| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - cancel work on re-enable SR-IOV timeout
The QAT reset worker queues SR-IOV reenable work using a work_struct and
completion embedded in an on-stack adf_sriov_dev_data. If the completion
wait times out, the reset worker can return while device_sriov_wq still
holds or executes the stack-backed work item.
Cancel the work on the device_sriov_wq on timeout before the stack frame
unwinds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/resctrl: Prevent use-after-free in rdtgroup_kn_put()
A struct rdtgroup is reference counted via rdtgroup::waitcount. Callers that
need the structure to remain valid across a sleep (while waiting on acquiring
rdtgroup_mutex) take a reference with rdtgroup_kn_get() and release it with
rdtgroup_kn_put().
The release path is intended to serve as the fallback freer: if the count
drops to zero and the group has already been marked RDT_DELETED,
rdtgroup_kn_put() frees the structure.
The bulk teardown paths free_all_child_rdtgrp() and rmdir_all_sub() resulting
from a resctrl directory remove or resctrl fs unmount act as the primary
freer: they hold rdtgroup_mutex and free each rdtgroup whose waitcount is
zero, otherwise they set RDT_DELETED and leave the freeing to the last waiter.
These two freers race. rdtgroup_kn_put() commits waitcount == 0 with
atomic_dec_and_test() outside rdtgroup_mutex, then reads rdtgroup::flags.
Between those two operations a concurrent caller of free_all_child_rdtgrp()
or rmdir_all_sub() (which holds the mutex) can observe waitcount == 0 via
atomic_read(), call rdtgroup_remove(), and kfree() the structure.
The subsequent read of rdtgroup::flags in rdtgroup_kn_put() is then
a use-after-free, and the structure may even be freed twice if the freed
memory happens to satisfy the RDT_DELETED flag check.
Replace the bare atomic_dec_and_test() with atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock() so
that the decrement-to-zero takes rdtgroup_mutex before the count becomes
globally visible. The inspection of rdtgroup::flags then runs under the same
mutex held by the bulk freers, making the two paths mutually exclusive.
The common case where the count does not reach zero remains lock-free. Defer
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection() until after the mutex is dropped since
kernfs active protections functionally wrap rdtgroup_mutex. Remove resource
group, which in turn drops its kernfs reference, after kernfs protection is
restored.
[ bp: Split the commit messsages into smaller, easier-parseable paragraphs. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/ipoib: Drain RCU callbacks during module teardown
IPoIB reclamation completions can be signaled from inside an RCU callback.
Teardown can wake before the callback returns and unload ib_ipoib while its
code is still executing.
Client registration failure can also remove already-added devices and queue
callbacks. Wait after client and workqueue teardown. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Wait for RCU callbacks before unloading ib_core
put_gid_ndev() is queued with call_rcu() and implemented in ib_core.
Stopping the workqueues does not drain callbacks already queued, so RCU
could invoke it after the module code has been unloaded.
synchronize_rcu() does not wait for callbacks. Wait for them after all
producers have stopped. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: mtdswap: Avoid freeing registered blktrans device twice
In mtdswap_add_mtd(), debugfs setup failure after successful blktrans
registration can free mbd_dev twice.
add_mtd_blktrans_dev() initializes the blktrans device reference and
publishes the disk. Once that succeeds, del_mtd_blktrans_dev() tears the
disk down and drops the blktrans reference; when that reference reaches
zero, blktrans_dev_release() frees the mtd_blktrans_dev.
The debugfs failure path called del_mtd_blktrans_dev(mbd_dev), then fell
through the common cleanup label and called kfree(mbd_dev) again. Clear
the local pointer after deregistration so the common cleanup can still
release the mtdswap state without freeing the blktrans object twice.
This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by
manual source review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipack: ipoctal: fix UAF, null-ptr-deref, and use-after-free in cleanup on remove
Three issues arise when the device is removed while a tty session is
still active:
1. UAF of struct ipoctal: the remove callback frees ipoctal via
kfree() while tty ops may still access it. Fix by introducing
kref-based lifetime management — kref is taken in install() when
a tty is opened and released in cleanup() when the tty is finally
destroyed; remove() uses kref_put() instead of kfree().
2. NULL dereference in ipoctal_write_tty(): __ipoctal_remove()
frees xmit_buf via tty_port_free_xmit_buf() while a userspace
process may still hold the tty fd and call write(). Fix by
checking for NULL xmit_buf in ipoctal_write_tty().
3. UAF in ipoctal_cleanup(): ipack_put_carrier(ipoctal->dev)
dereferences ipoctal->dev after the ipack_device has been freed
by ipack_device_del(). Fix by caching ipoctal->carrier_owner
during probe() and calling module_put() on the cached pointer
directly in cleanup(), avoiding any access to ipoctal->dev.
Also introduce a "removed" flag in struct ipoctal, set at the start
of __ipoctal_remove(), and checked in every tty op that accesses
hardware resources (port_activate, write_tty, set_termios, hangup,
shutdown). This prevents page faults when devm_ioremap() regions
are unmapped after remove() returns. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: Only fini scheduler after successful init
msm_ringbuffer_new() destroys a partially initialized ring through
msm_ringbuffer_destroy() when an allocation or scheduler setup step
fails.
If drm_sched_init() fails before it finishes initializing the scheduler,
the failure path still calls drm_sched_fini(). That teardown path assumes
the scheduler work items, lists, and workqueue state were initialized.
Track successful scheduler initialization and call drm_sched_fini() only
after drm_sched_init() returned 0.
This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by
manual source review.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/738905/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm/pat: Take cpa_lock around large-page collapse
Loading and unloading modules concurrently on several CPUs on a KASAN
build, with a short delay injected at the CPA page-table lookup to
widen the window, faults within minutes:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __change_page_attr+0x7cc/0x7e0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888181139718 by task modprobe
...
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
pfn:0x181139 ... page_type: f2(table)
cpa_collapse_large_pages() rebuilds a leaf PMD from its 4K PTEs and
frees the old PTE-table pages, while __change_page_attr() fetches a
PTE pointer from a lockless lookup_address_in_pgd_attr() and writes
it with set_pte_atomic() only later. When module text is served from
a shared large ROX mapping the two run on the same PMD:
CPU A (module load) CPU B (module finalize)
------------------- -----------------------
execmem_make_temp_rw
set_memory_nx
__change_page_attr
split 2M -> 4K table P
kpte = &P[i] (lockless)
execmem_restore_rox
set_memory_rox (CPA_COLLAPSE)
cpa_collapse_large_pages
rebuild leaf PMD
flush_tlb_all
pagetable_free(P)
set_pte_atomic(kpte, ...)
-> writes into freed P
P is a page-table page (page_type: table), reused at once, so the
write corrupts whatever got the page next: a bad-pte or bad-page
splat, or a fatal fault once P has been turned into read-only text.
The flush_tlb_all() before the free does not close this: its IPI only
serializes against page-table walkers that run with interrupts off
(e.g. GUP-fast); the walk in __change_page_attr() runs with interrupts
on, so nothing stops it from holding a stale pointer into P.
Serialize the collapse - the PMD rebuild, TLB flush and PTE-table
free - under cpa_lock, the same lock __change_page_attr() now takes
unconditionally since commit ("x86/mm/pat: stop gating cpa_lock on
debug_pagealloc_enabled()"), so a concurrent walker can no longer
hold a pointer into a table the collapse is about to free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix DM I2C teardown race
DM I2C adapters can remain visible to userspace while DM teardown is
already in progress. A concurrent i2c-dev transfer may then enter
amdgpu_dm_i2c_xfer() after the backing DM state has been torn down,
leading to a NULL pointer dereference.
Create a devres group around the DM I2C adapter lifetime and release it
at the start of dm_hw_fini(), before HPD, IRQ, and DM state are torn
down. This removes the I2C adapters first and waits for in-flight users
to drain before the structures used by amdgpu_dm_i2c_xfer() disappear.
This fixes a teardown ordering race seen during device removal:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference
RIP: amdgpu_dm_i2c_xfer+0x122/0x1c0 [amdgpu]
Call Trace:
__i2c_transfer
i2c_transfer
i2cdev_ioctl_rdwr |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix transport device teardown lookup
SCMI transport devices are deliberately excluded from normal SCMI bus
matching so protocol drivers cannot bind to the internal transport
children. However, scmi_device_destroy() uses the same protocol/name
lookup to find devices that must be unregistered during channel teardown.
Split the match helper so driver matching still skips transport devices,
while explicit child lookup can find them for teardown. Use a shared
transport-device name prefix macro for both matching and name generation.
Since transport-device names are derived from direction and protocol ID,
reject duplicate protocol channel setup before creating or finding a
transport device. This prevents malformed firmware with duplicate
protocol child nodes from reusing an existing transport device and then
destroying it when the duplicate IDR insertion fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix SCMI device destroy lifetimes
scmi_child_dev_find() drops the reference returned by
device_find_child() before returning the scmi_device pointer. A
concurrent unregister can then release the device while the destroy path
is still using the returned pointer.
Make the lookup helper return the device_find_child() reference and keep
it until scmi_device_destroy() has finished unregistering the child.
Also split device_unregister() in __scmi_device_destroy() so the SCMI bus
ID is not made reusable until after device_del() has removed the old
scmi_dev.N name from sysfs. This avoids a new SCMI device reusing the
same ID while the old device is still registered.
The final device release callback is also a possible cleanup path when
SCMI children are deleted by driver core recursion rather than
__scmi_device_destroy(). Release the SCMI bus ID from a common helper
used by destroy, register-failure and final-release paths, and clear
scmi_dev->id after freeing it so the final release cannot free the same
ID again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Drop handle on protocol bind failures
The SCMI bus notifier acquires an SCMI handle when the driver core emits
BUS_NOTIFY_BIND_DRIVER, before invoking the protocol driver probe
callback. The protocol probe path only checks whether sdev->handle is
set.
If device_link_add() fails after the handle has been acquired, the
protocol device can still bind with a valid handle but without the
dependency link to the SCMI parent. A concurrent parent unbind can then
miss the child and tear down the SCMI instance while the child still
holds a handle into it.
If the protocol driver probe later fails, for example with
-EPROBE_DEFER, the driver core emits BUS_NOTIFY_DRIVER_NOT_BOUND rather
than BUS_NOTIFY_UNBOUND_DRIVER. The SCMI notifier only released the
handle on BUS_NOTIFY_UNBOUND_DRIVER, so each failed protocol-device bind
leaked the SCMI instance users refcount and left sdev->handle set after
the failed probe.
Make the link helper report failure and drop the acquired handle if the
link cannot be created. Also handle BUS_NOTIFY_DRIVER_NOT_BOUND in the
same cleanup path used for unbind so failed probes balance the earlier
BUS_NOTIFY_BIND_DRIVER acquisition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix requested device removal race
scmi_protocol_device_unrequest() drops scmi_requested_devices_mtx while
notifying listeners but continues to retain the per-protocol list head.
When two SCMI drivers for the same protocol unregister concurrently, one
thread can remove the final request and free the list head while the other
is running its notifier. The latter then dereferences the freed list head
after reacquiring the mutex and can free it a second time.
Complete the list and IDR updates, including freeing an empty list head,
before dropping the mutex. Keep the blocking notifier outside the critical
section and retain only the detached request across the callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Fix use after free in ib_query_qp()
When querying a QP via the netlink flow the only synchronization
mechanism for the said QP is rdma_restrack_get(), meanwhile during the
QP destroy path rdma_restrack_del() is called at the end of the
ib_destroy_qp_user() function which is too late, since by then the
vendor specific resources for said QP would already be destroyed, and
till the rdma_restrack_del() is called this QP can still be accessed,
which could cause the use after free below.
Fix this by moving the rdma_restrack_begin_del() to the start of the
ib_destroy_qp_user(), which in turn waits for all usages of the QP to be
done then removes it from the database to prevent access to it while it
is being destroyed.
RIP: 0010:ib_query_qp+0x15/0x50 [ib_core]
Code: 48 83 05 5d 8e b9 ff 01 eb b5 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 c7 46 40 00 00 00 00 48 c7 46 78 00 00 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 88 01 00 00 48 85 c0 74 1a 48 83 05 54 91 b9 ff
RSP: 0018:ff11000108a8f2f0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff11000108a8f370 RCX: ff11000108a8f370
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff11000108a8f3d8 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ff1100010de5a000 R08: 0000000000000e80 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: ff110001057a604c R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff11000108a8f370
R13: ff110001090e8000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff110001057a602c
FS: 00007f2ffd8db6c0(0000) GS:ff110008dc90b000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010b9a7004 CR4: 0000000000373eb0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5_ib_gsi_query_qp+0x21/0x50 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_query_qp+0x689/0x9d0 [mlx5_ib]
ib_query_qp+0x35/0x50 [ib_core]
fill_res_qp_entry_query.isra.0+0x47/0x280 [ib_core]
? __wake_up+0x40/0x50
? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x15a/0x550
? kobject_uevent_env+0x562/0x710
? ep_poll_callback+0x242/0x270
? __nla_put+0xc/0x20
? nla_put+0x28/0x40
? nla_put_string+0x2e/0x40 [ib_core]
fill_res_qp_entry+0x138/0x190 [ib_core]
res_get_common_dumpit+0x4a5/0x800 [ib_core]
? fill_res_qp_entry_query.isra.0+0x280/0x280 [ib_core]
nldev_res_get_qp_dumpit+0x1e/0x30 [ib_core]
netlink_dump+0x16f/0x450
__netlink_dump_start+0x1ce/0x2e0
rdma_nl_rcv_msg+0x1d3/0x330 [ib_core]
? nldev_res_get_qp_raw_dumpit+0x30/0x30 [ib_core]
rdma_nl_rcv_skb.constprop.0.isra.0+0x108/0x180 [ib_core]
rdma_nl_rcv+0x12/0x20 [ib_core]
netlink_unicast+0x255/0x380
? __alloc_skb+0xfa/0x1e0
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f3/0x420
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
____sys_sendmsg+0x1e8/0x230
? copy_msghdr_from_user+0xea/0x170
___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xb0
? __futex_wait+0x95/0xf0
? __futex_wake_mark+0x40/0x40
? futex_wait+0x67/0x100
? futex_wake+0xac/0x1b0
__sys_sendmsg+0x5f/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x55/0xb90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mana_ib: drain QP references after partial table insertion
mana_table_store_ud_qp() publishes a QP at its send-queue id before
inserting the receive-queue id, dropping the XArray lock between the two
xa_insert_irq() calls. A concurrent completion handler can look up the QP
and take a transient reference. When the second insertion fails, the
rollback erased only the send-queue entry and returned, leaving both the
initial table reference and the transient reference outstanding while RDMA
core frees the QP, causing a use-after-free.
Drain the reference as normal destruction does: drop the initial reference
and wait for qp->free, releasing the QP only after every concurrent lookup
returns its reference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Free the error IRQ before tearing down VINTFs
tegra241_cmdqv_remove() tears each VINTF down first, then calls free_irq().
Tearing a VINTF down frees vintf0 and clears cmdqv->vintfs[0]. An error in
that window makes tegra241_cmdqv_isr() read the stale slot and hand it to
tegra241_vintf0_handle_error(), which dereferences a NULL or freed pointer.
Free the IRQ before tearing the VINTFs down. free_irq() waits for in-flight
handlers to finish and blocks new ones, so no ISR can observe a VINTF as it
is torn down.
Note: a user-owned VINTF (viommu) could outlive this teardown, which unmaps
cmdqv->base and frees cmdqv->vintfs, so a later viommu close then touches
freed memory. This is neither introduced nor fixed here: a physical IOMMU
is not a pluggable device, so iommufd by design holds no reference on the
one behind a viommu, and this teardown is not expected while that viommu is
still alive. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: mediatek: free EINT resources on unbind
mtk_eint_do_init() creates an IRQ domain, populates it with a mapping for
every EINT line and installs a chained handler on the parent interrupt,
but none of these are ever released. This was harmless while the drivers
were built-in, but now that they can be built as modules and
unbound/rmmod'd it leaves behind a dangling IRQ domain, interrupt mappings
whose chip data points at freed memory, and a chained handler that keeps
firing into that freed data.
The plain allocations in mtk_eint_do_init() already use the device-managed
devm_*() helpers, so tear the remaining resources down the same way:
register a devm action that detaches the chained handler, waits for any
in-flight handler to finish, disposes of the per-line mappings and removes
the IRQ domain. This mirrors the device-managed lifecycle adopted for the
GPIO chip and keeps the whole EINT setup self-cleaning on unbind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7915: fix ext PHY use-after-free on register error path
After mt7915_register_ext_phy() succeeded, a failure of the main PHY
mt7915_init_debugfs() or mt7915_coredump_register() unwound through
free_phy2, which called ieee80211_free_hw() on the ext PHY hw while it
was still registered with mac80211, since mt76_unregister_device() only
unregisters the main hw. Unregister the ext PHY (thermal + phy + hw)
first and skip the redundant free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: cancel reset and rc work on device unregister
Both drivers cancelled dump_work on unregister but left reset_work and
rc_work to be flushed only by destroy_workqueue() in mt76_free_device(),
which runs after the hw is unregistered and the hardware stopped. A
reset_work that fires in that window calls ieee80211_restart_hw() and
re-arms mac_work on an unregistered hw, and rc_work touches station state
being torn down. Cancel both up front, alongside dump_work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: isp1704_charger: cancel work on remove
The USB notifier and initial VBUS detection can schedule isp->work. The
remove path unregisters the notifier and power supply, but does not wait
for queued or running work before tearing down the power supply state.
Cancel the work after unregistering the notifier. Do this before
unregistering the power supply.
This issue was found by a static analysis tool. |
