| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix zeropoint update where i_size > remote_i_size
Fix the update of the zero point[*] by netfs_release_folio() when there is
uncommitted data in the pagecache beyond the folio being released but the
on-server EOF is in this folio (ie. i_size > remote_i_size). The update
needs to limit zero_point to remote_i_size, not i_size as i_size is a local
phenomenon reflecting updates made locally to the pagecache, not stuff
written to the server. remote_i_size tracks the server's i_size.
[*] The zero point is the file position from which we can assume that the
server will just return zeros, so we can avoid generating reads.
Note that netfs_invalidate_folio() probably doesn't need fixing as
zero_point should be updated by setattr after truncation or fallocate.
Found with:
fsx -q -N 1000000 -p 10000 -o 128000 -l 600000 \
/xfstest.test/junk --replay-ops=junk.fsxops
using the following as junk.fsxops:
truncate 0x0 0x1bbae 0x82864
write 0x3ef2e 0xf9c8 0x1bbae
write 0x67e05 0xcb5a 0x4e8f6
mapread 0x57781 0x85b6 0x7495f
copy_range 0x5d3d 0x10329 0x54fac 0x7495f
write 0x64710 0x1c2b 0x7495f
mapread 0x64000 0x1000 0x7495f
on cifs with the default cache option.
It shows read-gaps on folio 0x64 failing with a short read (ie. it hits
EOF) if the FMODE_READ check is commented out in netfs_perform_write():
if (//(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) ||
netfs_is_cache_enabled(ctx)) {
and no fscache. This was initially found with the generic/522 xfstest. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix potential for tearing in ->remote_i_size and ->zero_point
Fix potential tearing in using ->remote_i_size and ->zero_point by copying
i_size_read() and i_size_write() and using the same seqcount as for i_size.
We need to make sure that netfslib and the filesystems that use it always
hold i_lock whilst updating any of the sizes to prevent i_size_seqcount
from getting corrupted. |
| In Eclipse Jetty, the HTTP/1.1 parser is vulnerable to request smuggling when chunk extensions are used, similar to the "funky chunks" techniques outlined here:
* https://w4ke.info/2025/06/18/funky-chunks.html
* https://w4ke.info/2025/10/29/funky-chunks-2.html
Jetty terminates chunk extension parsing at \r\n inside quoted strings instead of treating this as an error.
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
1;ext="val
X
0
GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1
...
Note how the chunk extension does not close the double quotes, and it is able to inject a smuggled request. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.5, Kiota resolved OpenAPI $ref values by fetching remote http(s) URLs and reading local absolute or out-of-tree file paths, allowing `kiota generate` on an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced description to perform build-time SSRF, remote file inclusion, and local file inclusion by inlining external schemas such as REMOTE_KIOTA_PROP or Leaked into generated clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.5 by AllowedExternalOriginsStreamLoader and the --allowed-external-origins option. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.5, Kiota emitted x-ms-kiota-info clientClassName and clientNamespaceName values without identifier or path sanitization as both generated client class or namespace names and generated output path components when `kiota generate` ran without -c/--class-name, allowing an attacker-controlled or compromised OpenAPI description to write generated source outside the -o output directory and inject arbitrary text into generated class or namespace declarations. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.5 by GenerationConfiguration.SanitizeClientClassName and SanitizeClientNamespaceName. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.5, `kiota info` read x-ms-kiota-info.languagesInformation.<language>.dependencyInstallCommand plus dependency name and version values from an OpenAPI description and presented the spec-supplied command as Kiota's recommended install command, allowing an attacker-controlled or compromised description to cause command injection when the suggested command was run manually or through the Kiota VS Code extension's kiota info --json dependency-install flow. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.5. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.5, `kiota plugin add` and `kiota plugin generate` (with `-t APIPlugin`) emitted attacker-controlled static_template.file values from x-ai-adaptive-card and x-ai-capabilities into generated Microsoft 365 Copilot and Teams plugin manifests without path validation, allowing ../, absolute, rooted, UNC, Windows drive, or URI paths in response_semantics.static_template.file to cause path traversal or out-of-package file inclusion when the generated plugin was deployed. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.5. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.5, Kiota honored a poisoned .kiota/workspace.json workspace configuration without validating per-client or per-plugin outputPath values during kiota client generate and kiota plugin generate, allowing a malicious repository or pull request to use absolute paths, rooted POSIX / paths, UNC \\ or // paths, Windows drive X:\ paths, or .. traversal segments to write generated client files outside the workspace root on a developer or CI host. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.5. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.4, Kiota's PHP generator embedded OpenAPI description, default fields, property names, and other schema-derived strings into PHP double-quoted literals through SanitizeDoubleQuote() in Writers/StringExtensions.cs without escaping $, allowing attacker-controlled ${...}, $var, or {$obj->prop} interpolation constructs to inject arbitrary PHP code into generated model and request-builder classes. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.4. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.0, Kiota's Python generator let attacker-controlled enum value descriptions from x-ms-enum.values[].description flow through KiotaBuilder.SetEnumOptions into Documentation.DescriptionTemplate and PythonConventionService.RemoveInvalidDescriptionCharacters without newline sanitization, allowing generated inline comments to split and execute attacker-controlled Python code at module scope when generated modules were imported. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.0. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.0, Kiota's Ruby generator embedded OpenAPI default fields, property names, and other schema-derived strings through CodeMethodWriter.cs and SanitizeForQuotedLiteral() in Writers/StringExtensions.cs into Ruby double-quoted literals without escaping #, allowing attacker-controlled #{expr}, #$var, or #@var interpolation markers to inject arbitrary Ruby code into generated model classes. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.0. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.3, Kiota is affected by a code-generation injection vulnerability in the C# XML documentation-comment sink (the description, externalDocs label, and externalDocs link fields emitted as /// … comments). When text from an OpenAPI description is written into single-line XML doc comments without stripping newline and Unicode line-terminator characters, an attacker can break out of the /// comment line and inject additional code into generated C# clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.3. |
| Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Versions prior to 1.29.1 and 1.31.1 are affected by a code-generation literal injection vulnerability in multiple writer sinks (for example: serialization/deserialization keys, path/query parameter mappings, URL template metadata, enum/property metadata, and default value emission). When malicious values from an OpenAPI description are emitted into generated source without context-appropriate escaping, an attacker can break out of string literals and inject additional code into generated clients. This issue is only practically exploitable when the OpenAPI description used for generation is from an untrusted source, or a normally trusted OpenAPI description has been compromised/tampered with. Only generating from trusted, integrity-protected API descriptions significantly reduces the risk. To remediate the issue, upgrade Kiota to 1.29.1, 1.31.1, or later and regenerate/refresh existing generated clients as a precaution. Refreshing generated clients ensures previously generated vulnerable code is replaced with hardened output. |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle HCM Configuration Workbench product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Install). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle HCM Configuration Workbench. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle HCM Configuration Workbench accessible data as well as unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle HCM Configuration Workbench accessible data and unauthorized ability to cause a partial denial of service (partial DOS) of Oracle HCM Configuration Workbench. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.3 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK
tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count
from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it
does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:
tsk->snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);
msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK
message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction
wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true
and starving the connection of further transmits.
Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the
message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or,
for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a
TIPC connection's send side by sending an oversized connection ack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: meson: aiu: Validate written enum values
The AIU HDMI and internal codec mux put callbacks use the written enum
value with snd_soc_enum_item_to_val() before checking whether the value is
valid for the enumeration.
Reject out-of-range values before converting the enum item, matching the
validation already done by the G12A HDMI and internal codec mux controls. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci: validate codec capability element length
Read Local Codec Capabilities returns a sequence of capability elements.
Each element starts with a one-byte length followed by that many payload
bytes.
hci_read_codec_capabilities() checks that the skb contains the length
byte, but then validates only caps->len against the remaining skb
length. A malformed controller response with one remaining byte and
caps->len set to one passes that check even though the element needs two
bytes. The parser then records a two-byte capability and copies one
byte beyond the advertised response payload into the codec list.
Validate the full element size, including the length byte, before adding
it to the accumulated capability length. This preserves all well-formed
capability elements and drops only truncated controller responses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lockd: Avoid hashing uninitialized bytes in nlm4svc_lookup_file()
file_hash() digests the first LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE bytes of
nfs_fh.data when bucketing nlm_files[], independent of fh.size.
Commit 3de744ee4e45 ("lockd: Use xdrgen XDR functions for the
NLMv4 TEST procedure") set .pc_argzero to zero for the converted
procedures and moved file-handle population into
nlm4svc_lookup_file(), which copies only xdr_lock->fh.len bytes
into lock->fh.data.
When an NLMv4 client presents a file handle shorter than
LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE, bytes fh.len..31 retain whatever the argument
buffer held from an earlier request. The same wire handle then
hashes to different buckets across calls; nlm_lookup_file() misses
the existing nlm_file entry, and lock-state lookups fail.
Zero only the tail bytes that file_hash() would otherwise consume.
Handles of LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE or larger already populate every byte
that file_hash() reads. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix invalid pointer dereference in __btrfs_run_delayed_refs()
In the beginning of the loop, we try to obtain a locked delayed ref head,
if 'locked_ref' is currently NULL, by calling btrfs_select_ref_head(),
which can return an error pointer. If the error pointer is -EAGAIN we do
a continue and go back to the beginning of the loop, which will not try
again to call btrfs_select_ref_head() since 'locked_ref' is no longer
NULL but it's ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN), and then we do:
spin_lock(&locked_ref->lock);
against a ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN) value, generating an invalid pointer
dereference.
Fix this by ensuring that 'locked_ref' is set to NULL when
btrfs_select_ref_head() returns ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN) and incrementing 'count'
as well, to prevent infinite looping. We do this by doing a goto to the
bottom of the loop that already sets 'locked_ref' to NULL and does a
cond_resched(), with an increment to 'count' right before the goto.
These measures were in place before the refactoring in commit 0110a4c43451
("btrfs: refactor __btrfs_run_delayed_refs loop") but were unintentionally
lost afterwards. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: fix wrong pci_get_drvdata type in AER handlers
rtw89 stores an ieee80211_hw pointer via pci_set_drvdata() at probe
time, but io_error_detected() and io_resume() retrieve it as a
net_device pointer. This causes netif_device_detach/attach to
operate on an ieee80211_hw struct, reading and writing at wrong
offsets. The adjacent io_slot_reset() already does it correctly.
Use ieee80211_stop_queues/wake_queues instead, consistent with
every other queue stop/start path in the driver.
Tested on RTL8852CE by calling the handlers from a test module
before and after the fix. |
