| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: add missing device refcount for CAN filter removal
sashiko-bot remarked a problem with a concurrent device unregistration
in isotp.c which also is present in the bcm.c code. A former fix for raw.c
commit c275a176e4b6 ("can: raw: add missing refcount for memory leak fix")
introduced a netdevice_tracker which solves the issue for bcm.c too.
bcm_release(), bcm_delete_rx_op() and bcm_notifier() relied on
dev_get_by_index(ifindex) to re-find the device for an rx_op before
unregistering its filter. If a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER has already
unlisted the device from the ifindex table, that lookup fails and
can_rx_unregister() is silently skipped, leaving a stale CAN filter
pointing at the soon-to-be-freed bcm_op/socket.
Hold a netdev_hold()/netdev_put() tracked reference on op->rx_reg_dev
from the moment the rx filter is registered in bcm_rx_setup() until it
is unregistered in bcm_rx_unreg(), and use that reference directly in
bcm_release() and bcm_delete_rx_op() instead of re-looking the device
up by ifindex. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information due to a byte-count and element-count confusion. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to an off-by-one error in bounds checking. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to an out-of-bounds write. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211_hwsim: clamp virtio RX length before skb_put
hwsim_virtio_rx_work() passes the virtqueue used-ring length reported by
the device straight to skb_put() on a fixed-size receive skb. A backend
reporting a length larger than the skb tailroom drives skb_put() past the
buffer end and hits skb_over_panic() -- a host-triggerable guest panic
(denial of service).
Clamp the length to the skb's available room before skb_put(). A
conforming device never reports more than the posted buffer size, so valid
frames are unaffected; a truncated over-report then fails the
length/header checks in hwsim_virtio_handle_cmd() and is dropped, so
truncating rather than dropping here cannot be turned into a parsing
problem. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: nl80211: free RNR data on MBSSID mismatch
nl80211_parse_beacon() rejects EMA RNR data when there are fewer RNR
entries than MBSSID entries.
The rejected RNR allocation has not been attached to the beacon data yet,
so free it before returning the error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: sata_dwc_460ex: enable SATA interrupts only after IRQ handler is registered
sata_dwc_enable_interrupts() is called before platform_get_irq() and
ata_host_activate(), leaving the SATA controller's interrupt mask
enabled without a registered handler. If a later step fails (irq
request, phy init, etc.) or if the controller asserts an interrupt
during probe, the irq line may fire with no handler, causing a
spurious interrupt storm.
Move sata_dwc_enable_interrupts() after ata_host_activate() so that
interrupts are only unmasked once the handler is registered and the
core is fully initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: dummy_hcd: prevent fifo_req reuse during giveback
dummy_hcd embeds a single shared usb_request (dum->fifo_req) that the
"emulated single-request FIFO" fast-path in dummy_queue() reuses for
small IN transfers: it copies the caller's request into it
(req->req = *_req) and queues it, treating list_empty(&fifo_req.queue)
as "the slot is free".
The completion side (dummy_timer/transfer/nuke/dummy_dequeue) follows
the standard pattern: list_del_init(&req->queue) unlinks the request,
then the lock is dropped and usb_gadget_giveback_request() invokes
req->complete(). But list_del_init() makes fifo_req.queue look empty
*before* the completion callback returns, so a concurrent dummy_queue()
on another CPU sees the slot as free, reuses fifo_req and runs
req->req = *_req -- overwriting req->complete while dummy_timer is
mid-calling it. The indirect call then jumps to a clobbered pointer,
causing a general protection fault / page fault in dummy_timer
(syzkaller extid faf3a6cf579fc65591ca). The clobbering write is an
in-bounds memcpy on a live shared object, so KASAN cannot flag it.
Add a fifo_req_busy bit covering the shared request's whole lifetime:
set it in dummy_queue() when the FIFO fast-path takes fifo_req (making
it the fast-path guard, replacing the list_empty(&fifo_req.queue)
test), and clear it after the completion callback has returned, via a
dummy_giveback() helper used at all four gadget-request giveback
sites. The shared slot can no longer be reused until its completion
callback has finished. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: printer: fix infinite loop in printer_read()
printer_read() uses the same variable for the requested copy size and
the number of bytes actually copied to user space. copy_to_user()
returns the number of bytes not copied, so when it fails to copy
anything, the computed copied length becomes zero.
In that case len, buf, current_rx_bytes and current_rx_buf are left
unchanged. If RX data is available and the user buffer remains
unwritable, the read loop can repeat indefinitely.
Track the copied length separately and return -EFAULT, or the number of
bytes already copied, if an iteration makes no progress. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uvc: clamp SEND_RESPONSE length to the response buffer
uvc_send_response() builds the UVC control response from a user-supplied
struct uvc_request_data:
req->length = min_t(unsigned int, uvc->event_length, data->length);
...
memcpy(req->buf, data->data, req->length);
req->length is clamped to uvc->event_length, which is taken from the
host control request wLength (up to UVC_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE, 64), and to
data->length, which comes from the UVCIOC_SEND_RESPONSE ioctl and is
only checked for being negative. The source buffer data->data is only
60 bytes, so a response with uvc->event_length and data->length both
greater than 60 makes memcpy() read past the end of data->data.
Clamp req->length to sizeof(data->data) as well. |
| An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when the Windows State Repository Service improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code in an elevated context.
An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by running a specially crafted application on the victim system.
The update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way the Windows State Repository Service handles objects in memory. |
| An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when the Windows State Repository Service improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code in an elevated context.
An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by running a specially crafted application on the victim system.
The update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way the Windows State Repository Service handles objects in memory. |
| An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when the Windows State Repository Service improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code in an elevated context.
An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by running a specially crafted application on the victim system.
The update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way the Windows State Repository Service handles objects in memory. |
| An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when the Windows State Repository Service improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code in an elevated context.
An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by running a specially crafted application on the victim system.
The update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way the Windows State Repository Service handles objects in memory. |
| An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists when the Windows State Repository Service improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code in an elevated context.
An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by running a specially crafted application on the victim system.
The update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way the Windows State Repository Service handles objects in memory. |
| A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Jet Database Engine improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could execute arbitrary code on a victim system.
An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by enticing a victim to open a specially crafted file.
The update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way the Windows Jet Database Engine handles objects in memory. |
| A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Jet Database Engine improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could execute arbitrary code on a victim system.
An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by enticing a victim to open a specially crafted file.
The update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way the Windows Jet Database Engine handles objects in memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix NULL pointer dereference in ath11k_hal_srng_access_begin
In ATH11K_QMI_EVENT_FW_READY, ATH11K_FLAG_REGISTERED is set
unconditionally even when ath11k_core_qmi_firmware_ready() fails.
This leaves the driver in an inconsistent state where
initialization is considered complete although the firmware ready
handling did not finish successfully. During the subsequent SSR,
the driver enters the restart path based on this incorrect state
and dereferences uninitialized srng members, resulting in a NULL
pointer dereference.
Call trace:
ath11k_hal_srng_access_begin+0xc/0x60 [ath11k] (P)
ath11k_ce_cleanup_pipes+0x17c/0x180 [ath11k]
ath11k_core_restart+0x40/0x168 [ath11k]
Fix this by:
- skipping firmware_ready if ATH11K_FLAG_REGISTERED is already set
- setting ATH11K_FLAG_REGISTERED only when firmware_ready succeeds
- setting ATH11K_FLAG_QMI_FAIL and aborting the FW_READY handling
on error
Tested-on: WCN6750 hw1.0 AHB WLAN.MSL.2.0.c2-00204-QCAMSLSWPLZ-1 |
| A spoofing vulnerability exists in Microsoft Power BI Report Server in the way it validates the content-type of uploaded attachments. An authenticated attacker could exploit the vulnerability by uploading a specially crafted payload and sending it to the user.
The attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could then perform actions and run scripts in the security context of the user.
This security update addresses the vulnerability by ensuring Power BI Report Server properly validates content-type of the attachments when uploading and opening. |