| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: cyw: fix heap overflow on a short auth frame
brcmf_notify_auth_frame_rx() takes the frame length from the firmware
event and copies the frame body with the management header offset
subtracted:
u32 mgmt_frame_len = e->datalen - sizeof(struct brcmf_rx_mgmt_data);
...
memcpy(&mgmt_frame->u, frame,
mgmt_frame_len - offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u));
The only length check is e->datalen >= sizeof(*rxframe), so mgmt_frame_len
can be anything from 0 up. offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u) is 24. When
mgmt_frame_len is below that, the subtraction wraps as an unsigned value to
a huge length. The memcpy then runs far past the kzalloc'd buffer. A
malicious or malfunctioning AP can make the frame short during the
external SAE auth exchange, so this is a remotely triggered heap overflow.
Reject frames shorter than the management header offset before the copy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix stack buffer overflow in multichannel session-key copy
Commit 4b706360ffb7 ("ksmbd: fix multichannel binding and enforce channel
limit") moved the binding-path session key out of the session-wide
sess->sess_key (CIFS_KEY_SIZE = 40) into a new per-channel buffer, and
sized both that buffer and the on-stack copy used during binding with
SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE (16):
struct channel {
char sess_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE]; /* 16 */
...
};
ntlm_authenticate() / krb5_authenticate():
char channel_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE] = {}; /* 16 */
char *auth_key = conn->binding ? channel_key : sess->sess_key;
The two writers that fill this destination still bound the copy length
against CIFS_KEY_SIZE (40), not against the 16-byte buffer:
ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() (NTLM key exchange):
if (sess_key_len > CIFS_KEY_SIZE) /* 40 */
return -EINVAL;
arc4_crypt(ctx_arc4, sess_key,
(char *)authblob + sess_key_off, sess_key_len);
ksmbd_krb5_authenticate():
if (resp->session_key_len > sizeof(sess->sess_key)) /* 40 */
...
memcpy(sess_key, resp->payload, resp->session_key_len);
On a binding SESSION_SETUP, auth_key points at the 16-byte channel_key,
so a client that supplies an NTLM EncryptedRandomSessionKey of up to 40
bytes (with NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH), or a Kerberos ticket whose
session key is longer than 16 bytes (a normal AES256 key is 32), writes
past the 16-byte stack buffer -- up to a 24-byte kernel stack overflow.
KASAN reports it as a stack-out-of-bounds write in arc4_crypt() called
from ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob().
The destinations must be able to hold the full session key the length
checks already permit. Size the per-channel key buffer and the two
on-stack channel_key buffers with CIFS_KEY_SIZE, matching sess->sess_key. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: cn10k: restrict VF LMTLINE sharing to its own PF
rvu_mbox_handler_lmtst_tbl_setup() uses req->base_pcifunc as a direct
index into the LMT map table to read another function's LMTLINE
physical base address and copy it into the caller's own LMT map table
entry. The mailbox dispatcher authenticates req->hdr.pcifunc from the
IRQ source, but req->base_pcifunc is a separate payload field and is
not sanitized.
Reject the request with -EPERM when a VF caller's base_pcifunc is not a
valid function under its own PF. is_pf_func_valid() bounds the FUNC field
to the PF's configured VF count, keeping the computed index inside the
caller's own slot block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ip6_gre: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
ip6gre_changelink() and ip6erspan_changelink() operate on at most two
netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once
the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the
request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only
against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can
rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net.
Gate both ops on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at their top, before any
attribute is parsed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipip: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
ipip_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the
tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or
moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl
changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a
caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that
lives in t->net.
Gate ipip_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,
before any attribute is parsed. |
| The Backup Migration WordPress plugin before 2.1.7 does not properly restrict a post-restore automatic login mechanism, allowing a user who administers one site of a multisite network to obtain a long-lived authenticated session as an administrator of another site in the same network, without credentials and bypassing two-factor authentication. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix memory leak in ieee80211_register_hw()
If kmemdup() fails while copying supported band structures, the error
path jumps to fail_rate. This skips rate_control_deinitialize() and
leaks the initialized local->rate_ctrl.
Fix this by adding a fail_band label that shares the rate-control cleanup
path before falling through to the remaining teardown.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in
v7.1-rc7.
An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have a
suitable mac80211 device/driver combination to test with, no runtime
testing was able to be performed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rt2x00: avoid full teardown before work setup in probe
rt2x00lib_probe_dev() uses the full rt2x00lib_remove_dev() teardown for
all probe failures. However, drv_data allocation and workqueue allocation
can fail before intf_work, autowakeup_work and sleep_work have been
initialized.
Do not enter the full remove path until the probe has reached the point
where those work items are set up. Return directly for drv_data allocation
failure, and use a small early cleanup path for workqueue allocation
failure.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by
manual review of rt2x00lib_probe_dev() and rt2x00lib_remove_dev(). The
early probe exits should not call a common teardown path that assumes the
later work setup has already completed.
A QEMU PoC forced alloc_ordered_workqueue() to fail before the work
initializers are reached. The resulting fail path entered
rt2x00lib_remove_dev(), and DEBUG_OBJECTS reported invalid work drains with
rt2x00lib_probe_dev() and rt2x00lib_remove_dev() in the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: imx: Fix i.MX8MP VC8000E power up sequence
Per errata[1]:
ERR050531: VPU_NOC power down handshake may hang during VC8000E/VPUMIX
power up/down cycling.
Description: VC8000E reset de-assertion edge and AXI clock may have a
timing issue.
Workaround: Set bit2 (vc8000e_clk_en) of BLK_CLK_EN_CSR to 0 to gate off
both AXI clock and VC8000E clock sent to VC8000E and AXI clock sent to
VPU_NOC m_v_2 interface during VC8000E power up(VC8000E reset is
de-asserted by HW)
Add a bool variable is_errata_err050531 in
'struct imx8m_blk_ctrl_domain_data' to represent whether the workaround
is needed. If is_errata_err050531 is true, first clear the clk before
powering up gpc, then enable the clk after powering up gpc.
[1] https://www.nxp.com/webapp/Download?colCode=IMX8MP_1P33A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/resctrl: Fix double-add of pseudo-locked region's RMID to free list
A pseudo-locked group's RMID is freed when it is created. On unmount
rmdir_all_sub() unconditionally frees all RMID of all groups, resulting
in a double-free of the pseudo-locked group's RMID. The consequence of this
is that the original free results in the pseudo-locked group's RMID being
added to the rmid_free_lru linked list and the second free then attempts
to add the same RMID entry to the rmid_free_lru again.
Do not double-free a pseudo-locked group's RMID. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpu/hotplug: Fix NULL kobject warning in cpuhp_smt_enable()
On arm64, when booting with `maxcpus` greater than the number of present
CPUs (e.g., QEMU -smp cpus=4,maxcpus=8), some CPUs are marked as 'present'
but have not yet been registered via register_cpu(). Consequently,
the per-cpu device objects for these CPUs are not yet initialized.
In cpuhp_smt_enable(), the code iterates over all present CPUs. Calling
_cpu_up() for these unregistered CPUs eventually leads to
sysfs_create_group() being called with a NULL kobject (or a kobject
without a directory), triggering the following warning in
fs/sysfs/group.c:
WARNING: fs/sysfs/group.c:137 at internal_create_group+0x41c/0x4bc, CPU#2: sh/181
[...]
Call trace:
internal_create_group+0x41c/0x4bc (P)
sysfs_create_group+0x18/0x24
topology_add_dev+0x1c/0x28
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x104/0x20c
__cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x94/0x11c
_cpu_up+0x200/0x37c
When booting with ACPI, arm64 smp_prepare_cpus() currently sets all
enumerated CPUs as "present" regardless of their status in the MADT. This
causes issues with SMT hotplug control. For instance, with QEMU's
"-smp 4,maxcpus=8" configuration, the MADT GICC entries are populated as
follows:
1. The first four CPUs: `Enabled` set but `Online Capable` not set.
2. The remaining four CPUs: `Online Capable` set but `Enabled` not set
to support potential hot-plugging.
Fix this by:
1. When booting with ACPI, checking the ACPI_MADT_ENABLED flag in the GICC
entry before calling set_cpu_present() during SMP initialization.
2. Properly managing the present mask in acpi_map_cpu() and
acpi_unmap_cpu() to support actual CPU hotplug events, This aligns with
other architectures like x86 and LoongArch.
3. Update the arm64 CPU hotplug documentation to no longer state that all
online-capable vCPUs are marked as present by the kernel at boot time.
This ensures that only physically available or explicitly enabled CPUs
are in the present mask, keeping the SMT control logic consistent with
the actual hardware state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: reset full ip_vs_seq structs in ip_vs_conn_new
Commit 9a05475cebdd ("ipvs: avoid kmem_cache_zalloc in
ip_vs_conn_new") changed ip_vs_conn_new() to allocate an ip_vs_conn
object with kmem_cache_alloc(). The function then initializes many
fields explicitly, but only resets in_seq.delta and out_seq.delta in the
two struct ip_vs_seq members.
That leaves init_seq and previous_delta uninitialized. This is normally
harmless while the corresponding IP_VS_CONN_F_IN_SEQ or
IP_VS_CONN_F_OUT_SEQ flag is clear. For connections learned from a sync
message, however, ip_vs_proc_conn() preserves those flags from
IP_VS_CONN_F_BACKUP_MASK and passes opt=NULL when the message omits
IPVS_OPT_SEQ_DATA. In that case the new connection can be hashed with
SEQ flags set but with the rest of in_seq/out_seq still containing stale
slab data.
When a packet for such a connection is later handled by an IPVS
application helper, vs_fix_seq() and vs_fix_ack_seq() use
previous_delta and init_seq to rewrite TCP sequence numbers. A malformed
sync message can therefore make forwarded packets carry stale slab bytes
in their TCP seq/ack numbers, and can also corrupt the forwarded TCP
flow.
Reset both struct ip_vs_seq members completely before publishing the
connection. This matches the existing "reset struct ip_vs_seq" comment
and keeps the sequence-adjustment gates inactive unless valid sequence
data is installed later. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: atm: ueagle-atm: wait for pre-firmware load in .disconnect()
ueagle-atm uses the asynchronous request_firmware_nowait() in .probe(),
but does not wait for its completion, not even in .disconnect(); so, if the
device is unplugged meanwhile, its teardown runs concurrently with that.
Even though this inconsistency is worth addressing on its own, it has also
triggered several bug reports in syzbot over the years (some auto-closed)
where the firmware sysfs fallback mechanism (CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER)
creates a firmware subdirectory in the device directory during its removal,
which might hit unexpected conditions in kernfs, apparently, depending at
which point the add and remove operations raced. (See links.)
The pattern is:
usb ?-?: Direct firmware load for ueagle-atm/eagle?.fw failed with error -2
usb ?-?: Falling back to sysfs fallback for: ueagle-atm/eagle?.fw
<ERROR>
Call trace:
...
kernfs_create_dir_ns
sysfs_create_dir_ns
create_dir
kobject_add_internal
kobject_add_varg
kobject_add
class_dir_create_and_add
get_device_parent
device_add
fw_load_sysfs_fallback
fw_load_from_user_helper
firmware_fallback_sysfs
_request_firmware
request_firmware_work_func
...
(Some variations are observed, after fw_load_sysfs_fallback(), e.g., [1].)
While the kernfs side is being looked at, the ueagle-atm side can be fixed
by waiting for the pre-firmware load in the .disconnect() handler.
This change has a similar approach to previous work by Andrey Tsygunka [2]
(wait_for_completion() in .disconnect()), but it is relatively different in
design/implementation; using the Originally-by tag for credit assignment.
This has been tested with:
- synthetic reproducer to check the error path;
- USB gadget (virtual device) to check the firmware upload path;
- QEMU device emulator to check the device ID re-enumeration path;
(The latter two were written by Claude; no other code/text in this commit.)
Links (year first reported):
2025 https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=ce1e5a1b4e086b43e56d
2025 https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=9af8471255ac36e34fd4
2024 https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=306212936b13e520679d
2023 https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=457452d30bcdda75ead2
2022 https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=782984d6f1701b526edb
2021 https://syzbot.org/bug?id=f3f221579f4ef7e9691281f3c6f56c05f83e8490
2021 https://syzbot.org/bug?id=84d86f0d71394829df6fc53daf6642c045983881
2021 https://syzbot.org/bug?id=3302dc1c0e2b9c94f2e8edb404eabc9267bc6f90
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=457452d30bcdda75ead2
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: cache secctx size before release zeroes it
binder_transaction() bounds the scatter-gather buffer area with
sg_buf_end_offset and subtracts the aligned LSM context size because
the secctx is written at the tail of that area. The subtraction reads
lsmctx.len, but that field has already been cleared by the time the
line runs:
security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &lsmctx) /* lsmctx.len set */
lsmctx_aligned_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64))
extra_buffers_size += lsmctx_aligned_size
...
security_release_secctx(&lsmctx) /* memset zeroes len */
...
sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size
- ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64)) /* ALIGN(0,8) */
security_release_secctx() does memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp)), so lsmctx.len
reads back as 0 and the subtraction contributes nothing, leaving
sg_buf_end_offset too large by the aligned secctx size on every
transaction to a txn_security_ctx node.
Each BINDER_TYPE_PTR object then derives buf_left = sg_buf_end_offset -
sg_buf_offset as the sole upper bound on its copy, so the inflated end
offset lets the copy run into the bytes that already hold the secctx.
The aligned size must therefore be cached before release rather than
re-read from the now-cleared field. Fix by caching it in
lsmctx_aligned_size at function scope when it is first computed and
subtracting lsmctx_aligned_size instead of re-reading lsmctx.len after
release. Reuse the same value for the earlier buf_offset computation. |
| The ECS WordPress plugin before 4.3.8 does not check the post status or any capability when rendering an Elementor document requested through one of its AJAX actions, allowing unauthenticated users to retrieve the rendered content of unpublished (private, draft, pending) documents by supplying their identifier. |
| The ECS WordPress plugin before 4.3.8 does not perform capability or object-ownership checks on its Dynamic Repeater AJAX handlers (gated only by a capability-agnostic nonce that any edit_posts user obtains from the Elementor editor), so a Contributor can write a data-source binding into any post — including admin-authored pages — whose attacker-controlled values are rendered into a widget's repeater output without sanitization, executing JavaScript in the session of any visitor or administrator who views the page. |
| The Simply Schedule Appointments WordPress plugin before 1.6.12.17 does not restrict the user records returned by some of its REST endpoints to those the requester is entitled to see, allowing users with a low-privileged staff role to disclose the names and email addresses of arbitrary registered users. |
| The Product Feed PRO for WooCommerce by AdTribes WordPress plugin before 13.5.7 does not perform an authorization check on one of its REST read routes, allowing unauthenticated users to disclose a store's feed configuration (rules, filters and field mapping) and to enumerate the full product category taxonomy. |
| The ECS WordPress plugin before 4.3.8 does not have capability or ownership checks on its dynamic repeater actions, relying only on a nonce available to any user who can open the page builder, allowing users with a contributor-level account or above to read, alter and delete the binding configuration of posts they do not own and to change the ECS WordPress plugin before 4.3.8's site-wide presets. |
| An authentication issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.9, macOS Sonoma 14.8.9, macOS Tahoe 26.6.1. An attacker on the network may be able to authenticate to Screen Sharing without valid credentials. |
