| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| TimescaleDB through 2.29.1, fixed in commit 517c13e, contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to cause query-result integrity failures or backend crashes by supplying a crafted Simple8b selector-11 value, which is stored in the signed int16 Arrow dictionary-index type and bypasses index validation checks in bulk text dictionary decompression. Attackers with direct DML access to a non-frozen physical compressed hypertable relation can trigger an out-of-bounds read before the base of the live offsets array through the VectorAgg single-text hashing strategy, resulting in incorrect aggregation output, backend SIGSEGV, or PostgreSQL crash recovery depending on build configuration. |
| TimescaleDB through 2.29.1, fixed in commit 517c13e, contains an out-of-bounds read in the Dictionary compression reverse row iterator (tsl/src/compression/algorithms/dictionary.c). The forward path validates the decoded index; the reverse path uses an assertion compiled out of release builds, leaving the 64-bit Simple8b index unvalidated and the read offset attacker-controlled. Attackers with DML access to a physical compressed relation can store a crafted datum and run a reverse-order scan. With a pass-by-value column type the out-of-bounds Datum is returned to the client as a normal column value, disclosing backend memory including the shared buffer pool, which SQL access control does not cover. |
| rsync before 3.5.0 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the sender-side block matching logic that allows a malicious receiver to trigger memory access before the start of an allocated buffer by sending a crafted checksum block with a length of zero. Attackers can send a specially crafted checksum set containing a zero-length block to cause a negative offset calculation during delta computation, resulting in an out-of-bounds read of file data buffer memory on the sender side. |
| frp is a fast reverse proxy. From 0.53.0 until 0.70.1, frp's optional SSH Tunnel Gateway in pkg/ssh/server.go parses an SSH exec channel request by adding 4 to an attacker-controlled four-byte big-endian length. A length of 0xFFFFFFFF makes the uint32 addition wrap to 3, defeats the payload bounds check, and causes payload[4:3] to panic in TunnelServer.handleNewChannel. When no authorized-keys file is configured, sshConfig.NoClientAuth permits an unauthenticated peer to reach this channel phase before the frp token is checked, so a single five-byte request terminates the frps process and drops every active tunnel. This issue is fixed in version 0.70.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet
tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed
three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full
packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree:
tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
...
tw->idx = 0;
}
The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device
controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow
peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the
index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and
keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte
array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen
byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write.
Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when
the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index
iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:
i = data[1] & 0x7f;
if (data[1] & 0x80) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
...
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
...
}
The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.
data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.
Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always
carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are
unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded
and is left untouched. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlabel: validate unlabeled address and mask attribute lengths
netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() used the address attribute length to
determine whether the attribute data could be read as an IPv4 or IPv6
address, but did not independently validate the corresponding mask
attribute length. A crafted Generic Netlink request could therefore
provide a valid IPv4/IPv6 address attribute with a shorter mask
attribute, which would later be read as a full struct in_addr or
struct in6_addr.
NLA_BINARY policy lengths are maximum lengths by default, so use
NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() for the unlabeled IPv4/IPv6 address and mask
attributes. This rejects short attributes during policy validation and
also exposes the exact length requirements through policy introspection. |
| Wire provides gRPC and protocol buffers for Android, Kotlin, Swift, and Java. Prior to 6.3.0 and 7.0.0-alpha03, ByteArrayProtoReader32.skipGroup() and ProtoReader.skipGroup() in wire-runtime do not validate that a LENGTH_DELIMITED field length is non-negative before skip(), allowing a crafted protobuf varint encoding -128 as a signed Int to make skip(-128) move the internal position negative and make the next readByte() throw ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException instead of the documented IOException or ProtocolException, which can crash services using ProtoAdapter.decode(byte[]) on untrusted payloads. This issue is fixed in versions 6.3.0 and 7.0.0-alpha03. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: CGX: add bounds check to cgx_speed_mbps index
cgx_speed_mbps has 13 elements but RESP_LINKSTAT_SPEED can yield values
0-15. If it returns a value >= 13, this causes an out-of-bounds array
access. Add a bounds check and default to speed 0 if the index is out of
range. |
| A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's udmabuf device driver, within a fault handler. This issue occurs due to the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in memory access past the end of an array. This may allow an attacker to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of the kernel. |
| Microsoft Office Visio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Weak configuration when UE does not verify the consistency of its additional security capabilities with the replayed capabilities. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: sch_sfq: don't allow 1 packet limit
The current implementation does not work correctly with a limit of
1. iproute2 actually checks for this and this patch adds the check in
kernel as well.
This fixes the following syzkaller reported crash:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210:6
index 65535 is out of range for type 'struct sfq_head[128]'
CPU: 0 PID: 2569 Comm: syz-executor101 Not tainted 5.10.0-smp-DEV #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x125/0x19f lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:148 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xed/0x120 lib/ubsan.c:347
sfq_link net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210 [inline]
sfq_dec+0x528/0x600 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:238
sfq_dequeue+0x39b/0x9d0 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:500
sfq_reset+0x13/0x50 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525
qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
tbf_reset+0x3d/0x100 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:319
qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
dev_reset_queue+0x8c/0x140 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1296
netdev_for_each_tx_queue include/linux/netdevice.h:2350 [inline]
dev_deactivate_many+0x6dc/0xc20 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1362
__dev_close_many+0x214/0x350 net/core/dev.c:1468
dev_close_many+0x207/0x510 net/core/dev.c:1506
unregister_netdevice_many+0x40f/0x16b0 net/core/dev.c:10738
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2be/0x310 net/core/dev.c:10695
unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2893 [inline]
__tun_detach+0x6b6/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:689
tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:705 [inline]
tun_chr_close+0x104/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3640
__fput+0x203/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0x129/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:185
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:33 [inline]
do_exit+0x5ce/0x2200 kernel/exit.c:931
do_group_exit+0x144/0x310 kernel/exit.c:1046
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1057 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1055 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3b/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1055
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7fe5e7b52479
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7fe5e7b5244f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffd3c800398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe5e7b52479
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fe5e7bcdd20 R15: 00007fe5e7b24270
The crash can be also be reproduced with the following (with a tc
recompiled to allow for sfq limits of 1):
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 1: root tbf rate 1Kbit burst 100b lat 1s
../iproute2-6.9.0/tc/tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 2: parent 1:10 sfq limit 1
ifconfig dummy0 up
ping -I dummy0 -f -c2 -W0.1 8.8.8.8
sleep 1
Scenario that triggers the crash:
* the first packet is sent and queued in TBF and SFQ; qdisc qlen is 1
* TBF dequeues: it peeks from SFQ which moves the packet to the
gso_skb list and keeps qdisc qlen set to 1. TBF is out of tokens so
it schedules itself for later.
* the second packet is sent and TBF tries to queues it to SFQ. qdisc
qlen is now 2 and because the SFQ limit is 1 the packet is dropped
by SFQ. At this point qlen is 1, and all of the SFQ slots are empty,
however q->tail is not NULL.
At this point, assuming no more packets are queued, when sch_dequeue
runs again it will decrement the qlen for the current empty slot
causing an underflow and the subsequent out of bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: array-index-out-of-bounds fix in dtReadFirst
The value of stbl can be sometimes out of bounds due
to a bad filesystem. Added a check with appopriate return
of error code in that case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: fix array-index-out-of-bounds in jfs_readdir
The stbl might contain some invalid values. Added a check to
return error code in that case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-core: add missing buffer index check
dvb_vb2_expbuf() didn't check if the given buffer index was
for a valid buffer. Add this check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Check the remaining info_cnt before repeating btf fields
When trying to repeat the btf fields for array of nested struct, it
doesn't check the remaining info_cnt. The following splat will be
reported when the value of ret * nelems is greater than BTF_FIELDS_MAX:
------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ../kernel/bpf/btf.c:3951:49
index 11 is out of range for type 'btf_field_info [11]'
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: test_progs ...... 6.11.0-rc4+ #1
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70
dump_stack+0x10/0x20
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x40
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x6f/0x80
? kallsyms_lookup_name+0x48/0xb0
btf_parse_fields+0x992/0xce0
map_create+0x591/0x770
__sys_bpf+0x229/0x2410
__x64_sys_bpf+0x1f/0x30
x64_sys_call+0x199/0x9f0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7fea56f2cc5d
......
</TASK>
---[ end trace ]---
Fix it by checking the remaining info_cnt in btf_repeat_fields() before
repeating the btf fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix array out-of-bound access in SoC stats
Currently, the ath11k_soc_dp_stats::hal_reo_error array is defined with a
maximum size of DP_REO_DST_RING_MAX. However, the ath11k_dp_process_rx()
function access ath11k_soc_dp_stats::hal_reo_error using the REO
destination SRNG ring ID, which is incorrect. SRNG ring ID differ from
normal ring ID, and this usage leads to out-of-bounds array access. To fix
this issue, modify ath11k_dp_process_rx() to use the normal ring ID
directly instead of the SRNG ring ID to avoid out-of-bounds array access.
Tested-on: QCN9074 hw1.0 PCI WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix index out of bounds in degamma hardware format translation
Fixes index out of bounds issue in
`cm_helper_translate_curve_to_degamma_hw_format` function. The issue
could occur when the index 'i' exceeds the number of transfer function
points (TRANSFER_FUNC_POINTS).
The fix adds a check to ensure 'i' is within bounds before accessing the
transfer function points. If 'i' is out of bounds the function returns
false to indicate an error.
Reported by smatch:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:594 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_degamma_hw_format() error: buffer overflow 'output_tf->tf_pts.red' 1025 <= s32max
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:595 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_degamma_hw_format() error: buffer overflow 'output_tf->tf_pts.green' 1025 <= s32max
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:596 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_degamma_hw_format() error: buffer overflow 'output_tf->tf_pts.blue' 1025 <= s32max |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: soc-acpi-intel-lnl-match: add missing empty item
There is no links_num in struct snd_soc_acpi_mach {}, and we test
!link->num_adr as a condition to end the loop in hda_sdw_machine_select().
So an empty item in struct snd_soc_acpi_link_adr array is required. |
