| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| ieee802154_send() in subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154.c copies the outgoing packet into a single fixed 125-byte transmit buffer (tx_frame_buf_pool, sized IEEE802154_MTU). In builds with CONFIG_NET_L2_IEEE802154_FRAGMENT enabled (the default whenever CONFIG_NET_6LO is set), the branch taken when 6LoWPAN fragmentation is not required performed an unchecked net_buf_add_mem(frame_buf, pkt_buf->data, pkt_buf->len). The only guard was __ASSERT_NO_MSG() inside net_buf_simple_add(), which is compiled out without CONFIG_ASSERT, so an oversized packet silently overran the frame buffer.
The defect is not reachable from the radio: for NET_AF_INET6 packets ieee802154_6lo_encode_pkt() compares the whole packet length against IEEE802154_MTU and takes the fragmentation path when it does not fit, so every buffer copied on the unfragmented branch is within bounds. It is reachable through NET_AF_PACKET sockets bound to an 802.15.4 interface: for NET_SOCK_RAW the 6LoWPAN block is skipped entirely and for NET_SOCK_DGRAM it returns early on the address-family test, leaving no length validation anywhere on the transmit path (net_context_sendto() and net_if_tx() apply none, and pkt_buffer_length() does not clamp the allocation for this L2).
An application — or, in a CONFIG_USERSPACE build, an unprivileged application thread using the zsock_socket()/zsock_sendto() syscalls — can therefore drive a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write of chosen bytes past the 125-byte pool buffer. With the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE of 128 bytes the overrun is bounded to roughly ll_hdr_len + 3 bytes; with CONFIG_NET_BUF_VARIABLE_DATA_SIZE a single storage buffer can be as large as CONFIG_NET_PKT_BUF_TX_DATA_POOL_SIZE, making the overrun far larger. The consequence is corruption of memory adjacent to the pool, with a crash or further compromise of kernel state as the practical impact.
The fix validates ll_hdr_len + net_pkt_get_len(pkt) + authtag_len against IEEE802154_MTU before any copy and adds a tailroom-checking copy_pkt_to_frame() helper that returns -EMSGSIZE instead of overrunning the buffer. The same change also linearizes the whole net_buf chain into one MAC frame, so packet storage boundaries no longer become frame boundaries on the wire. |
| The ADC API requires each driver to reject a sampling sequence whose destination buffer is too small: the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h documents that "the driver must ensure that samples are not written beyond the limit and it must return an error if the buffer turns out to be not large enough". The ADI MAX32 driver did not honour that contract. start_read() in drivers/adc/adc_max32.c compared buffer_size, a byte count, against a sample count ((1 + extra_samplings) channels), ignoring sizeof(uint16_t), so it accepted a buffer half the required size. The samples are then stored through the uint16_t data->buffer by Wrap_MXC_ADC_GetData(), which writes two bytes per sample and advances the pointer by one uint16_t: in adc_max32_start_channel() for synchronous reads, and in adc_max32_isr() for asynchronous ones. A sequence selecting two channels with a two-byte buffer, for example, passes the check and has its second sample written past the end of the buffer.
On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE, adc_read() and adc_read_async() are system calls. The handler in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c copies the sequence in from user memory, verifies only that [buffer, buffer + buffer_size) is writable by the calling thread, and rejects a user-supplied options->callback; it deliberately leaves the size arithmetic to the driver. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to a MAX32 ADC device object therefore fully controls channels, buffer, buffer_size and options->extra_samplings, and can make the driver write twice as many bytes as its buffer holds. Because the check scales with extra_samplings, the overrun equals the length of the buffer itself, up to channels * 65536 bytes past its end, since the sample pointer is only rewound on a repeat sampling, never on the extra samplings of a sequence.
The resulting stores are performed by the driver in kernel mode (in the system call itself, the ADC context timer, or the ADC interrupt handler for asynchronous reads), where the MPU does not restrict the thread's memory domain, so the write walks linearly out of the user partition and into adjacent memory such as other partitions, kernel data or thread stacks. The impact is kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset, a plausible privilege-escalation and denial-of-service primitive from an unprivileged user-mode thread. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are affected only as a caller-side robustness defect, since the application itself supplies the buffer.
The fix replaces that check in start_read() with a call to the new shared helper adc_sequence_validate_buffer() in drivers/adc/adc_common.c, passing sizeof(uint16_t) as the sample size. The helper computes active_channels sizeof(uint16_t) (1 + extra_samplings) and returns -ENOMEM before any sampling is started. |
| U-Boot through 2026.10-rc5 contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the video_display_rle8_bitmap function in drivers/video/video_bmp.c. Attackers can supply a crafted RLE8-compressed BMP image to corrupt memory adjacent to the framebuffer and crash the bootloader. |
| Out of bounds write in WebGL in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Out of bounds write in GPU in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| U-Boot before 2026.10-rc3 with CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG enabled contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the __net_defragment() function in net/net.c. Remote attackers can send a crafted IP fragment with non-zero offset and More-Fragments flag set during netboot to corrupt adjacent memory and crash the bootloader. |
| Out of bounds write in GPU in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Buffer overflow in ANGLE in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 154.0.8037.92 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Add checking nr_subbufs to persistent ring buffer validation
Sashiko reported that the code was using meta->nr_subbufs without making
sure that it matched the nr_pages + 1 on data that was assuming the two
were the same.
Add a check to the persistent ring buffer validation code to make sure
that the saved nr_subbufs matches what we expect. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix out-of-bounds write in l2cap_ecred_connect
l2cap_chan_connect() tries to ensure there are no more than
L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_SCID_MAX pending ECRED channels, so they fit in the
same L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ that l2cap_ecred_connect() constructs.
However, the check only counts deferred channels. If 6 L2CAP sockets
are connected at the same time in order DDDDND (D=deferred,
N=non-deferred), the last can bump the total to max+1. It results to
one __le16 written out of bounds of the scid array, and an invalid
ECRED_CONN_REQ being sent.
Fix by leaving room for the non-deferred pending ECRED channels in the
counting in l2cap_chan_connect(), so the limit can't be exceeded.
Move counting under same critical section where the channel is added.
Although race conditions involving this appear unreachable, it's easier
to see.
Also add WARN_ON_ONCE check in l2cap_ecred_defer_connect() to make this
less brittle. |
| A flaw was found in dash. The printf builtin reserves four bytes before converting a Unicode \u or \U escape, but the multi-byte token can need five or six bytes. A local user who can supply such an escape to dash printf or echo %b, including through dash -c and a positional argument, can write one or two bytes past that reservation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: nfp: bound the ntuple rule dump by the caller's buffer size
nfp_net_get_fs_loc() dumps every entry of nn->fs.list into rule_locs[]
without consulting cmd->rule_cnt, which is how many entries the caller
had room for. ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN and the
ioctl sizes the buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so once an
admin has installed flow steering rules any user can ask for fewer slots
than there are rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt
of 0 leaves the buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it.
Bail out with -EMSGSIZE when the buffer fills up, the way the other
ntuple capable drivers do, and report how many locations were filled so
a shrinking rule list does not leave the caller reading stale slots. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Don't resurrect a scalar id dropped by collect_linked_regs()
check_cond_jmp_op() copies the compared registers into
env->{false,true}_reg{1,2} before collect_linked_regs() runs and copies
those snapshots back into both branch states afterwards.
collect_linked_regs() records at most LINKED_REGS_MAX members of a
linked registers group in the jump history and calls clear_scalar_id()
for every member that does not fit. The compared register is not exempt
from that.
As a consequence, sync_linked_regs() might adjust ranges for more
registers than bpf_bt_sync_linked_regs() can propagate precision to.
Collect the linked registers before the snapshots are taken instead.
This might lead to some unnecessary clear_scalar_id's, but from
previous testing situations with many linked registers are
extremely rare. |
| Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its
transmit packet.
The string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four:
```c
/* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */
memory_len = ((memory_len & 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
...
len = *((USHORT*)(p - 2)); /* slot size, not string length */
if ((len == memory_len) && ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...)
```
The lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size,
so names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered
with the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than
the length the caller accounted for. `_nx_mdns_packet_rr_add` (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only
bound check from that stale length, and `_nx_mdns_name_string_encode` writes the real string.
Two PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a `_http._tcp` query, with owner names
whose lengths fall in the same bucket:
```
==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
WRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5
#0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096
#1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911
0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region
```
The overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past `nx_packet_data_end`. In a
normal pool that lands in the next packet in the same pool rather than in a redzone, so the visible
effect is a corrupted neighbouring packet or a corrupted pool free list rather than a clean crash.
Compare the slot size against the stored string length before declaring a match, or keep the
string length in the slot header and return it to the caller so the encoder and the bound check
agree. |
| A vulnerability has been found in FastStone Image Viewer up to 8.3. The impacted element is an unknown function of the component 1bpp RLE Decoder. The manipulation leads to out-of-bounds write. The attack can be initiated remotely. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix the rtrmap and rtrefcount _maxlevels_ondisk functions
The _maxlevels_ondisk functions are used to compute the size of
in-memory btree cursors for each btree type. Unfortunately, LOLLM
noticed that the rtrmap and rtrefcount versions of these functions
forget to account for the inode root, which means that we could access
beyond the end of the cursor given a sufficiently large btree. Fix
this. |
| A heap-based buffer overflow exists in the TLS transport layer of the MongoDB C Driver when built with the Windows platform TLS backend. A remote endpoint that the client connects to can cause the driver to write uncontrolled data outside the bounds of a heap allocation while processing incoming encrypted traffic after the TLS handshake completes. No authentication or user interaction is required, because the affected processing occurs before any application-level authentication completes. Triggering this issue may lead to memory corruption in the client process, disclosure of adjacent heap memory, or termination of the process. |
| OpenImageIO is a toolset for reading, writing, and manipulating image files of any image file format relevant to VFX / animation. Prior to 3.0.20.0, 3.1.15.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1, A crafted cineon file can supply a numberofelements value greater than the format maximum of eight. cineoninput::open() uses that unchecked value as the loop bound while filling the fixed strings[8] array, writing pointers beyond the stack buffer and into adjacent state, resulting in memory corruption and denial of service. The affected implementation is identified by src/cineon.imageio/cineoninput.cpp, CineonInput::open(), numberOfElements, and strings[8], which define the relevant source path, functions, state, and trigger. This issue is fixed in versions 3.0.20.0, 3.1.15.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1. |
| OpenImageIO is a toolset for reading, writing, and manipulating image files of any image file format relevant to VFX / animation. Prior to 3.0.21.0, 3.1.16.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1, A zbuffer-only tiled iff is exposed with a 16-bit public imagespec while the decoder retains a 32-bit internal pixel size. iffinput::read_native_tile() copies according to m_header.pixel_bytes() rather than imagespec::tile_bytes(true), and a failed read can leave m_buf nonempty so a later call copies partially initialized data into the undersized caller buffer, resulting in a heap out-of-bounds write and memory corruption. The affected implementation is identified by src/iff.imageio/iffinput.cpp, IffInput::read_native_tile(), ImageSpec::tile_bytes(true), m_header.pixel_bytes(), ZBUFFER, and m_buf, which define the relevant source path, functions, state, and trigger. This issue is fixed in versions 3.0.21.0, 3.1.16.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1. |
| OpenImageIO is a toolset for reading, writing, and manipulating image files of any image file format relevant to VFX / animation. Prior to 3.0.21.0, 3.1.16.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1, A valid tiled openexr image whose width is not a multiple of its tile width can trigger an overflow when a caller reads a partial edge-tile rectangle. openexrinput::read_native_tiles() copies each row into the caller buffer using the padded whole-tile scanline_stride rather than user_scanline_bytes for the requested rectangle, resulting in a heap out-of-bounds write and memory corruption. The affected implementation is identified by src/openexr.imageio/exrinput.cpp, OpenEXRInput::read_native_tiles(), partial edge tile, user_scanline_bytes, and scanline_stride, which define the relevant source path, functions, state, and trigger. This issue is fixed in versions 3.0.21.0, 3.1.16.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1. |
