| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_flow: Dont expose folded kernel pointers
The flow classifier falls back to addr_fold() for fields that are missing
from packet headers. In map mode, userspace controls mask, xor, rshift,
addend and divisor, and can observe the resulting classid through class
statistics. This allows a tc classifier in a user/network namespace to
recover the 32-bit folded value of skb->sk, skb_dst() or skb_nfct().
Align with standard kernel practices for pointer hashing and replace the
XOR folding with a keyed siphash (which is cryptographically secure) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: fib: Don't dump dying fib_info in fib_leaf_notify().
syzbot reported use-after-free in nsim_fib4_prepare_event(). [0]
The problem is that the following functions call fib_info_hold() /
refcount_inc() while dumping fib_info under RCU, which is unsafe.
* mlxsw_sp_router_fib4_event()
* rocker_router_fib_event()
* nsim_fib4_prepare_event()
refcount_inc_not_zero() must be used, but it would be too late
there.
Let's guarantee the lifetime of fib_info in fib_leaf_notify().
Note that IPv6 does not need the corresponding change since
fib6_table_dump() holds fib6_table.tb6_lock.
[0]:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x9f/0x110 lib/refcount.c:25, CPU#0: kworker/u8:15/3420
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3420 Comm: kworker/u8:15 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/18/2026
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x9f/0x110 lib/refcount.c:25
Code: eb 66 85 db 74 3e 83 fb 01 75 4c e8 1b f1 22 fd 48 8d 3d 84 cb f1 0a 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 4a e8 08 f1 22 fd 48 8d 3d 81 cb f1 0a <67> 48 0f b9 3a eb 37 e8 f5 f0 22 fd 48 8d 3d 7e cb f1 0a 67 48 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f2c7270 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff84a18858 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff888032ff9ec0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff8f9353e0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888032ff9ec0 R09: 0000000000000005
R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ffff8880570cc000
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802b40563c R15: ffff8880570cc000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888126173000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fb1f4d5d000 CR3: 000000006072a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:-1 [inline]
__refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:366 [inline]
refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:383 [inline]
fib_info_hold include/net/ip_fib.h:629 [inline]
nsim_fib4_prepare_event drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:930 [inline]
nsim_fib_event_schedule_work drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1000 [inline]
nsim_fib_event_nb+0x1055/0x1240 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1043
call_fib_notifier+0x45/0x80 net/core/fib_notifier.c:25
call_fib_entry_notifier net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:90 [inline]
fib_leaf_notify net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2176 [inline]
fib_table_notify net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2194 [inline]
fib_notify+0x36b/0x5e0 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2217
fib_net_dump net/core/fib_notifier.c:70 [inline]
register_fib_notifier+0x184/0x360 net/core/fib_notifier.c:108
nsim_fib_create+0x85d/0x9f0 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1596
nsim_dev_reload_create drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1604 [inline]
nsim_dev_reload_up+0x374/0x7c0 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1058
devlink_reload+0x501/0x8d0 net/devlink/dev.c:475
devlink_pernet_pre_exit+0x1ff/0x420 net/devlink/core.c:558
ops_pre_exit_list net/core/net_namespace.c:161 [inline]
ops_undo_list+0x187/0x940 net/core/net_namespace.c:234
cleanup_net+0x56e/0x800 net/core/net_namespace.c:702
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3314 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xb5d/0x1860 kernel/workqueue.c:3397
worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0 kernel/workqueue.c:3478
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fib_rules: Don't dump dying fib_rule in fib_rules_dump().
rocker_router_fib_event() calls fib_rule_get() during RCU dump.
If the fib_rule is dying, refcount_inc() will complain about it.
Let's call refcount_inc_not_zero() in fib_rules_dump(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate embedded address parameter length
sctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_param() only validate ADD_IP, DEL_IP,
and SET_PRIMARY parameters against a fixed minimum size of sizeof(struct
sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This ensures the outer
parameter is large enough to contain an embedded address parameter header,
but does not verify that the embedded address parameter's declared length
fits within the bounds of the outer parameter.
Later, sctp_process_param() and sctp_process_asconf_param() extract the
embedded address parameter and pass it to af->from_addr_param(), which uses
the address parameter length to parse the variable-length address payload.
A malformed peer can therefore advertise an embedded address parameter
length that exceeds the remaining bytes in the enclosing parameter.
Validate that addr_param->p.length does not exceed the space available
after the sctp_addip_param header before processing the embedded address
parameter. Reject malformed parameters when the embedded address length
extends beyond the enclosing parameter bounds.
This prevents out-of-bounds reads when parsing malformed parameters carried
in INIT or ASCONF processing paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: pfcp: allocate per-cpu tstats for PFCP netdevs
PFCP uses dev_get_tstats64() as its ndo_get_stats64 callback, but
pfcp_link_setup() does not request NETDEV_PCPU_STAT_TSTATS. The net
core therefore leaves dev->tstats NULL for PFCP devices.
Creating a PFCP rtnetlink device can immediately ask the new netdev for
stats while building the RTM_NEWLINK notification. That reaches
dev_get_tstats64() and dereferences the NULL dev->tstats pointer.
Set pcpu_stat_type to NETDEV_PCPU_STAT_TSTATS during PFCP link setup so
the net core allocates the storage expected by dev_get_tstats64(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_hfsc: Don't make class passive twice
update_vf() is called from two places for the same class during a single
dequeue when the class's child qdisc (e.g. codel/fq_codel) drops its last
packets while dequeuing:
1. The child calls qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog(), which, now that the child
is empty, invokes hfsc_qlen_notify() -> update_vf(cl, 0, 0) and turns
the class passive (cl_nactive is decremented up the hierarchy).
2. hfsc_dequeue() then calls update_vf(cl, qdisc_pkt_len(skb), cur_time)
to charge the dequeued bytes.
On the second call the class is already passive, but its child qdisc is
still empty, so update_vf() arms go_passive again:
if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen == 0 && cl->cl_flags & HFSC_FSC)
go_passive = 1;
The leaf is then skipped by the cl_nactive == 0 check inside the loop,
which does not clear go_passive, so the stale go_passive propagates to the
parent and decrements its cl_nactive a second time. A parent that still
has other active children is driven to cl_nactive == 0 and removed from
the vttree, even though those siblings are still backlogged. They are
never dequeued again and the qdisc stalls.
Fix this by only arming go_passive when the class is actually active, so an
already-passive class no longer triggers a second passive transition. The
byte accounting (cl->cl_total += len) still runs for every ancestor, so
dequeued bytes continue to be counted exactly once. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK
tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count
from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it
does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:
tsk->snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);
msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK
message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction
wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true
and starving the connection of further transmits.
Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the
message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or,
for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a
TIPC connection's send side by sending an oversized connection ack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: marvell/octeontx - fix DMA cleanup using wrong loop index
The sg_cleanup path used list[i] instead of list[j] when unmapping DMA
buffers, leaking successfully mapped entries and repeatedly unmapping
the failed one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: cavium/cpt - fix DMA cleanup using wrong loop index
The sg_cleanup error path used list[i] instead of list[j] when unmapping
DMA buffers, leaking successfully mapped entries and repeatedly unmapping
the failed one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: Fix kernel heap address leak in bounce_error_event()
The comment above bounce_error_event() documents that user clients
should receive SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with the original event embedded
as variable-length data, while kernel clients should receive
SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR with a quoted kernel pointer.
However, the implementation unconditionally uses
SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR with data.quote.event set to the raw
struct snd_seq_event pointer for all clients. When a bounce error
event is delivered to a USER_CLIENT via snd_seq_read(), the kernel
heap address in data.quote.event is exposed to userspace through
copy_to_user() in the fixed-length branch.
This is a distinct leak path from the one addressed by commit
705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read"),
which sanitizes data.ext.ptr in the variable-length branch of
snd_seq_read(). The bounce_error_event() leak uses fixed-length
events that take the else branch where no sanitization occurs.
Differentiate the bounce event by client type. For USER_CLIENT,
send SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_VARIABLE
and data.ext pointing to the original event. The variable-length
path in snd_seq_event_dup() copies the event data into chained
cells, and snd_seq_expand_var_event() copies only the content --
never the pointer -- to userspace. For KERNEL_CLIENT, keep the
existing SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR behavior with the quoted
pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/region: Fix out-of-bounds access in cxl_cancel_auto_attach()
In cxl_cancel_auto_attach(), it assumes cxled->pos is a valid index for
accessing p->targets[]. However, cxled->pos can be set to negative errno
in cxl_region_sort_targets() if cxl_calc_interleave_pos() fails. This
causes the driver to use a negative index to access p->targets[],
resulting in out-of-bounds access.
Fix it by walking p->targets[] instead of using cxled->pos directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/region: Fill first free targets[] slot during auto-discovery
Any invalid endpoint decoder pointer in the target array of an active
region is not allowed by cxl driver. This means cxl driver always
assumes the first p->nr_targets entries of the target array in an
auto-assembly region are valid. However, there are scenarios that could
leave NULL endpoint decoder pointer holes in the target array.
1. When cxl_cancel_auto_attach() removes an endpoint decoder from a
target array, the target slot is set to NULL. If the removed endpoint
decoder is not the last element in the target array, the target array
will contain a NULL hole.
2. When a auto-assembly region removes an assigned endpoint decoder, if
the removed endpoint decoder is not the last element in the target
array, always remains a NULL hole in the target array.
When a NULL pointer hole exists in a region's target array, it
introduces two potential problems:
1. Access an endpoint decoder via a NULL pointer. it always trigger
calltrace like that.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000008: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
RIP: 0010:cxl_calc_interleave_pos+0x26/0x810 [cxl_core]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cxl_region_attach+0xc50/0x2140 [cxl_core]
cxl_add_to_region+0x321/0x2330 [cxl_core]
discover_region+0x92/0x150 [cxl_port]
device_for_each_child+0xf3/0x170
cxl_port_probe+0x150/0x200 [cxl_port]
cxl_bus_probe+0x4f/0xa0 [cxl_core]
really_probe+0x1c8/0x960
__driver_probe_device+0x323/0x450
driver_probe_device+0x45/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x15d/0x280
bus_for_each_drv+0x10f/0x190
2. Not having enough valid endpoint decoders attached to an
auto-assembly region. if an auto-assembly region is created with lock
flag or assigned endpoint decoder with lock flag, which means
assigned endpoint decoder will not be reset during detaching, they
could re-attach to the auto-assembly region again. But cxl region
driver relies on p->nr_targets to verify whether the required number
of endpoint decoders has been attached, and NULL endpoint decoder
pointers are still counted in that case.
To fix above issues, adjust cxl_region_attach_auto() logic to find the
first free target slot for endpoint decoder attachment, this ensures
NULL holes in the target array are filled, rather than adding new
endpoint decoders at the tail of the target array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/region: Block region delete during region creation
Expand the range lock, rename it "regions_lock", to disable region deletion
in the critical period between construct_region() and attach_target(), as
well as the period between device_add() and registering the remove actions.
Otherwise, userspace can confuse the kernel. It can violate the assumption
the region stays registered through the completion of cxl_add_to_region().
It can violate the assumption that devm_add_action_or_reset() is working
with a live 'struct cxl_region'.
It is ok for the region to disappear outside of those windows as that
mirrors device hotplug flows where the proper locks are held. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/region: Resolve region deletion races
Sungwoo noticed that the sysfs trigger to delete a region may try to delete
a region multiple times. It also has no exclusion relative to the kernel
releasing the region via CXL root device teardown.
Instead of installing new cxl root devres actions per region, use the
existing root decoder unregistration event to remove all remaining regions.
An xarray of regions replaces a devres list of regions.
This handles 3 separate issues with the old approach:
1/ sysfs users racing to delete the same region: no longer possible now
that the regions_lock is held over the lookup and deletion.
2/ multiple actions triggering deletion of the same region: solved by
erasing regions while holding @regions_lock, and only proceeding on
successful erasure.
3/ userspace racing devres_release_all() to trigger the devres not found
warning: solved by sysfs unregistration not requiring a release action |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_dualpi2: Do not call qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog during peek before restoring qlen
Whenever dualpi2 drops packets during peek, it calls
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog. An issue arises because it calls
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog before it reincrements the qlen. If qlen drops
to zero, but peek returns an skb, the parent's qlen_notify callback will be
executed even though dualpi2 still has 1 packet on the queue and, thus,
mistakenly deactivates the parent's class which leads to a null-ptr-deref:
[ 101.427314][ T599] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000009: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 101.427755][ T599] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000048-0x000000000000004f]
[ 101.428048][ T599] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 599 Comm: ping Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00284-gbce53c430ed7 #102 PREEMPT(full)
[ 101.428400][ T599] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 101.428608][ T599] RIP: 0010:qfq_dequeue (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1150) sch_qfq
[ 101.428821][ T599] Code: 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 46 0c 00 00 4c 8d 73 48 48 89 9d b8 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 2d 0c 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b
All code
[ 101.429348][ T599] RSP: 0018:ffff8881110df4f0 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 101.429541][ T599] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000
[ 101.429763][ T599] RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00000024c0000000 RDI: ffff88811436c2b0
[ 101.429985][ T599] RBP: ffff88811436c000 R08: ffff88811436c280 R09: 1ffff11021277523
[ 101.430206][ T599] R10: 1ffff11021277526 R11: 1ffff11021277527 R12: 00000024c0000000
[ 101.430423][ T599] R13: ffff88811436c2b8 R14: 0000000000000048 R15: 0000000020000000
[ 101.430642][ T599] FS: 00007f61813e1c40(0000) GS:ffff8881691ef000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 101.430913][ T599] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 101.431100][ T599] CR2: 00005651650850a8 CR3: 000000010ca0b000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[ 101.431320][ T599] PKRU: 55555554
[ 101.431433][ T599] Call Trace:
[ 101.431544][ T599] <TASK>
[ 101.431628][ T599] __qdisc_run (net/sched/sch_generic.c:322 net/sched/sch_generic.c:427 net/sched/sch_generic.c:445)
[ 101.431792][ T599] ? dev_qdisc_enqueue (./include/trace/events/qdisc.h:49 (discriminator 22) net/core/dev.c:4176 (discriminator 22))
[ 101.431941][ T599] __dev_queue_xmit (./include/net/pkt_sched.h:120 ./include/net/pkt_sched.h:117 net/core/dev.c:4292 net/core/dev.c:4831)
Fix this by only calling qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog in peek after the
qlen is restored. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: initialize gdma queue id to INVALID_QUEUE_ID
mana_gd_create_mana_wq_cq() leaves queue->id as 0 (from kzalloc_obj())
until mana_create_wq_obj() assigns the firmware-returned id. If creation
fails before that, cleanup calls mana_gd_destroy_cq() with id 0, NULLing
gc->cq_table[0] and silently breaking whichever real CQ owns that slot.
Initialize queue->id to INVALID_QUEUE_ID right after allocation, matching
mana_gd_create_eq(). The existing (id >= max_num_cqs) guard then
short-circuits cleanly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: watchdog: fix refcount tracking races
Blamed commit converted the untracked dev_hold()/dev_put() calls
in the watchdog code to use the tracked dev_hold_track()/dev_put_track()
(which were later renamed/interfaced to netdev_hold() and netdev_put()).
By introducing dev->watchdog_dev_tracker to store the
reference tracking information without adding synchronization
between netdev_watchdog_up() and dev_watchdog(), it enabled the
race condition where this pointer could be overwritten or freed
concurrently, leading to the list corruption crash syzbot reported:
list_del corruption, ffff888114a18c00->next is NULL
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:52 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 91 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026
Workqueue: events_unbound linkwatch_event
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0x22/0x2a lib/list_debug.c:52
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:132 [inline]
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:246 [inline]
list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:341 [inline]
ref_tracker_free+0x1a7/0x6c0 lib/ref_tracker.c:329
netdev_tracker_free include/linux/netdevice.h:4491 [inline]
netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4508 [inline]
netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4504 [inline]
netdev_watchdog_down net/sched/sch_generic.c:600 [inline]
dev_deactivate_many+0x28c/0xfe0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1363
dev_deactivate+0x109/0x1d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1397
linkwatch_do_dev net/core/link_watch.c:184 [inline]
linkwatch_do_dev+0xd3/0x120 net/core/link_watch.c:166
__linkwatch_run_queue+0x3a5/0x810 net/core/link_watch.c:240
linkwatch_event+0x8f/0xc0 net/core/link_watch.c:314
process_one_work+0xa0e/0x1980 kernel/workqueue.c:3314
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3397 [inline]
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3478
kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x69a/0xc80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
This patch has three coordinated parts:
1) Add dev->watchdog_lock and dev->watchdog_ref_held to serialize watchdog operations.
2) Remove netdev_watchdog_up() call from netif_carrier_on():
This ensures netdev_watchdog_up() is only called from process/BH context
(via linkwatch workqueue dev_activate()), allowing us to use
spin_lock_bh() for synchronization.
3) Synchronize watchdog up and watchdog timer:
Protect netdev_watchdog_up() with tx_global_lock and watchdog_lock.
Only allocate a new tracker in netdev_watchdog_up() if one is
not already present.
In dev_watchdog(), ensure we don't release the tracker if the
timer was rescheduled either by dev_watchdog() itself or concurrently
by netdev_watchdog_up(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: remove all cifs files before kill super
Cifs files may be put into fileinfo_put_wq during umounting cifs.
After umount done, cifsFileInfo_put_final is called, which cause
following BUG:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
[ 134.222152] list_lru_add+0x64/0x1a0
[ 134.222399] ? cifs_put_tcon+0x171/0x340 [cifs]
[ 134.222772] d_lru_add+0x44/0x60
[ 134.222997] dput+0x1fc/0x210
[ 134.223213] cifsFileInfo_put_final+0x11a/0x140 [cifs]
[ 134.223576] process_one_work+0x17c/0x320
[ 134.223843] worker_thread+0x188/0x280
[ 134.224084] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 134.224366] kthread+0xcc/0x100
[ 134.224576] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 134.224827] ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
[ 134.225063] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 134.225328] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
This can be reproduce by following:
unshare -n bash -c "
mkdir -p ${CIFS_MNT}
ip netns attach root 1
ip link add eth0 type veth peer veth0 netns root
ip link set eth0 up
ip -n root link set veth0 up
ip addr add 192.168.0.2/24 dev eth0
ip -n root addr add 192.168.0.1/24 dev veth0
ip route add default via 192.168.0.1 dev eth0
ip netns exec root sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
ip netns exec root iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.2 -o
${DEV} -j MASQUERADE
mount -t cifs ${CIFS_PATH} ${CIFS_MNT} -o
vers=3.0,sec=ntlmssp,credentials=${CIFS_CRED},rsize=65536,wsize=65536,cache=none,echo_interval=1
touch ${CIFS_MNT}/a.txt
ip netns exec root iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.2 -o
${DEV} -j MASQUERADE
"
umount ${CIFS_MNT} |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Guard __get_user acesss with access_ok for uprobe_multi data
As reported by sashiko [1] we need to use access_ok to check the user
space data bounds before we use __get-user to get it.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: fix integer overflow in bpf_msg_pop_data() bounds check
start and len are u32, so
u64 last = start + len;
evaluates start + len in 32-bit and wraps before storing it in last.
The bounds check
if (start >= offset + l || last > msg->sg.size)
return -EINVAL;
can then be passed with an out-of-range start/len, after which the pop
loop runs off the end of the scatterlist and sk_msg_shift_left() calls
put_page() on the empty msg->sg.end slot:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
RIP: 0010:sk_msg_shift_left net/core/filter.c:2957 [inline]
RIP: 0010:____bpf_msg_pop_data net/core/filter.c:3103 [inline]
RIP: 0010:bpf_msg_pop_data+0x753/0x1a10 net/core/filter.c:2984
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bpf_prog_4cc92c278f4d5d56+0x1b1/0x1e8
bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0x107/0x320 include/linux/filter.h:746
sk_psock_msg_verdict+0x357/0x7f0 net/core/skmsg.c:934
tcp_bpf_send_verdict net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:420 [inline]
tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x766/0x1ae0 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:583
__sock_sendmsg+0x153/0x1c0 net/socket.c:802
__sys_sendto+0x326/0x430 net/socket.c:2265
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100 net/socket.c:2268
do_syscall_64+0x14c/0x480
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Widen the addition with a (u64) cast so the bound is evaluated in
64-bit and a len near U32_MAX no longer wraps below msg->sg.size.
While here, change pop from int to u32. It counts bytes against the
unsigned scatterlist lengths and can never be negative, so the signed
type only invites sign-confusion in the pop loop. |
