| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: validate split-point offset in indx_insert_into_buffer
indx_insert_into_buffer() computes
used = used1 - to_copy - sp_size;
memmove(de_t, Add2Ptr(sp, sp_size), used - le32_to_cpu(hdr1->de_off));
where sp and sp_size come from hdr_find_split(). hdr_find_split()
walks entries by le16_to_cpu(e->size) without validating that each
step stays within hdr->used or that the size field is at least
sizeof(struct NTFS_DE). index_hdr_check(), the on-load gatekeeper,
only validates header-level fields (used, total, de_off) and does
not walk per-entry sizes.
A crafted NTFS image whose leaf INDEX_HDR reports used == total but
contains one interior NTFS_DE with size = 0xFFF0 therefore passes
validation, descends to indx_insert_into_buffer() through the
ntfs_create() -> indx_insert_entry() path, and makes hdr_find_split()
return an sp whose sp_size (0xFFF0) greatly exceeds the remaining
bytes in the buffer. The u32 subtraction underflows and the memmove
count becomes a near-4-GiB value, producing an out-of-bounds kernel
write that corrupts adjacent allocations and panics the kernel.
Reproduced on 7.0.0-rc7 with UML + KASAN via a crafted image and a
single 'touch' inside the mounted directory; crash site resolves to
fs/ntfs3/index.c at the memmove. Trigger requires only local mount
of an attacker-supplied filesystem image (USB, loopback, or removable
media auto-mount).
Reject the split whenever the chosen sp plus its declared size
already extends past hdr1->used. This is the minimal fix; it
preserves the existing hdr_find_split() contract and relies on the
same out: cleanup path as the pre-existing error returns.
A prior OOB read in the very same indx_insert_into_buffer() memmove
was fixed in commit b8c44949044e ("fs/ntfs3: Fix OOB read in
indx_insert_into_buffer") by tightening hdr_find_e(), but that fix
does not cover the split-point size field path addressed here: sp is
returned by hdr_find_split(), not hdr_find_e(), and the underflow is
driven by sp->size rather than hdr->used exceeding hdr->total. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: add depth limit to indx_find_buffer to prevent stack overflow
indx_find_buffer() recursively descends the B+ tree index with no depth
limit. A crafted NTFS image with circular index node references causes
unbounded recursion, overflowing the kernel stack and panicking the
system.
This is reachable by mounting a malicious NTFS filesystem (e.g. from a
USB drive via desktop automount) and deleting a file whose index entry
triggers the rebalancing fallback path in indx_delete_entry().
Add a depth parameter and bail out with -EINVAL when it reaches the
fnd->nodes array bound, matching the constraint already enforced by
fnd_push() in indx_find().
The related function indx_find() was previously patched for a similar
infinite-loop issue (commit 1732053c8a6b), but indx_find_buffer() was
missed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: bound attr_off in UpdateResidentValue against data_off
In do_action()'s UpdateResidentValue case (fslog.c:3307),
lrh->attr_off and lrh->redo_len come from the on-disk LRH.
When they satisfy aoff + dlen < attr->res.data_off, the
assignment
attr->res.data_size = cpu_to_le32(aoff + dlen - data_off);
underflows to ~4 GiB (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9 when aoff=0x10, dlen=1,
data_off=0x18). Subsequent code that reads attr->res.data_size
to walk the resident attribute payload would then read up to
4 GiB past the 1024-byte MFT record allocation.
The existing mi_enum_attr() defense in fs/ntfs3/record.c:287
catches the corrupted data_size on the next attribute walk
and fails the mount, but only on the path that walks all
attributes. A read site that picks an attribute by name and
reads its data_size without re-validating is not covered.
Validate aoff against data_off and asize at the source.
Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via
pr_warn-only probe: with aoff=0x10 and data_off=0x18, the
post-assignment data_size is 0xfffffff9 (mount then fails
at -22 from mi_enum_attr).
[[email protected]: clang-formatted the changes] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: centalize $INDEX_ROOT header validation
Add a dedicated helper to perform stricter validation of $INDEX_ROOT and
use it for both directory inodes and named index inodes. This keeps the
root size and header geometry checks consistent across both read paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: validate index block header more strictly
Modify ntfs_index_block_inconsisent() to perform stricter validation of
INDEX_HEADER geometry in INDX blocks, and update
ntfs_lookup_inode_by_name() to use that function to validate INDX
blocks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: grow index root value before reparent header update
ntfs_ir_reparent() moves the resident index root entries into an index
block and leaves a small root stub containing the child VCN. That root
stub can be larger than the existing resident value. For example, an
empty root with value_length 48 has an index area of 32 bytes, while the
large-index root stub needs index_length and allocated_size of 40 bytes.
The current code publishes the larger index.index_length and
index.allocated_size before resizing the resident value. If the resize
returns -ENOSPC, the recovery path can call ntfs_inode_add_attrlist(),
which looks attributes up again while the root header says
allocated_size 40 but the resident value still only provides 32 bytes of
index area. Lookup-time $INDEX_ROOT validation then correctly rejects
that transient layout as corrupt.
This reproduces as a generic/013 failure under qemu. In the failing run,
the transient root had value_len=48, index_size=32, index_length=40, and
allocated_size=40, and ntfsprogs-plus ntfsck reported "Corrupt index
root in MFT record 1177".
When the root stub grows, resize the resident value before publishing the
larger root header. If the resize fails, the old root remains valid for
recovery lookups. Keep the existing header-before-resize ordering for
shrink or same-size cases so the resident value never temporarily
exposes an allocated_size beyond its bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Bound-check xdr_buf_to_bvec() stores before writing
xdr_buf_to_bvec() writes a bio_vec into the caller's array before
testing whether that slot is in range, and the head branch performs
the store with no check at all. When the caller's budget is exactly
used up, the next store lands one element past the end of the array.
The overflow label returns count - 1, which masks the surplus store
but cannot undo it.
rq_bvec, the array passed by nfsd_vfs_write(), is allocated to
exactly rq_maxpages entries with no slack. The OOB store can land in
adjacent slab memory; the bv_len and bv_offset fields written there
are derived from client-supplied RPC payload sizes.
Move the in-range check ahead of the store in the head, page-loop,
and tail branches. With the check at the top of each sequence, count
is incremented only after a successful store, so the overflow label
can return count directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jbd2: fix integer underflow in jbd2_journal_initialize_fast_commit()
jbd2_journal_initialize_fast_commit() validates journal capacity by
checking (journal->j_last - num_fc_blks < JBD2_MIN_JOURNAL_BLOCKS).
Both j_last and num_fc_blks are unsigned, so when num_fc_blks exceeds
j_last the subtraction wraps to a large value, bypassing the bounds
check.
The resulting underflow corrupts j_last, j_fc_first, and j_free,
leading to journal abort.
Fix by checking num_fc_blks against j_last before the subtraction,
returning -EFSCORRUPTED. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: mcast: avoid OOB read of num_dests header
Before the access to struct batadv_tvlv_mcast_tracker's num_dests, it is
attempted to check whether enough space is actually in the network header.
But instead of using offsetofend() to check for the whole size (2) which
must be accessible, offsetof() of is called. The latter is always returning
0. The comparison with the network header length will always return that
enough data is available - even when only 1 or 0 bytes are accessible.
Instead of using offsetofend(), use the more common check for the whole
header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: avoid sk_socket dereference in selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
selinux_sctp_bind_connect() dereferences sk->sk_socket to pass a
struct socket * to selinux_socket_bind() and
selinux_socket_connect_helper(). However, when the hook is invoked
from the ASCONF softirq path (sctp_process_asconf), there is no file
reference guaranteeing that sk->sk_socket is non-NULL. The setsockopt
callers (bindx, connectx, set_primary, sendmsg connect) hold a file
reference and are not affected.
Both selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper()
immediately resolve sock->sk, never using the struct socket * for
anything else. Refactor the inner logic into helpers that take a
struct sock * directly so that selinux_sctp_bind_connect() never needs
to touch sk->sk_socket at all. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fhandle: reject detached mounts in capable_wrt_mount()
The recent fhandle RCU fix moved the mount namespace capability check
into capable_wrt_mount(), so a non-NULL mnt_namespace survives the
ns_capable() dereference. The helper still assumes the later
READ_ONCE(mount->mnt_ns) must be non-NULL because may_decode_fh()
checked is_mounted() first.
That assumption is not stable. A detached mount from
open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE) can be dissolved on fput while
open_by_handle_at() is between those checks, and umount_tree() can
clear mount->mnt_ns. If the helper observes NULL, it dereferences
mnt_ns->user_ns and panics.
Return false when the RCU read observes a detached mount. This keeps
the relaxed permission path conservative: a mount no longer attached
to a namespace cannot authorize open_by_handle_at() access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_multiq: Replace direct dequeue call with peek and qdisc_dequeue_peeked
multiq_dequeue() takes a packet from a band's child with a direct
->dequeue() call after multiq_peek() peeked it. When the child is
non-work-conserving the peek stashes the skb in the child's gso_skb, so
the direct dequeue returns a different skb and orphans the stash,
desyncing the child's qlen/backlog. With a qfq child reached through a
peeking parent (e.g. tbf) this re-enters the child on an emptied list and
dereferences NULL, panicking the kernel from softirq on ordinary egress.
Take the packet through qdisc_dequeue_peeked(), as sch_prio already does
and as sch_red and sch_sfb were just fixed to do. The helper is a no-op
when the child has no stash, so a work-conserving child is unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
espintcp: use sk_msg_free_partial to fix partial send
sk_msg_free_partial() ensures consistency of the skmsg at every
iteration, without having to manually handle uncharges and offsets.
This simplifies the code, and fixes some bugs in skmsg accounting when
we don't send the full contents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: cn10k: restrict VF LMTLINE sharing to its own PF
rvu_mbox_handler_lmtst_tbl_setup() uses req->base_pcifunc as a direct
index into the LMT map table to read another function's LMTLINE
physical base address and copy it into the caller's own LMT map table
entry. The mailbox dispatcher authenticates req->hdr.pcifunc from the
IRQ source, but req->base_pcifunc is a separate payload field and is
not sanitized.
Reject the request with -EPERM when a VF caller's base_pcifunc is not a
valid function under its own PF. is_pf_func_valid() bounds the FUNC field
to the PF's configured VF count, keeping the computed index inside the
caller's own slot block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: admin-gate legacy LLSEC dump operations
In net/ieee802154/netlink.c, the legacy IEEE802154_NL family ops table
builds the LLSEC dump entries (LLSEC_LIST_KEY, LLSEC_LIST_DEV,
LLSEC_LIST_DEVKEY, LLSEC_LIST_SECLEVEL) with IEEE802154_DUMP() which
sets no .flags, so generic netlink runs them ungated. The modern
nl802154 family admin-gates the equivalent reads via
NL802154_CMD_GET_SEC_KEY and friends with .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM.
Any local uid that can open AF_NETLINK / NETLINK_GENERIC can resolve
the "802.15.4 MAC" family and dump LLSEC_LIST_KEY on any wpan netdev
that has an LLSEC key installed; the dump handler writes the raw
16-byte AES-128 key bytes (IEEE802154_ATTR_LLSEC_KEY_BYTES, copied
verbatim from struct ieee802154_llsec_key.key) into the reply.
Recovering the AES key compromises 802.15.4 LLSEC link confidentiality
and authenticity, since LLSEC uses CCM* and the same key authenticates
and encrypts frames.
Impact: any local uid with no capabilities can read the raw 16-byte
AES-128 LLSEC key from the kernel keytable on any wpan netdev that has
an administrator-installed LLSEC key, by issuing an LLSEC_LIST_KEY
dump on the legacy IEEE802154_NL generic-netlink family.
Introduce IEEE802154_DUMP_PRIV() mirroring IEEE802154_DUMP() but
setting .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, and use it for the four LLSEC dump
entries. LIST_PHY and LIST_IFACE retain IEEE802154_DUMP() because the
modern nl802154 family exposes their equivalents to unprivileged
readers by design (NL802154_CMD_GET_WPAN_PHY and
NL802154_CMD_GET_INTERFACE carry "can be retrieved by unprivileged
users" annotations). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ip6_tunnel: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
ip6_tnl_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the
tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or
moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl
changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a
caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that
lives in t->net.
Gate ip6_tnl_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,
before any attribute is parsed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ip6_gre: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
ip6gre_changelink() and ip6erspan_changelink() operate on at most two
netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once
the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the
request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only
against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can
rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net.
Gate both ops on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at their top, before any
attribute is parsed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ip_vti: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
vti_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the
tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or
moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl
changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a
caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that
lives in t->net.
Gate vti_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,
before any attribute is parsed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ip6_vti: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
vti6_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the
tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or
moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl
changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a
caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that
lives in t->net.
Gate vti6_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,
before any attribute is parsed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ct: preserve tc_skb_cb across defragmentation
tcf_ct_handle_fragments() calls nf_ct_handle_fragments() without saving
and restoring skb->cb. The defrag helper clears IPCB/IP6CB, which aliases
the tc_skb_cb/qdisc_skb_cb control buffer. Fragmented traffic through
act_ct therefore loses qdisc metadata such as pkt_segs and can trigger
WARN_ON_ONCE() in qdisc_pkt_segs() when panic_on_warn is enabled.
Save and restore the full tc_skb_cb around nf_ct_handle_fragments(),
matching the pattern used by ovs_ct_handle_fragments(). |
