| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: Fix potential use after free in ib_dealloc_pd_user()
When accessing a PD via the netlink path the only synchronization
mechanism for the said PD is rdma_restrack_get().
Currently, rdma_restrack_del() is invoked at the end of
ib_dealloc_pd_user(), which is too late, since by that point
vendor-specific resources associated with the PD might already be
freed. This can leave a short window where the PD remains accessible
through restrack, leading to a potential use-after-free.
Fix this by moving the rdma_restrack_begin_del() call to the start of
ib_dealloc_pd_user(), ensuring that the PD is removed from restrack
before its internal resources are released. This guarantees that no new
users hold references to a PD that is in the process of destruction.
In addition, this change preserves the intended inverted order
between create and destroy routines: resources are added to
restrack at the end of successful creation, and hence shall be removed
from the restrack first thing during the destruction flow, which keeps
the lifecycle management consistent and predictable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix requested device removal race
scmi_protocol_device_unrequest() drops scmi_requested_devices_mtx while
notifying listeners but continues to retain the per-protocol list head.
When two SCMI drivers for the same protocol unregister concurrently, one
thread can remove the final request and free the list head while the other
is running its notifier. The latter then dereferences the freed list head
after reacquiring the mutex and can free it a second time.
Complete the list and IDR updates, including freeing an empty list head,
before dropping the mutex. Keep the blocking notifier outside the critical
section and retain only the detached request across the callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Fix undefined behavior in devid_write debugfs function
When for_each_pci_segment() loop completes without finding a matching
segment, the pci_seg pointer is not NULL but points to an invalid memory
location (the list head). Accessing pci_seg->id after the loop causes
undefined behavior.
Fix this by handling the successful case inside the loop and returning
-EINVAL after the loop if no matching segment is found. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal: intel: int3400: clean up ODVP on probe failures
evaluate_odvp() creates per-ODVP sysfs files before the thermal zone
and later probe resources are registered. The current unwind path only
calls cleanup_odvp() from the late sysfs failure path, so failures after
evaluate_odvp() but before that label, including
thermal_tripless_zone_device_register() failures, leave the ODVP files
and storage behind.
Move the ODVP cleanup to the common ART/TRT unwind path so every failure
after evaluate_odvp() releases the ODVP state. Also clear the cached
ODVP pointers in cleanup_odvp(), because evaluate_odvp() can already call
it for partial setup failures while probe continues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix ABBA deadlock in ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find()
Syzbot/stress-ng reported an ABBA deadlock in ext4 when exercising
concurrent xattr workloads (using the ea_inode mount/format option).
The deadlock occurs between the running transaction and the eviction
thread:
- Task 1 (stress-ng): Holds a reference to a shared mbcache_entry (ce)
and calls ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find() -> ext4_iget() to retrieve
the corresponding EA inode. Since the EA inode is currently being
evicted, ext4_iget() blocks in __wait_on_freeing_inode() waiting for
eviction to complete.
- Task 2 (eviction thread): Currently evicting the same EA inode in
ext4_evict_ea_inode(). It calls mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(oe) which
blocks waiting for Task 1 to release the reference to the mbcache_entry.
To break this deadlock, implement a new ext4_iget() configuration flag
named EXT4_IGET_NOWAIT. When set, perform a non-blocking lookup of the
inode via VFS's find_inode_nowait() API.
If the inode is currently being evicted (marked with I_FREEING or
I_WILL_FREE) or created (I_CREATING), or if it is not present in the VFS
inode cache (cache miss), simply skip it (returning -ENOENT) rather than
waiting for eviction/creation to complete, breaking the ABBA cycle.
Since we return -ENOENT immediately on a cache miss, we never attempt to
allocate a new inode or call iget_locked(), completely eliminating any
TOCTOU race window.
If the returned inode is I_NEW, wait for its initialization to clear via
wait_on_new_inode(). If initialization fails and the inode is unhashed
during wait_on_new_inode() waking up (e.g., due to an I/O read error in
another thread), safely drop the reference and return -ENOENT. This
unhashed check is executed unconditionally on all cache-hit pathways to
properly handle concurrent initialization failures.
Finally, standard validation checks (including is_bad_inode,
EXT4_EA_INODE_FL, file_acl, and xattr flags) are executed as normal inside
check_igot_inode() to fully guarantee VFS-layer safety.
In ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find(), invoke ext4_iget() with the new
EXT4_IGET_NOWAIT flag to perform the non-blocking cache search. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: clear stale xarray tags on folios skipped during writeback
In data=journal mode, the writeback thread can hit the
WARN_ON_ONCE(sb_rdonly(sb)) in ext4_journal_check_start() while the
superblock is being remounted read-only during reboot:
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0)
RIP: 0010:ext4_journal_check_start+0x8b/0xd0
Call Trace:
__ext4_journal_start_sb+0x3c/0x1e0
mpage_prepare_extent_to_map+0x4af/0x580
ext4_do_writepages+0x3c0/0x1080
ext4_writepages+0xc8/0x1a0
do_writepages+0xc4/0x180
__writeback_single_inode+0x45/0x2f0
writeback_sb_inodes+0x26b/0x5d0
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x54/0x100
wb_writeback+0x1ac/0x320
wb_workfn+0x394/0x470
And followed by the warning:
EXT4-fs warning (device vda1): ext4_evict_inode:195: inode #6263:
comm (sd-umount): data will be lost
This issue is not reproduced every time, but frequently.
The reproduction step is to create a VM with 8 CPUs, 16G memory and
setup data=journal:
sudo tune2fs -o journal_data /dev/vda1
Run fio:
rm -f fiotest
fio --name=fiotest --rw=randwrite --bs=4k --runtime=6 --ioengine=libaio
--iodepth=256 --numjobs=8 --filename=fiotest --filesize=30G
--group_reporting
Reboot the VM, and check the console output from:
virsh console testvm
But there is no dirty inode, folio_clear_dirty_for_io clears PG_dirty
but leaves tags PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY and PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE set which
are only cleared by __folio_start_writeback.
In data=journal mode, jbd2 checkpoints the journalled data to its final
location and clears its own dirty flag without touching folio PG_dirty
or xarray dirty flags.
The commit f4a2b42e7891 ("ext4: fix stale xarray tags after writeback")
fixes when PG_dirty is still set but there is no dirty page.
Another case is PG_dirty is cleared, but PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY and
PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE is still set. In this case, writeback thread
checks clean folio and skips it in mpage_prepare_extent_to_map:
if (!folio_test_dirty(folio) ||
...
folio_unlcok(folio);
continue
And never reaches ext4_bio_write_folio where the commit f4a2b42e7891
clears the stale xarray tags. Print debug logs after the filesystem
is remounted read-only:
writepages RDONLY nrpages=2048 dirtytag=1 wbtag=0 towrite=1 sync=0
And all folios are actually clean:
folio idx=3 dirty=0 wb=0 checked=0 dirtybuf=0 jbddirty=0 mapped=1
...
We need to clear the xarray stale tags for such clean folios by
cycling them through writeback in the skip path, the same way
f4a2b42e7891 does in ext4_bio_write_folio. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: drain in-flight DIO before buffered write fallback
generic/746 started failing intermittently on ext3 (no-extent inodes).
The test triggers 'Page cache invalidation failure on direct I/O'
warnings and subsequent fsync returns -EIO. Adding a 50ms delay
between ext4_buffered_write_iter() and filemap_write_and_wait_range()
in ext4_dio_write_iter() makes the race almost always reproducible.
On no-extent inodes, DIO writes to holes cannot use unwritten extents,
so ext4_iomap_alloc() leaves m_flags=0 and ext4_map_blocks() returns 0.
The iomap layer then returns -ENOTBLK, causing fallback to buffered I/O.
The fallback path in ext4_dio_write_iter() calls
ext4_buffered_write_iter() which dirties pages, then does flush and
invalidate. However, there's an unprotected window between
ext4_buffered_write_iter() returning (with inode lock released) and
the subsequent flush+invalidate.
Concurrent async DIO completions from other threads can run
kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() during this window. If pages have
been re-dirtied, post-invalidation finds dirty pages and triggers the
warning, setting -EIO in the error sequence.
Consider a file with two 4k extents: [hole][written]. Thread A does
DIO to the written extent, while thread B does DIO spanning both:
kworker A (4k DIO, allocated block) kworker B (8k DIO, fallback)
----------------------------------- ----------------------------
inode_lock_shared() inode_lock_shared()
iomap_dio_rw(): iomap_dio_rw():
kiocb_invalidate_pages -> clean iomap_begin -> -ENOTBLK
submit_bio (async) dio->size = 0
inode_unlock_shared() inode_unlock_shared()
[bio pending in block layer] /* fallback: lock released */
ext4_buffered_write_iter()
inode_lock(exclusive)
generic_perform_write()
-> dirty pages [0, 8k]
inode_unlock(exclusive)
/* pages dirty, no lock */
[bio completes] filemap_write_and_wait_range()
iomap_dio_complete() -> flush dirty pages
kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() invalidate_mapping_pages()
invalidate_inode_pages2_range()
-> finds dirty page!
-> dio_warn_stale_pagecache()
-> errseq_set(-EIO)
This issue can be triggered through normal I/O paths, not just
intentionally overlapping DIO writes from userspace. For example,
generic/746 uses a loop device where multiple kworkers issue concurrent
I/O to the backing file. Additionally, when block_size < folio_size,
non-overlapping DIO writes that share a large folio can also trigger
the race.
Add inode_dio_wait() in ext4_buffered_write_iter() before
ext4_write_checks() to drain all in-flight DIO. This ensures that
all DIO clears existing pages before submitting IO (via
kiocb_invalidate_pages()), all BIO waits for all DIO to complete
(via inode_dio_wait()), and ext4_write_checks() observes the inode
size after all completed DIO so that ext4_block_zero_eof() does not
race with in-flight DIO, thus eliminating the race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: use fsdata to track inline data write state and fix race
Instead of checking the live inode state (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)
and ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)) in the
write_end handlers, use the fsdata parameter of the address space
operations to explicitly pass down the state in which write_begin
prepared the write.
A concurrent thread (such as ext4_page_mkwrite()) can convert the
inline data to an extent between write_begin and write_end. If this
happens, the write_end handlers would previously miss the inline
write_end path and fall through to extent-based write_end logic.
However, since block buffers were never allocated in write_begin,
this resulted in NULL pointer dereferences or data loss because
folio_buffers(folio) was NULL.
Define EXT4_WRITE_DATA_INLINE (4) as a bit flag (Bit 2), treating
fsdata as bitwise flags rather than mutually exclusive enums to keep
states of the write path independent. Communicate this state via
fsdata:
1) ext4_write_begin() and ext4_da_write_begin() set the
EXT4_WRITE_DATA_INLINE bit in *fsdata via bitwise OR when an inline
write is successfully prepared.
2) On entry, ext4_write_begin() clears the EXT4_WRITE_DATA_INLINE bit
to safely handle VFS retries (where generic_perform_write() bypasses
the fsdata initialization on its retry jump).
3) The write_end handlers perform a bitwise AND to check if the
EXT4_WRITE_DATA_INLINE bit is set and invoke the inline write_end
helper accordingly.
Furthermore, during a buffered write, ext4_write_inline_data_end()
acquires the xattr lock after preparing the write. If a concurrent
page fault (ext4_page_mkwrite()) converts the inline data to an extent
after the write_end handlers check the state but before
ext4_write_inline_data_end() acquires the xattr write lock, the
subsequent check will trigger a kernel panic via
BUG_ON(!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)).
To keep git history working and bisectability clean, replace the
BUG_ON check in ext4_write_inline_data_end() with a graceful error-
handling retry path in this same commit. If the inline data is cleared
after locking the xattr, we safely release all resources (releasing
iloc.bh, unlocking/putting the folio, stopping the active journal
transaction handle) and return 0 (VFS retry) to let the generic write
path retry the operation safely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when
ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
print_report+0xd0/0x630
kasan_report+0xce/0x100
__ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820
ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70
iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520
__x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an
adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced.
ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir()
rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks
only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can
therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a
complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated
entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter
reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example:
block offset 0 4092 4096
|---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----|
de2.inode
| de2.rec_len
^ OOB, reported as UAF
de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in
the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary.
The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded
directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata
checksum tail is only 12 bytes.
Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory
entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and
the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block
tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an
offset exactly at the block boundary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: avoid buffer overreads in WMI event handlers
The following WMI event handlers currently read from the event buffer
without first verifying that the message was large enough to hold the
expected event:
ath6kl_wmi_scan_complete_rx()
ath6kl_wmi_addba_req_event_rx()
ath6kl_wmi_delba_req_event_rx()
Add length checks to prevent overread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Avoid buffer overread in ath12k_wmi_op_rx()
Currently, in ath12k_wmi_op_rx(), the firmware buffer is read without
first verifying that the buffer has enough data to hold a header. This
could result in a buffer overread.
Update the logic to verify the buffer contains at least enough data to
hold a wmi_cmd_hdr before reading from the buffer.
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c7-00108-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ_UPSTREAM-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: Avoid buffer overread in ath11k_wmi_tlv_op_rx()
Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_op_rx(), the firmware buffer is read
without first verifying that the buffer has enough data to hold a
header. This could result in a buffer overread.
Add an upfront length check before dereferencing skb->data as a
wmi_cmd_hdr. The check is placed before the trace_ath11k_wmi_event()
call to preserve the existing trace semantics (tracing the full raw
WMI event including the header), unlike the analogous ath12k fix which
could use skb_pull_data() directly.
Compile tested only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Clear VM_MAYWRITE on DBR/toggle page mmap
bnxt_re_mmap() rejects VM_WRITE for the DBR_PAGE and TOGGLE_PAGE mmap
flags, but a read-only mapping can still retain VM_MAYWRITE. nd later
be upgraded with mprotect(PROT_WRITE). This can bypass the write check
that only runs at mmap time.
Clear VM_MAYWRITE before vm_insert_page() in the shared DBR/toggle-page
branch, matching the existing policy that userspace writes are not
expected for these pages. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix buffer_head leak in ext4_init_orphan_info
ext4_init_orphan_info() reads orphan file blocks with ext4_bread()
and stores the returned buffer_head in oi->of_binfo[i].ob_bh.
If ext4_bread() succeeds but the orphan block magic or checksum
validation fails, the function jumps to out_free. However, the old
out_free loop starts releasing buffers from i - 1, so the current
buffer_head at index i is skipped.
This leaks the buffer_head reference obtained by ext4_bread() on the
bad magic and bad checksum error paths.
Fix this by tracking the number of successfully read buffer_heads and
releasing exactly those buffer_heads on the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: amd-pstate-ut: Skip tests when amd-pstate driver is not active
The crash issue may occur when modprobe amd_pstate_ut on intel platform.
amd_pstate_ut: 1 amd_pstate_ut_acpi_cpc_valid success!
amd_pstate_ut: 2 amd_pstate_ut_check_enabled success!
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 20300 Comm: modprobe
Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 6.6.0-0010.rc1.ctl4.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: FiberHome R2200 V5/Xeon Boards, BIOS 3.1a 02/24/2020
RIP: 0010:amd_pstate_ut_check_perf+0x141/0x280 [amd_pstate_ut]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
amd_pstate_ut_init+0x1b/0xff0 [amd_pstate_ut]
? __pfx_amd_pstate_ut_init+0x10/0x10 [amd_pstate_ut]
do_one_initcall+0x42/0x2e0
? kmalloc_trace+0x26/0x90
do_init_module+0x60/0x240
__se_sys_init_module+0x185/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x190
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
Add state detection to amd pstate driver to prevent amd_pstate_ut driver
from testing on non-AMD platforms.
(ML: adjust title) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq/amd-pstate: handle missing policy in dynamic EPP callbacks
cpufreq_cpu_get() returns NULL when no cpufreq policy is associated with
the requested CPU, for example because the CPU is offline or the policy
has already been torn down. Both amd_pstate_power_supply_notifier() and
amd_pstate_profile_set() acquire a policy via cpufreq_cpu_get() and then
pass that pointer to amd_pstate_get_balanced_epp() and
amd_pstate_set_epp(), which dereference it unconditionally. A racing
CPU hotplug or driver teardown can therefore lead to a NULL pointer
dereference on either of these dynamic EPP paths.
The third cpufreq_cpu_get() caller in this file, amd_pstate_verify(),
already handles the NULL case. Bring the two new callers in line with
that pattern: return NOTIFY_OK from the power-supply notifier (matching
the other "nothing to do" exits) and -ENODEV from amd_pstate_profile_set()
(the usual cpufreq error for a missing CPU policy).
Found by code inspection; not tested on hardware. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Roll back partial protocol table registration
scmi_protocol_table_register() can leave earlier requests registered when
a later entry in the same ID table fails. Each request retains a pointer
to the driver's ID table, so a failed module load can leave a dangling
pointer after the module storage is released.
Unrequest only the successfully registered prefix, in reverse order,
before returning the failure. Leave the failed entry and the remaining
entries untouched because matching requests can be owned by another
driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Unrequest devices if driver registration fails
scmi_driver_register() requests protocol devices before registering the
driver. If driver_register() fails, those requests remain in the global
IDR and retain pointers to the module's ID table. Once the failed module
load releases that storage, later request matching or SCMI device creation
can dereference the stale pointers.
Unrequest the complete protocol table before returning the registration
failure. At this point table registration succeeded, so every entry is
owned by the current registration attempt. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: Fix skb double-free in xfrm_dev_direct_output()
A return value other than 1 from local_out() means that the skb has been
consumed or its ownership was transferred. xfrm_dev_direct_output()
nevertheless frees the skb on this path, causing a double-free when
netfilter drops the packet and invalidating any other owner.
Return the local_out() result directly, matching the ownership handling
in xfrm_output_resume(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/erdma: complete object teardown when the destroy command fails
erdma_destroy_qp(), erdma_destroy_cq(), erdma_dereg_mr(), and
erdma_destroy_ah() returned early when erdma_post_cmd_wait() failed,
leaking the queue buffers, MTTs, doorbells and the STAG, QPN, CQN and AHN
identifiers. A command timeout clears ERDMA_CMDQ_STATE_OK_BIT and
permanently disables the command queue, so no retry can succeed; the RDMA
core keeps the object after a failed destructor and forced uverbs cleanup
then nulls the pointers, making the resources unreachable.
Warn on failure but release every software-owned resource and return
success, since during terminal destruction the hardware command result is
only diagnostic. |
