hard reset
There is a race condition in which a rendering job might take just long
enough to trigger the drm sched job timeout handler but also still
complete before the hard reset is done by the timeout handler.
This runs into race conditions not expected by the timeout handler.
In some very specific cases it currently may result in a refcount
imbalance on lima_pm_idle, with a stack dump such as:
[10136.669170] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at drivers/gpu/drm/lima/lima_devfreq.c:205 lima_devfreq_record_idle+0xa0/0xb0
...
[10136.669459] pc : lima_devfreq_record_idle+0xa0/0xb0
...
[10136.669628] Call trace:
[10136.669634] lima_devfreq_record_idle+0xa0/0xb0
[10136.669646] lima_sched_pipe_task_done+0x5c/0xb0
[10136.669656] lima_gp_irq_handler+0xa8/0x120
[10136.669666] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x48/0x160
[10136.669679] handle_irq_event+0x4c/0xc0
We can prevent that race condition entirely by masking the irqs at the
beginning of the timeout handler, at which point we give up on waiting
for that job entirely.
The irqs will be enabled again at the next hard reset which is already
done as a recovery by the timeout handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: remove clear SB_INLINECRYPT flag in default_options
In f2fs_remount, SB_INLINECRYPT flag will be clear and re-set.
If create new file or open file during this gap, these files
will not use inlinecrypt. Worse case, it may lead to data
corruption if wrappedkey_v0 is enable.
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount -f2fs_file_open or f2fs_new_inode
-default_options
<- clear SB_INLINECRYPT flag
-fscrypt_select_encryption_impl
-parse_options
<- set SB_INLINECRYPT again |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mips: bmips: BCM6358: make sure CBR is correctly set
It was discovered that some device have CBR address set to 0 causing
kernel panic when arch_sync_dma_for_cpu_all is called.
This was notice in situation where the system is booted from TP1 and
BMIPS_GET_CBR() returns 0 instead of a valid address and
!!(read_c0_brcm_cmt_local() & (1 << 31)); not failing.
The current check whether RAC flush should be disabled or not are not
enough hence lets check if CBR is a valid address or not. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: prevent possible NULL deref in fib6_nh_init()
syzbot reminds us that in6_dev_get() can return NULL.
fib6_nh_init()
ip6_validate_gw( &idev )
ip6_route_check_nh( idev )
*idev = in6_dev_get(dev); // can be NULL
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000bc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005e0-0x00000000000005e7]
CPU: 0 PID: 11237 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00249-gbe27b8965297 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024
RIP: 0010:fib6_nh_init+0x640/0x2160 net/ipv6/route.c:3606
Code: 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 64 24 58 48 8b 44 24 28 4c 8b 74 24 30 48 89 c1 48 89 44 24 28 48 8d 98 e0 05 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 b3 17 00 00 8b 1b 31 ff 89 de e8 b8 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffc900032775a0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000bc RBX: 00000000000005e0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffffc90003277a54 RDI: ffff88802b3a08d8
RBP: ffffc900032778b0 R08: 00000000000002fc R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000002fc R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88802b3a08b8
R13: 1ffff9200064eec8 R14: ffffc90003277a00 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f940feb06c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000245e8000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ip6_route_info_create+0x99e/0x12b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3809
ip6_route_add+0x28/0x160 net/ipv6/route.c:3853
ipv6_route_ioctl+0x588/0x870 net/ipv6/route.c:4483
inet6_ioctl+0x21a/0x280 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:579
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f940f07cea9 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: prevent possible NULL dereference in rt6_probe()
syzbot caught a NULL dereference in rt6_probe() [1]
Bail out if __in6_dev_get() returns NULL.
[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000cb: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000658-0x000000000000065f]
CPU: 1 PID: 22444 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
RIP: 0010:rt6_probe net/ipv6/route.c:656 [inline]
RIP: 0010:find_match+0x8c4/0xf50 net/ipv6/route.c:758
Code: 14 fd f7 48 8b 85 38 ff ff ff 48 c7 45 b0 00 00 00 00 48 8d b8 5c 06 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 19
RSP: 0018:ffffc900034af070 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90004521000
RDX: 00000000000000cb RSI: ffffffff8990d0cd RDI: 000000000000065c
RBP: ffffc900034af150 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 000000000000000a
R13: 1ffff92000695e18 R14: ffff8880244a1d20 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f4844a5a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b31b27000 CR3: 000000002d42c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rt6_nh_find_match+0xfa/0x1a0 net/ipv6/route.c:784
nexthop_for_each_fib6_nh+0x26d/0x4a0 net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1496
__find_rr_leaf+0x6e7/0xe00 net/ipv6/route.c:825
find_rr_leaf net/ipv6/route.c:853 [inline]
rt6_select net/ipv6/route.c:897 [inline]
fib6_table_lookup+0x57e/0xa30 net/ipv6/route.c:2195
ip6_pol_route+0x1cd/0x1150 net/ipv6/route.c:2231
pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:616 [inline]
fib6_rule_lookup+0x386/0x720 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:121
ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2639 [inline]
ip6_route_output_flags+0x1d0/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:2651
ip6_dst_lookup_tail.constprop.0+0x961/0x1760 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1147
ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x99/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250
rawv6_sendmsg+0xdab/0x4340 net/ipv6/raw.c:898
inet_sendmsg+0x119/0x140 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:853
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x4b8/0x5c0 net/socket.c:1160
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6b6/0x1140 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x1f8/0x260 fs/read_write.c:643
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm6: check ip6_dst_idev() return value in xfrm6_get_saddr()
ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, xfrm6_get_saddr() must act accordingly.
syzbot reported:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker
RIP: 0010:xfrm6_get_saddr+0x93/0x130 net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:64
Code: df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 97 00 00 00 4c 8b ab d8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 86 00 00 00 4d 8b 6d 00 e8 ca 13 47 01 48 b8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000117378 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88807b079dc0 RCX: ffffffff89a0d6d7
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89a0d6e9 RDI: ffff88807b079e98
RBP: ffff88807ad73248 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: fffffffffffff000
R10: ffff88807b079dc0 R11: 0000000000000007 R12: ffffc90000117480
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f4586d00440 CR3: 0000000079042000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
xfrm_get_saddr net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2452 [inline]
xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2481 [inline]
xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xa26/0xf10 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2541
xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x140/0x2570 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2835
xfrm_bundle_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3070 [inline]
xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x4d1/0x1e60 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3201
xfrm_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3298 [inline]
xfrm_lookup_route+0x3b/0x200 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3309
ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x15c/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1256
send6+0x611/0xd20 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:139
wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer+0xf9/0x220 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:178
wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer+0x12b/0x190 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:200
wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x227/0x360 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:40
wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x1c/0x30 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:51
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393
kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netns: Make get_net_ns() handle zero refcount net
Syzkaller hit a warning:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7890 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 7890 Comm: tun Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-00100-gcaa4f9578aba-dirty #310
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
Code: 41 49 04 31 ff 89 de e8 9f 1e cd fe 84 db 75 9c e8 76 26 cd fe c6 05 b6 41 49 04 01 90 48 c7 c7 b8 8e 25 86 e8 d2 05 b5 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 79 ff ff ff e8 53 26 cd fe 0f b6 1
RSP: 0018:ffff8881067b7da0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff811c72ac
RDX: ffff8881026a2140 RSI: ffffffff811c72b5 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8881067b7db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 205b5d3730353139
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 205d303938375420 R12: ffff8881086500c4
R13: ffff8881086500c4 R14: ffff8881086500b0 R15: ffff888108650040
FS: 00007f5b2961a4c0(0000) GS:ffff88823bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055d7ed36fd18 CR3: 00000001482f6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0xa3/0xc0
? __warn+0xa5/0x1c0
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
? report_bug+0x1fc/0x2d0
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
? handle_bug+0xa1/0x110
? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0xb0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? __warn_printk+0xcc/0x140
? __warn_printk+0xd5/0x140
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
get_net_ns+0xa4/0xc0
? __pfx_get_net_ns+0x10/0x10
open_related_ns+0x5a/0x130
__tun_chr_ioctl+0x1616/0x2370
? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xa0
? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2+0x1c/0x30
? __pfx_tun_chr_ioctl+0x10/0x10
tun_chr_ioctl+0x2f/0x40
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x11b/0x160
x64_sys_call+0x1211/0x20d0
do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f5b28f165d7
Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 b1 48 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 8
RSP: 002b:00007ffc2b59c5e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5b28f165d7
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000054e3 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffc2b59c650 R08: 00007f5b291ed8c0 R09: 00007f5b2961a4c0
R10: 0000000029690010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400730
R13: 00007ffc2b59cf40 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
This is trigger as below:
ns0 ns1
tun_set_iff() //dev is tun0
tun->dev = dev
//ip link set tun0 netns ns1
put_net() //ref is 0
__tun_chr_ioctl() //TUNGETDEVNETNS
net = dev_net(tun->dev);
open_related_ns(&net->ns, get_net_ns); //ns1
get_net_ns()
get_net() //addition on 0
Use maybe_get_net() in get_net_ns in case net's ref is zero to fix this |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: fix parameter passing when calling NF_HOOK() in End.DX4 and End.DX6 behaviors
input_action_end_dx4() and input_action_end_dx6() are called NF_HOOK() for
PREROUTING hook, in PREROUTING hook, we should passing a valid indev,
and a NULL outdev to NF_HOOK(), otherwise may trigger a NULL pointer
dereference, as below:
[74830.647293] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000090
[74830.655633] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[74830.657888] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[74830.659500] PGD 0 P4D 0
[74830.660450] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
...
[74830.664953] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[74830.666569] RIP: 0010:rpfilter_mt+0x44/0x15e [ipt_rpfilter]
...
[74830.689725] Call Trace:
[74830.690402] <IRQ>
[74830.690953] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[74830.692020] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[74830.693095] ? ipt_do_table+0x286/0x710 [ip_tables]
[74830.694275] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
[74830.695205] ? page_fault_oops+0xac/0x140
[74830.696244] ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150
[74830.697225] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[74830.698344] ? rpfilter_mt+0x44/0x15e [ipt_rpfilter]
[74830.699540] ipt_do_table+0x286/0x710 [ip_tables]
[74830.700758] ? ip6_route_input+0x19d/0x240
[74830.701752] nf_hook_slow+0x3f/0xb0
[74830.702678] input_action_end_dx4+0x19b/0x1e0
[74830.703735] ? input_action_end_t+0xe0/0xe0
[74830.704734] seg6_local_input_core+0x2d/0x60
[74830.705782] lwtunnel_input+0x5b/0xb0
[74830.706690] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x63/0xa0
[74830.707825] process_backlog+0x99/0x140
[74830.709538] __napi_poll+0x2c/0x160
[74830.710673] net_rx_action+0x296/0x350
[74830.711860] __do_softirq+0xcb/0x2ac
[74830.713049] do_softirq+0x63/0x90
input_action_end_dx4() passing a NULL indev to NF_HOOK(), and finally
trigger a NULL dereference in rpfilter_mt()->rpfilter_is_loopback():
static bool
rpfilter_is_loopback(const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in)
{
// in is NULL
return skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK ||
in->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK;
} |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Fix possible Use-After-Free in irq_process_work_list
Use list_for_each_entry_safe() to allow iterating through the list and
deleting the entry in the iteration process. The descriptor is freed via
idxd_desc_complete() and there's a slight chance may cause issue for
the list iterator when the descriptor is reused by another thread
without it being deleted from the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: do not leave a dangling sk pointer, when socket creation fails
It is possible to trigger a use-after-free by:
* attaching an fentry probe to __sock_release() and the probe calling the
bpf_get_socket_cookie() helper
* running traceroute -I 1.1.1.1 on a freshly booted VM
A KASAN enabled kernel will log something like below (decoded and stripped):
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888007110dd8 by task traceroute/299
CPU: 2 PID: 299 Comm: traceroute Tainted: G E 6.10.0-rc2+ #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117 (discriminator 1))
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:488)
? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603)
? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)
kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:183 mm/kasan/generic.c:189)
__sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)
bpf_get_socket_ptr_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:94 ./include/linux/sock_diag.h:42 net/core/filter.c:5094 net/core/filter.c:5092)
bpf_prog_875642cf11f1d139___sock_release+0x6e/0x8e
bpf_trampoline_6442506592+0x47/0xaf
__sock_release (net/socket.c:652)
__sock_create (net/socket.c:1601)
...
Allocated by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328492s:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68)
__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:312 mm/kasan/common.c:338)
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:3941 mm/slub.c:4000 mm/slub.c:4007)
sk_prot_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2075)
sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2134)
inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:327 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252)
__sock_create (net/socket.c:1572)
__sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706)
__x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Freed by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328502s:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68)
kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:582)
poison_slab_object (mm/kasan/common.c:242)
__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:256)
kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4437 mm/slub.c:4511)
__sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2117 net/core/sock.c:2208)
inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:397 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252)
__sock_create (net/socket.c:1572)
__sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706)
__x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Fix this by clearing the struct socket reference in sk_common_release() to cover
all protocol families create functions, which may already attached the
reference to the sk object with sock_init_data(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Fix a data race on last_boosted_vcpu in kvm_vcpu_on_spin()
Use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() to access kvm->last_boosted_vcpu to ensure the
loads and stores are atomic. In the extremely unlikely scenario the
compiler tears the stores, it's theoretically possible for KVM to attempt
to get a vCPU using an out-of-bounds index, e.g. if the write is split
into multiple 8-bit stores, and is paired with a 32-bit load on a VM with
257 vCPUs:
CPU0 CPU1
last_boosted_vcpu = 0xff;
(last_boosted_vcpu = 0x100)
last_boosted_vcpu[15:8] = 0x01;
i = (last_boosted_vcpu = 0x1ff)
last_boosted_vcpu[7:0] = 0x00;
vcpu = kvm->vcpu_array[0x1ff];
As detected by KCSAN:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in kvm_vcpu_on_spin [kvm] / kvm_vcpu_on_spin [kvm]
write to 0xffffc90025a92344 of 4 bytes by task 4340 on cpu 16:
kvm_vcpu_on_spin (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4112) kvm
handle_pause (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5929) kvm_intel
vmx_handle_exit (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:?
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606) kvm_intel
vcpu_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11107 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11211) kvm
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:?) kvm
kvm_vcpu_ioctl (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:?) kvm
__se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:904 fs/ioctl.c:890)
__x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890)
x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
read to 0xffffc90025a92344 of 4 bytes by task 4342 on cpu 4:
kvm_vcpu_on_spin (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4069) kvm
handle_pause (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5929) kvm_intel
vmx_handle_exit (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:?
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606) kvm_intel
vcpu_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11107 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11211) kvm
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:?) kvm
kvm_vcpu_ioctl (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:?) kvm
__se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:904 fs/ioctl.c:890)
__x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890)
x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
value changed: 0x00000012 -> 0x00000000 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_table_check: fix crash on ZONE_DEVICE
Not all pages may apply to pgtable check. One example is ZONE_DEVICE
pages: they map PFNs directly, and they don't allocate page_ext at all
even if there's struct page around. One may reference
devm_memremap_pages().
When both ZONE_DEVICE and page-table-check enabled, then try to map some
dax memories, one can trigger kernel bug constantly now when the kernel
was trying to inject some pfn maps on the dax device:
kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:55!
While it's pretty legal to use set_pxx_at() for ZONE_DEVICE pages for page
fault resolutions, skip all the checks if page_ext doesn't even exist in
pgtable checker, which applies to ZONE_DEVICE but maybe more. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section
A panic happens in ima_match_policy:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh
Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39
7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d
f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea
44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000)
GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
path_openat+0x571/0x1720
do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.
Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.
The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
| Thread A | Thread B |
| |ima_match_policy |
| | rcu_read_lock |
|ima_lsm_update_rule | |
| synchronize_rcu | |
| | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
| | sleep |
==> synchronize_rcu returns early
| kfree(entry) | |
| | entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
| | entry->action |
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.
To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.
[PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix races between hole punching and AIO+DIO
After commit "ocfs2: return real error code in ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block",
fstests/generic/300 become from always failed to sometimes failed:
========================================================================
[ 473.293420 ] run fstests generic/300
[ 475.296983 ] JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal
[ 475.302473 ] ocfs2: Mounting device (253,1) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode.
[ 494.290998 ] OCFS2: ERROR (device dm-1): ocfs2_change_extent_flag: Owner 5668 has an extent at cpos 78723 which can no longer be found
[ 494.291609 ] On-disk corruption discovered. Please run fsck.ocfs2 once the filesystem is unmounted.
[ 494.292018 ] OCFS2: File system is now read-only.
[ 494.292224 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_mark_extent_written:5272 ERROR: status = -30
[ 494.292602 ] (kworker/19:11,2628,19):ocfs2_dio_end_io_write:2374 ERROR: status = -3
fio: io_u error on file /mnt/scratch/racer: Read-only file system: write offset=460849152, buflen=131072
=========================================================================
In __blockdev_direct_IO, ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block is called to add unwritten
extents to a list. extents are also inserted into extent tree in
ocfs2_write_begin_nolock. Then another thread call fallocate to puch a
hole at one of the unwritten extent. The extent at cpos was removed by
ocfs2_remove_extent(). At end io worker thread, ocfs2_search_extent_list
found there is no such extent at the cpos.
T1 T2 T3
inode lock
...
insert extents
...
inode unlock
ocfs2_fallocate
__ocfs2_change_file_space
inode lock
lock ip_alloc_sem
ocfs2_remove_inode_range inode
ocfs2_remove_btree_range
ocfs2_remove_extent
^---remove the extent at cpos 78723
...
unlock ip_alloc_sem
inode unlock
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
lock ip_alloc_sem
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_search_extent_list
^---failed to find extent
...
unlock ip_alloc_sem
In most filesystems, fallocate is not compatible with racing with AIO+DIO,
so fix it by adding to wait for all dio before fallocate/punch_hole like
ext4. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: mesh: Fix leak of mesh_preq_queue objects
The hwmp code use objects of type mesh_preq_queue, added to a list in
ieee80211_if_mesh, to keep track of mpath we need to resolve. If the mpath
gets deleted, ex mesh interface is removed, the entries in that list will
never get cleaned. Fix this by flushing all corresponding items of the
preq_queue in mesh_path_flush_pending().
This should take care of KASAN reports like this:
unreferenced object 0xffff00000668d800 (size 128):
comm "kworker/u8:4", pid 67, jiffies 4295419552 (age 1836.444s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 1f 05 09 00 00 ff ff 00 d5 68 06 00 00 ff ff ..........h.....
8e 97 ea eb 3e b8 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....>...........
backtrace:
[<000000007302a0b6>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e0/0x35c
[<00000000049bd418>] kmalloc_trace+0x34/0x80
[<0000000000d792bb>] mesh_queue_preq+0x44/0x2a8
[<00000000c99c3696>] mesh_nexthop_resolve+0x198/0x19c
[<00000000926bf598>] ieee80211_xmit+0x1d0/0x1f4
[<00000000fc8c2284>] __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x30c/0x764
[<000000005926ee38>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x9c/0x7a4
[<000000004c86e916>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x174/0x440
[<0000000023495647>] __dev_queue_xmit+0xe24/0x111c
[<00000000cfe9ca78>] batadv_send_skb_packet+0x180/0x1e4
[<000000007bacc5d5>] batadv_v_elp_periodic_work+0x2f4/0x508
[<00000000adc3cd94>] process_one_work+0x4b8/0xa1c
[<00000000b36425d1>] worker_thread+0x9c/0x634
[<0000000005852dd5>] kthread+0x1bc/0x1c4
[<000000005fccd770>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffff000009051f00 (size 128):
comm "kworker/u8:4", pid 67, jiffies 4295419553 (age 1836.440s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
90 d6 92 0d 00 00 ff ff 00 d8 68 06 00 00 ff ff ..........h.....
36 27 92 e4 02 e0 01 00 00 58 79 06 00 00 ff ff 6'.......Xy.....
backtrace:
[<000000007302a0b6>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e0/0x35c
[<00000000049bd418>] kmalloc_trace+0x34/0x80
[<0000000000d792bb>] mesh_queue_preq+0x44/0x2a8
[<00000000c99c3696>] mesh_nexthop_resolve+0x198/0x19c
[<00000000926bf598>] ieee80211_xmit+0x1d0/0x1f4
[<00000000fc8c2284>] __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x30c/0x764
[<000000005926ee38>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x9c/0x7a4
[<000000004c86e916>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x174/0x440
[<0000000023495647>] __dev_queue_xmit+0xe24/0x111c
[<00000000cfe9ca78>] batadv_send_skb_packet+0x180/0x1e4
[<000000007bacc5d5>] batadv_v_elp_periodic_work+0x2f4/0x508
[<00000000adc3cd94>] process_one_work+0x4b8/0xa1c
[<00000000b36425d1>] worker_thread+0x9c/0x634
[<0000000005852dd5>] kthread+0x1bc/0x1c4
[<000000005fccd770>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
