| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Cap MSIX used to online CPUs + 1
The irdma driver can use a maximum number of msix vectors equal
to num_online_cpus() + 1 and the kernel warning stack below is shown
if that number is exceeded.
The kernel throws a warning as the driver tries to update the affinity
hint with a CPU mask greater than the max CPU IDs. Fix this by capping
the MSIX vectors to num_online_cpus() + 1.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 23655 at include/linux/cpumask.h:106 irdma_cfg_ceq_vector+0x34c/0x3f0 [irdma]
RIP: 0010:irdma_cfg_ceq_vector+0x34c/0x3f0 [irdma]
Call Trace:
irdma_rt_init_hw+0xa62/0x1290 [irdma]
? irdma_alloc_local_mac_entry+0x1a0/0x1a0 [irdma]
? __is_kernel_percpu_address+0x63/0x310
? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0xe/0xb0
? irdma_lan_unregister_qset+0x280/0x280 [irdma]
? irdma_request_reset+0x80/0x80 [irdma]
? ice_get_qos_params+0x84/0x390 [ice]
irdma_probe+0xa40/0xfc0 [irdma]
? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xd0/0xd0
? irdma_remove+0x140/0x140 [irdma]
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x62/0xe0
? down_write+0x187/0x3d0
? auxiliary_match_id+0xf0/0x1a0
? irdma_remove+0x140/0x140 [irdma]
auxiliary_bus_probe+0xa6/0x100
__driver_probe_device+0x4a4/0xd50
? __device_attach_driver+0x2c0/0x2c0
driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110
__driver_attach+0x1aa/0x350
bus_for_each_dev+0x11d/0x1b0
? subsys_dev_iter_init+0xe0/0xe0
bus_add_driver+0x3b1/0x610
driver_register+0x18e/0x410
? 0xffffffffc0b88000
irdma_init_module+0x50/0xaa [irdma]
do_one_initcall+0x103/0x5f0
? perf_trace_initcall_level+0x420/0x420
? do_init_module+0x4e/0x700
? __kasan_kmalloc+0x7d/0xa0
? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x188/0x2b0
? kasan_unpoison+0x21/0x50
do_init_module+0x1d1/0x700
load_module+0x3867/0x5260
? layout_and_allocate+0x3990/0x3990
? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0xe/0xb0
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x62/0xe0
? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xd0/0xd0
? __vmalloc_node_range+0x46b/0x890
? lock_release+0x5c8/0xba0
? alloc_vm_area+0x120/0x120
? selinux_kernel_module_from_file+0x2a5/0x300
? __inode_security_revalidate+0xf0/0xf0
? __do_sys_init_module+0x1db/0x260
__do_sys_init_module+0x1db/0x260
? load_module+0x5260/0x5260
? do_syscall_64+0x22/0x450
do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x450
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x66/0xdb |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_close_cached_fid()
find_or_create_cached_dir() could grab a new reference after kref_put()
had seen the refcount drop to zero but before cfid_list_lock is acquired
in smb2_close_cached_fid(), leading to use-after-free.
Switch to kref_put_lock() so cfid_release() is called with
cfid_list_lock held, closing that gap. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/kprobes: Fix null pointer reference in arch_prepare_kprobe()
I found a null pointer reference in arch_prepare_kprobe():
# echo 'p cmdline_proc_show' > kprobe_events
# echo 'p cmdline_proc_show+16' >> kprobe_events
Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000050bfc
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 122 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3-00007-gdcf8e5633e2e #10
NIP: c000000000050bfc LR: c000000000050bec CTR: 0000000000005bdc
REGS: c0000000348475b0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.0.0-rc3-00007-gdcf8e5633e2e)
MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 88002444 XER: 20040006
CFAR: c00000000022d100 DAR: 0000000000000000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
...
NIP arch_prepare_kprobe+0x10c/0x2d0
LR arch_prepare_kprobe+0xfc/0x2d0
Call Trace:
0xc0000000012f77a0 (unreliable)
register_kprobe+0x3c0/0x7a0
__register_trace_kprobe+0x140/0x1a0
__trace_kprobe_create+0x794/0x1040
trace_probe_create+0xc4/0xe0
create_or_delete_trace_kprobe+0x2c/0x80
trace_parse_run_command+0xf0/0x210
probes_write+0x20/0x40
vfs_write+0xfc/0x450
ksys_write+0x84/0x140
system_call_exception+0x17c/0x3a0
system_call_vectored_common+0xe8/0x278
--- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fffa5682de0
NIP: 00007fffa5682de0 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c000000034847e80 TRAP: 3000 Not tainted (6.0.0-rc3-00007-gdcf8e5633e2e)
MSR: 900000000280f033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44002408 XER: 00000000
The address being probed has some special:
cmdline_proc_show: Probe based on ftrace
cmdline_proc_show+16: Probe for the next instruction at the ftrace location
The ftrace-based kprobe does not generate kprobe::ainsn::insn, it gets
set to NULL. In arch_prepare_kprobe() it will check for:
...
prev = get_kprobe(p->addr - 1);
preempt_enable_no_resched();
if (prev && ppc_inst_prefixed(ppc_inst_read(prev->ainsn.insn))) {
...
If prev is based on ftrace, 'ppc_inst_read(prev->ainsn.insn)' will occur
with a null pointer reference. At this point prev->addr will not be a
prefixed instruction, so the check can be skipped.
Check if prev is ftrace-based kprobe before reading 'prev->ainsn.insn'
to fix this problem.
[mpe: Trim oops] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: correct grp validation in ext4_mb_good_group
Group corruption check will access memory of grp and will trigger kernel
crash if grp is NULL. So do NULL check before corruption check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: IOMMUFD_DESTROY should not increase the refcount
syzkaller found a race where IOMMUFD_DESTROY increments the refcount:
obj = iommufd_get_object(ucmd->ictx, cmd->id, IOMMUFD_OBJ_ANY);
if (IS_ERR(obj))
return PTR_ERR(obj);
iommufd_ref_to_users(obj);
/* See iommufd_ref_to_users() */
if (!iommufd_object_destroy_user(ucmd->ictx, obj))
As part of the sequence to join the two existing primitives together.
Allowing the refcount the be elevated without holding the destroy_rwsem
violates the assumption that all temporary refcount elevations are
protected by destroy_rwsem. Racing IOMMUFD_DESTROY with
iommufd_object_destroy_user() will cause spurious failures:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3076 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/device.c:477 iommufd_access_destroy+0x18/0x20 drivers/iommu/iommufd/device.c:478
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3076 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/03/2023
RIP: 0010:iommufd_access_destroy+0x18/0x20 drivers/iommu/iommufd/device.c:477
Code: e8 3d 4e 00 00 84 c0 74 01 c3 0f 0b c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 fe 48 8b bf a8 00 00 00 e8 1d 4e 00 00 84 c0 74 01 c3 <0f> 0b c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 41 55 4c 8d ae d0 00 00 00 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003067e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888109ea0300 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810bbb3500
R10: ffff88810bbb3e48 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90003067e88
R13: ffffc90003067ea8 R14: ffff888101249800 R15: 00000000fffffffe
FS: 00007ff7254fe6c0(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000555557262da8 CR3: 000000010a6fd000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
iommufd_test_create_access drivers/iommu/iommufd/selftest.c:596 [inline]
iommufd_test+0x71c/0xcf0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/selftest.c:813
iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x10f/0x1b0 drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c:337
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x84/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The solution is to not increment the refcount on the IOMMUFD_DESTROY path
at all. Instead use the xa_lock to serialize everything. The refcount
check == 1 and xa_erase can be done under a single critical region. This
avoids the need for any refcount incrementing.
It has the downside that if userspace races destroy with other operations
it will get an EBUSY instead of waiting, but this is kind of racing is
already dangerous. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix failed to find the peer with peer_id 0 when disconnected
It has a fail log which is ath11k_dbg in ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status(),
as below, it will not print when debug_mask is not set ATH11K_DBG_DATA.
ath11k_dbg(ab, ATH11K_DBG_DATA,
"failed to find the peer with peer_id %d\n",
ppdu_info.peer_id);
When run scan with station disconnected, the peer_id is 0 for case
HAL_RX_MPDU_START in ath11k_hal_rx_parse_mon_status_tlv() which called
from ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status(), and the peer_id of ppdu_info is
reset to 0 in the while loop, so it does not match condition of the
check "if (ppdu_info->peer_id == HAL_INVALID_PEERID" in the loop, and
then the log "failed to find the peer with peer_id 0" print after the
check in the loop, it is below call stack when debug_mask is set
ATH11K_DBG_DATA.
The reason is this commit 01d2f285e3e5 ("ath11k: decode HE status tlv")
add "memset(ppdu_info, 0, sizeof(struct hal_rx_mon_ppdu_info))" in
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status(), but the commit does not initialize
the peer_id to HAL_INVALID_PEERID, then lead the check mis-match.
Callstack of the failed log:
[12335.689072] RIP: 0010:ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status+0x9ea/0x1020 [ath11k]
[12335.689157] Code: 89 ff e8 f9 10 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 f7 e8 dc 4b 4e de 48 8b 85 38 ff ff ff c7 80 e4 07 00 00 01 00 00 00 e9 20 f8 ff ff <0f> 0b 41 0f b7 96 be 06 00 00 48 c7 c6 b8 50 44 c1 4c 89 ff e8 fd
[12335.689180] RSP: 0018:ffffb874001a4ca0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[12335.689210] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff995642cbd100 RCX: 0000000000000000
[12335.689229] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff99564212cd18
[12335.689248] RBP: ffffb874001a4dc0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[12335.689268] R10: 0000000000000220 R11: ffffb874001a48e8 R12: ffff995642473d40
[12335.689286] R13: ffff99564212c5b8 R14: ffff9956424736a0 R15: ffff995642120000
[12335.689303] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff995739000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[12335.689323] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[12335.689341] CR2: 00007f43c5d5e039 CR3: 000000011c012005 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[12335.689360] Call Trace:
[12335.689377] <IRQ>
[12335.689418] ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0x12/0x50
[12335.689447] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x25/0x80
[12335.689471] ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0x12/0x50
[12335.689504] ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x8d/0x4f0 [ath11k]
[12335.689578] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x8d/0x4f0 [ath11k]
[12335.689653] ? lock_acquire+0xef/0x360
[12335.689681] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x25/0x80
[12335.689713] ath11k_dp_service_mon_ring+0x38/0x60 [ath11k]
[12335.689784] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x4f0/0x4f0 [ath11k]
[12335.689860] call_timer_fn+0xb2/0x2f0
[12335.689897] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x4f0/0x4f0 [ath11k]
[12335.689970] run_timer_softirq+0x21f/0x540
[12335.689999] ? ktime_get+0xad/0x160
[12335.690025] ? lapic_next_deadline+0x2c/0x40
[12335.690053] ? clockevents_program_event+0x82/0x100
[12335.690093] __do_softirq+0x151/0x4a8
[12335.690135] irq_exit_rcu+0xc9/0x100
[12335.690165] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa8/0xd0
[12335.690189] </IRQ>
[12335.690204] <TASK>
[12335.690225] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
Reset the default value to HAL_INVALID_PEERID each time after memset
of ppdu_info as well as others memset which existed in function
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status(), then the failed log disappeared.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: eeprom: fix null-deref on genl_info in dump
The similar fix as commit 46cdedf2a0fa ("ethtool: pse-pd: fix null-deref on
genl_info in dump") is also needed for ethtool eeprom. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix system hang caused by cpu-clock usage
cpu-clock usage by the async-profiler tool can trigger a system hang,
which got bisected back to the following commit by Octavia Togami:
18dbcbfabfff ("perf: Fix the POLL_HUP delivery breakage") causes this issue
The root cause of the hang is that cpu-clock is a special type of SW
event which relies on hrtimers. The __perf_event_overflow() callback
is invoked from the hrtimer handler for cpu-clock events, and
__perf_event_overflow() tries to call cpu_clock_event_stop()
to stop the event, which calls htimer_cancel() to cancel the hrtimer.
But that's a recursion into the hrtimer code from a hrtimer handler,
which (unsurprisingly) deadlocks.
To fix this bug, use hrtimer_try_to_cancel() instead, and set
the PERF_HES_STOPPED flag, which causes perf_swevent_hrtimer()
to stop the event once it sees the PERF_HES_STOPPED flag.
[ mingo: Fixed the comments and improved the changelog. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: reject negative ifindex
Recent changes in net-next (commit 759ab1edb56c ("net: store netdevs
in an xarray")) refactored the handling of pre-assigned ifindexes
and let syzbot surface a latent problem in ovs. ovs does not validate
ifindex, making it possible to create netdev ports with negative
ifindex values. It's easy to repro with YNL:
$ ./cli.py --spec netlink/specs/ovs_datapath.yaml \
--do new \
--json '{"upcall-pid": 1, "name":"my-dp"}'
$ ./cli.py --spec netlink/specs/ovs_vport.yaml \
--do new \
--json '{"upcall-pid": "00000001", "name": "some-port0", "dp-ifindex":3,"ifindex":4294901760,"type":2}'
$ ip link show
-65536: some-port0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
link/ether 7a:48:21:ad:0b:fb brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
...
Validate the inputs. Now the second command correctly returns:
$ ./cli.py --spec netlink/specs/ovs_vport.yaml \
--do new \
--json '{"upcall-pid": "00000001", "name": "some-port0", "dp-ifindex":3,"ifindex":4294901760,"type":2}'
lib.ynl.NlError: Netlink error: Numerical result out of range
nl_len = 108 (92) nl_flags = 0x300 nl_type = 2
error: -34 extack: {'msg': 'integer out of range', 'unknown': [[type:4 len:36] b'\x0c\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x00\x03\x00\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\x01\x00\x08\x00\x00\x00'], 'bad-attr': '.ifindex'}
Accept 0 since it used to be silently ignored. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: bridge: dw_hdmi: fix connector access for scdc
Commit 5d844091f237 ("drm/scdc-helper: Pimp SCDC debugs") changed the scdc
interface to pick up an i2c adapter from a connector instead. However, in
the case of dw-hdmi, the wrong connector was being used to pass i2c adapter
information, since dw-hdmi's embedded connector structure is only populated
when the bridge attachment callback explicitly asks for it.
drm-meson is handling connector creation, so this won't happen, leading to
a NULL pointer dereference.
Fix it by having scdc functions access dw-hdmi's current connector pointer
instead, which is assigned during the bridge enablement stage.
[narmstrong: moved Fixes tag before first S-o-b and added Reported-by tag] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/sched: Fix deadlock in drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb
The Mesa issue referenced below pointed out a possible deadlock:
[ 1231.611031] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1231.611033] CPU0 CPU1
[ 1231.611034] ---- ----
[ 1231.611035] lock(&xa->xa_lock#17);
[ 1231.611038] local_irq_disable();
[ 1231.611039] lock(&fence->lock);
[ 1231.611041] lock(&xa->xa_lock#17);
[ 1231.611044] <Interrupt>
[ 1231.611045] lock(&fence->lock);
[ 1231.611047]
*** DEADLOCK ***
In this example, CPU0 would be any function accessing job->dependencies
through the xa_* functions that don't disable interrupts (eg:
drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb()).
CPU1 is executing drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() as a fence signalling
callback so in an interrupt context. It will deadlock when trying to
grab the xa_lock which is already held by CPU0.
Replacing all xa_* usage by their xa_*_irq counterparts would fix
this issue, but Christian pointed out another issue: dma_fence_signal
takes fence.lock and so does dma_fence_add_callback.
dma_fence_signal() // locks f1.lock
-> drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb()
-> foreach dependencies
-> dma_fence_add_callback() // locks f2.lock
This will deadlock if f1 and f2 share the same spinlock.
To fix both issues, the code iterating on dependencies and re-arming them
is moved out to drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work().
[phasta: commit message nits] |
| SAP Web Dispatcher, Internet Communication Manager (ICM), and SAP Content Server allow an unauthenticated user to exploit logical errors that lead to a memory corruption vulnerability. This results in high impact on the availability with no impact on confidentiality or integrity of the application. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Shutdown FW DMA in bnxt_shutdown()
The netif_close() call in bnxt_shutdown() only stops packet DMA. There
may be FW DMA for trace logging (recently added) that will continue. If
we kexec to a new kernel, the DMA will corrupt memory in the new kernel.
Add bnxt_hwrm_func_drv_unrgtr() to unregister the driver from the FW.
This will stop the FW DMA. In case the call fails, call pcie_flr() to
reset the function and stop the DMA. |
| SAP NetWeaver remote service for Xcelsius allows an attacker with network access and high privileges to execute arbitrary code on the affected system due to insufficient input validation and improper handling of remote method calls. Exploitation does not require user interaction and could lead to service disruption or unauthorized system control. This has high impact on integrity and availability, with no impact on confidentiality. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: avs: Disable periods-elapsed work when closing PCM
avs_dai_fe_shutdown() handles the shutdown procedure for HOST HDAudio
stream while period-elapsed work services its IRQs. As the former
frees the DAI's private context, these two operations shall be
synchronized to avoid slab-use-after-free or worse errors. |
| Due to a Missing Authorization Check vulnerability in SAP S/4 HANA Private Cloud (Financials General Ledger), an authenticated attacker with authorization limited to a single company code could read sensitive data and post or modify documents across all company codes. Successful exploitation could result in a high impact to confidentiality and a low impact to integrity, while availability remains unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: Prevent TOCTOU out-of-bounds write
For the following path not holding the sock lock,
sctp_diag_dump() -> sctp_for_each_endpoint() -> sctp_ep_dump()
make sure not to exceed bounds in case the address list has grown
between buffer allocation (time-of-check) and write (time-of-use). |
| SAP Web Dispatcher and ICM may expose internal testing interfaces that are not intended for production. If enabled, unauthenticated attackers could exploit them to access diagnostics, send crafted requests, or disrupt services. This vulnerability has a high impact on confidentiality, availability and low impact on integrity and of the application. |
| Input verification vulnerability in the compression and decompression module. Impact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect app data integrity. |
| The ParseAddress function constructs domain-literal address components through repeated string concatenation. When parsing large domain-literal components, this can cause excessive CPU consumption. |
