| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Prevent sending WMI commands to firmware during firmware crash
Currently, we encounter the following kernel call trace when a firmware
crash occurs. This happens because the host sends WMI commands to the
firmware while it is in recovery, causing the commands to fail and
resulting in the kernel call trace.
Set the ATH12K_FLAG_CRASH_FLUSH and ATH12K_FLAG_RECOVERY flags when the
host driver receives the firmware crash notification from MHI. This
prevents sending WMI commands to the firmware during recovery.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0xc0
register_lock_class+0x6be/0x7a0
? __lock_acquire+0x644/0x19a0
__lock_acquire+0x95/0x19a0
lock_acquire+0x265/0x310
? ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k]
? find_held_lock+0x34/0xa0
? ath12k_ce_send+0x56/0x210 [ath12k]
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x70
? ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k]
ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k]
ath12k_htc_send+0x178/0x390 [ath12k]
ath12k_wmi_cmd_send_nowait+0x76/0xa0 [ath12k]
ath12k_wmi_cmd_send+0x62/0x190 [ath12k]
ath12k_wmi_pdev_bss_chan_info_request+0x62/0xc0 [ath1
ath12k_mac_op_get_survey+0x2be/0x310 [ath12k]
ieee80211_dump_survey+0x99/0x240 [mac80211]
nl80211_dump_survey+0xe7/0x470 [cfg80211]
? kmalloc_reserve+0x59/0xf0
genl_dumpit+0x24/0x70
netlink_dump+0x177/0x360
__netlink_dump_start+0x206/0x280
genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit.isra.22+0x8a/0xe0
? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.isra.23+0xe0/0xe0
? genl_op_lock.part.12+0x10/0x10
? genl_dumpit+0x70/0x70
genl_rcv_msg+0x1d0/0x290
? nl80211_del_station+0x330/0x330 [cfg80211]
? genl_get_cmd_both+0x50/0x50
netlink_rcv_skb+0x4f/0x100
genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30
netlink_unicast+0x1b6/0x260
netlink_sendmsg+0x31a/0x450
__sock_sendmsg+0xa8/0xb0
____sys_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x260
___sys_sendmsg+0x89/0xe0
? local_clock_noinstr+0xb/0xc0
? rcu_is_watching+0xd/0x40
? kfree+0x1de/0x370
? __sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xc0
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix node corruption in ar->arvifs list
In current WLAN recovery code flow, ath12k_core_halt() only reinitializes
the "arvifs" list head. This will cause the list node immediately following
the list head to become an invalid list node. Because the prev of that node
still points to the list head "arvifs", but the next of the list head
"arvifs" no longer points to that list node.
When a WLAN recovery occurs during the execution of a vif removal, and it
happens before the spin_lock_bh(&ar->data_lock) in
ath12k_mac_vdev_delete(), list_del() will detect the previously mentioned
situation, thereby triggering a kernel panic.
The fix is to remove and reinitialize all vif list nodes from the list head
"arvifs" during WLAN halt. The reinitialization is to make the list nodes
valid, ensuring that the list_del() in ath12k_mac_vdev_delete() can execute
normally.
Call trace:
__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xd4/0x100 (P)
ath12k_mac_remove_link_interface.isra.0+0xf8/0x2e4 [ath12k]
ath12k_scan_vdev_clean_work+0x40/0x164 [ath12k]
cfg80211_wiphy_work+0xfc/0x100
process_one_work+0x164/0x2d0
worker_thread+0x254/0x380
kthread+0xfc/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
The change is mostly copied from the ath11k patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: QOS: Refactor TC_HTB_LEAF_DEL_LAST callback
This patch addresses below issues,
1. Active traffic on the leaf node must be stopped before its send queue
is reassigned to the parent. This patch resolves the issue by marking
the node as 'Inner'.
2. During a system reboot, the interface receives TC_HTB_LEAF_DEL
and TC_HTB_LEAF_DEL_LAST callbacks to delete its HTB queues.
In the case of TC_HTB_LEAF_DEL_LAST, although the same send queue
is reassigned to the parent, the current logic still attempts to update
the real number of queues, leadning to below warnings
New queues can't be registered after device unregistration.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6475 at net/core/net-sysfs.c:1714
netdev_queue_update_kobjects+0x1e4/0x200 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: drv: netdevsim: don't napi_complete() from netpoll
netdevsim supports netpoll. Make sure we don't call napi_complete()
from it, since it may not be scheduled. Breno reports hitting a
warning in napi_complete_done():
WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 104 at net/core/dev.c:6592 napi_complete_done+0x2cc/0x560
__napi_poll+0x2d8/0x3a0
handle_softirqs+0x1fe/0x710
This is presumably after netpoll stole the SCHED bit prematurely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: serial: uartlite: register uart driver in init
When two instances of uart devices are probing, a concurrency race can
occur. If one thread calls uart_register_driver function, which first
allocates and assigns memory to 'uart_state' member of uart_driver
structure, the other instance can bypass uart driver registration and
call ulite_assign. This calls uart_add_one_port, which expects the uart
driver to be fully initialized. This leads to a kernel panic due to a
null pointer dereference:
[ 8.143581] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002b8
[ 8.156982] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 8.156984] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 8.156986] PGD 0 P4D 0
...
[ 8.180668] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x19/0x30
[ 8.188624] Call Trace:
[ 8.188629] ? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f
[ 8.195260] ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x290
[ 8.209183] ? __irq_resolve_mapping+0x47/0x80
[ 8.209187] ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140
[ 8.209190] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 8.209196] ? mutex_lock+0x19/0x30
[ 8.223116] uart_add_one_port+0x60/0x440
[ 8.223122] ? proc_tty_register_driver+0x43/0x50
[ 8.223126] ? tty_register_driver+0x1ca/0x1e0
[ 8.246250] ulite_probe+0x357/0x4b0 [uartlite]
To prevent it, move uart driver registration in to init function. This
will ensure that uart_driver is always registered when probe function
is called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pkey: Prevent overflow in size calculation for memdup_user()
Number of apqn target list entries contained in 'nr_apqns' variable is
determined by userspace via an ioctl call so the result of the product in
calculation of size passed to memdup_user() may overflow.
In this case the actual size of the allocated area and the value
describing it won't be in sync leading to various types of unpredictable
behaviour later.
Use a proper memdup_array_user() helper which returns an error if an
overflow is detected. Note that it is different from when nr_apqns is
initially zero - that case is considered valid and should be handled in
subsequent pkey_handler implementations.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: fix crash in wacom_aes_battery_handler()
Commit fd2a9b29dc9c ("HID: wacom: Remove AES power_supply after extended
inactivity") introduced wacom_aes_battery_handler() which is scheduled
as a delayed work (aes_battery_work).
In wacom_remove(), aes_battery_work is not canceled. Consequently, if
the device is removed while aes_battery_work is still pending, then hard
crashes or "Oops: general protection fault..." are experienced when
wacom_aes_battery_handler() is finally called. E.g., this happens with
built-in USB devices after resume from hibernate when aes_battery_work
was still pending at the time of hibernation.
So, take care to cancel aes_battery_work in wacom_remove(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix use-after-free in vhci_flush()
syzbot reported use-after-free in vhci_flush() without repro. [0]
From the splat, a thread close()d a vhci file descriptor while
its device was being used by iotcl() on another thread.
Once the last fd refcnt is released, vhci_release() calls
hci_unregister_dev(), hci_free_dev(), and kfree() for struct
vhci_data, which is set to hci_dev->dev->driver_data.
The problem is that there is no synchronisation after unlinking
hdev from hci_dev_list in hci_unregister_dev(). There might be
another thread still accessing the hdev which was fetched before
the unlink operation.
We can use SRCU for such synchronisation.
Let's run hci_dev_reset() under SRCU and wait for its completion
in hci_unregister_dev().
Another option would be to restore hci_dev->destruct(), which was
removed in commit 587ae086f6e4 ("Bluetooth: Remove unused
hci-destruct cb"). However, this would not be a good solution, as
we should not run hci_unregister_dev() while there are in-flight
ioctl() requests, which could lead to another data-race KCSAN splat.
Note that other drivers seem to have the same problem, for exmaple,
virtbt_remove().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_queue_empty_lockless include/linux/skbuff.h:1891 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_queue_purge_reason+0x99/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:3937
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807cb8d858 by task syz.1.219/6718
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6718 Comm: syz.1.219 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-syzkaller-00196-g08207f42d3ff #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xd2/0x2b0 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:634
skb_queue_empty_lockless include/linux/skbuff.h:1891 [inline]
skb_queue_purge_reason+0x99/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:3937
skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3368 [inline]
vhci_flush+0x44/0x50 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:69
hci_dev_do_reset net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:552 [inline]
hci_dev_reset+0x420/0x5c0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:592
sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1190
sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1311
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fcf5b98e929
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fcf5c7b9038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fcf5bbb6160 RCX: 00007fcf5b98e929
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000400448cb RDI: 0000000000000009
RBP: 00007fcf5ba10b39 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fcf5bbb6160 R15: 00007ffd6353d528
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6535:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]
vhci_open+0x57/0x360 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:635
misc_open+0x2bc/0x330 drivers/char/misc.c:161
chrdev_open+0x4c9/0x5e0 fs/char_dev.c:414
do_dentry_open+0xdf0/0x1970 fs/open.c:964
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1094
do_open fs/namei.c:3887 [inline]
path_openat+0x2ee5/0x3830 fs/name
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: megaraid_sas: Fix invalid node index
On a system with DRAM interleave enabled, out-of-bound access is
detected:
megaraid_sas 0000:3f:00.0: requested/available msix 128/128 poll_queue 0
------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ./arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h:72:28
index -1 is out of range for type 'cpumask *[1024]'
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x2b
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x46/0x4b
megasas_alloc_irq_vectors+0x149/0x190 [megaraid_sas]
megasas_probe_one.cold+0xa4d/0x189c [megaraid_sas]
local_pci_probe+0x42/0x90
pci_device_probe+0xdc/0x290
really_probe+0xdb/0x340
__driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
__driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
bus_for_each_dev+0x8b/0xe0
bus_add_driver+0x142/0x220
driver_register+0x72/0xd0
megasas_init+0xdf/0xff0 [megaraid_sas]
do_one_initcall+0x57/0x310
do_init_module+0x90/0x250
init_module_from_file+0x85/0xc0
idempotent_init_module+0x114/0x310
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x65/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x82/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Fix it accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: fnic: Fix crash in fnic_wq_cmpl_handler when FDMI times out
When both the RHBA and RPA FDMI requests time out, fnic reuses a frame to
send ABTS for each of them. On send completion, this causes an attempt to
free the same frame twice that leads to a crash.
Fix crash by allocating separate frames for RHBA and RPA, and modify ABTS
logic accordingly.
Tested by checking MDS for FDMI information.
Tested by using instrumented driver to:
- Drop PLOGI response
- Drop RHBA response
- Drop RPA response
- Drop RHBA and RPA response
- Drop PLOGI response + ABTS response
- Drop RHBA response + ABTS response
- Drop RPA response + ABTS response
- Drop RHBA and RPA response + ABTS response for both of them |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Restore context entry setup order for aliased devices
Commit 2031c469f816 ("iommu/vt-d: Add support for static identity domain")
changed the context entry setup during domain attachment from a
set-and-check policy to a clear-and-reset approach. This inadvertently
introduced a regression affecting PCI aliased devices behind PCIe-to-PCI
bridges.
Specifically, keyboard and touchpad stopped working on several Apple
Macbooks with below messages:
kernel: platform pxa2xx-spi.3: Adding to iommu group 20
kernel: input: Apple SPI Keyboard as
/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.3/pxa2xx-spi.3/spi_master/spi2/spi-APP000D:00/input/input0
kernel: DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 3
kernel: DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [00:1e.3] fault addr
0xffffa000 [fault reason 0x06] PTE Read access is not set
kernel: DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 3
kernel: DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [00:1e.3] fault addr
0xffffa000 [fault reason 0x06] PTE Read access is not set
kernel: applespi spi-APP000D:00: Error writing to device: 01 0e 00 00
kernel: DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 3
kernel: DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [00:1e.3] fault addr
0xffffa000 [fault reason 0x06] PTE Read access is not set
kernel: DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 3
kernel: applespi spi-APP000D:00: Error writing to device: 01 0e 00 00
Fix this by restoring the previous context setup order. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipc: fix to protect IPCS lookups using RCU
syzbot reported that it discovered a use-after-free vulnerability, [0]
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
idr_for_each() is protected by rwsem, but this is not enough. If it is
not protected by RCU read-critical region, when idr_for_each() calls
radix_tree_node_free() through call_rcu() to free the radix_tree_node
structure, the node will be freed immediately, and when reading the next
node in radix_tree_for_each_slot(), the already freed memory may be read.
Therefore, we need to add code to make sure that idr_for_each() is
protected within the RCU read-critical region when we call it in
shm_destroy_orphaned(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: remove tag set when second admin queue config fails
Commit 104d0e2f6222 ("nvme-fabrics: reset admin connection for secure
concatenation") modified nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() to call
nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() twice. The first call prepares for
DH-CHAP negotitation, and the second call is required for secure
concatenation. However, this change triggered BUG KASAN slab-use-after-
free in blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter(). This BUG can be recreated by
repeating the blktests test case nvme/063 a few times [1].
When the BUG happens, nvme_tcp_create_ctrl() fails in the call chain
below:
nvme_tcp_create_ctrl()
nvme_tcp_alloc_ctrl() new=true ... Alloc nvme_tcp_ctrl and admin_tag_set
nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() new=true
nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() new=true ... Succeed
nvme_alloc_admin_tag_set() ... Alloc the tag set for admin_tag_set
nvme_stop_keep_alive()
nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue() remove=false
nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() new=false
nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue() ... Fail, but do not call nvme_remove_admin_tag_set()
nvme_uninit_ctrl()
nvme_put_ctrl() ... Free up the nvme_tcp_ctrl and admin_tag_set
The first call of nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() succeeds with
new=true argument. The second call fails with new=false argument. This
second call does not call nvme_remove_admin_tag_set() on failure, due to
the new=false argument. Then the admin tag set is not removed. However,
nvme_tcp_create_ctrl() assumes that nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() would call
nvme_remove_admin_tag_set(). Then it frees up struct nvme_tcp_ctrl which
has admin_tag_set field. Later on, the timeout handler accesses the
admin_tag_set field and causes the BUG KASAN slab-use-after-free.
To not leave the admin tag set, call nvme_remove_admin_tag_set() when
the second nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() call fails. Do not return
from nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() on failure. Instead, jump to "destroy_admin"
go-to label to call nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue() which calls
nvme_remove_admin_tag_set(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: dell_rbu: Fix list usage
Pass the correct list head to list_for_each_entry*() when looping through
the packet list.
Without this patch, reading the packet data via sysfs will show the data
incorrectly (because it starts at the wrong packet), and clearing the
packet list will result in a NULL pointer dereference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: sch_sfq: reject invalid perturb period
Gerrard Tai reported that SFQ perturb_period has no range check yet,
and this can be used to trigger a race condition fixed in a separate patch.
We want to make sure ctl->perturb_period * HZ will not overflow
and is positive.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb -10 # negative value : error
Error: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 1000000000 # too big : error
Error: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 2000000 # acceptable value
tc -s -d qd sh dev lo
qdisc sfq 8005: root refcnt 2 limit 127p quantum 64Kb depth 127 flows 128 divisor 1024 perturb 2000000sec
Sent 0 bytes 0 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0)
backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix null-ptr-deref when acquiring remote ip of ethernet bearer
The reproduction steps:
1. create a tun interface
2. enable l2 bearer
3. TIPC_NL_UDP_GET_REMOTEIP with media name set to tun
tipc: Started in network mode
tipc: Node identity 8af312d38a21, cluster identity 4711
tipc: Enabled bearer <eth:syz_tun>, priority 1
Oops: general protection fault
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range
CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 559 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1+ #117 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC
RIP: 0010:tipc_udp_nl_dump_remoteip+0x4a4/0x8f0
the ub was in fact a struct dev.
when bid != 0 && skip_cnt != 0, bearer_list[bid] may be NULL or
other media when other thread changes it.
fix this by checking media_id. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
calipso: Fix null-ptr-deref in calipso_req_{set,del}attr().
syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in sock_omalloc() while allocating
a CALIPSO option. [0]
The NULL is of struct sock, which was fetched by sk_to_full_sk() in
calipso_req_setattr().
Since commit a1a5344ddbe8 ("tcp: avoid two atomic ops for syncookies"),
reqsk->rsk_listener could be NULL when SYN Cookie is returned to its
client, as hinted by the leading SYN Cookie log.
Here are 3 options to fix the bug:
1) Return 0 in calipso_req_setattr()
2) Return an error in calipso_req_setattr()
3) Alaways set rsk_listener
1) is no go as it bypasses LSM, but 2) effectively disables SYN Cookie
for CALIPSO. 3) is also no go as there have been many efforts to reduce
atomic ops and make TCP robust against DDoS. See also commit 3b24d854cb35
("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood").
As of the blamed commit, SYN Cookie already did not need refcounting,
and no one has stumbled on the bug for 9 years, so no CALIPSO user will
care about SYN Cookie.
Let's return an error in calipso_req_setattr() and calipso_req_delattr()
in the SYN Cookie case.
This can be reproduced by [1] on Fedora and now connect() of nc times out.
[0]:
TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 12262 Comm: syz.1.2611 Not tainted 6.14.0 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_kmalloc+0x35/0x170 net/core/sock.c:2806
Code: 89 d5 41 54 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 25 e3 c6 fd e8 f0 91 e3 00 48 8d 7b 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b
RSP: 0018:ffff88811af89038 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888105266400
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88800c890000 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: 0000000000000050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810526640e
R10: ffffed1020a4cc81 R11: ffff88810526640f R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000820 R14: ffff888105266400 R15: 0000000000000050
FS: 00007f0653a07640(0000) GS:ffff88811af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f863ba096f4 CR3: 00000000163c0005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
ipv6_renew_options+0x279/0x950 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1288
calipso_req_setattr+0x181/0x340 net/ipv6/calipso.c:1204
calipso_req_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:597
netlbl_req_setattr+0x18a/0x440 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1249
selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request+0x1fb/0x320 security/selinux/netlabel.c:342
selinux_inet_conn_request+0x1eb/0x2c0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5551
security_inet_conn_request+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4945
tcp_v6_route_req+0x22c/0x550 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:825
tcp_conn_request+0xec8/0x2b70 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7275
tcp_v6_conn_request+0x1e3/0x440 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1328
tcp_rcv_state_process+0xafa/0x52b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6781
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x8a6/0x1a40 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1667
tcp_v6_rcv+0x505e/0x5b50 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1904
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x17c/0x1da0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:436
ip6_input_finish+0x103/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:480
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
ip6_input+0x13c/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491
dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0xb6/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netf
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/fpsimd: Avoid clobbering kernel FPSIMD state with SMSTOP
On system with SME, a thread's kernel FPSIMD state may be erroneously
clobbered during a context switch immediately after that state is
restored. Systems without SME are unaffected.
If the CPU happens to be in streaming SVE mode before a context switch
to a thread with kernel FPSIMD state, fpsimd_thread_switch() will
restore the kernel FPSIMD state using fpsimd_load_kernel_state() while
the CPU is still in streaming SVE mode. When fpsimd_thread_switch()
subsequently calls fpsimd_flush_cpu_state(), this will execute an
SMSTOP, causing an exit from streaming SVE mode. The exit from
streaming SVE mode will cause the hardware to reset a number of
FPSIMD/SVE/SME registers, clobbering the FPSIMD state.
Fix this by calling fpsimd_flush_cpu_state() before restoring the kernel
FPSIMD state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: arm-ni: Unregister PMUs on probe failure
When a resource allocation fails in one clock domain of an NI device,
we need to properly roll back all previously registered perf PMUs in
other clock domains of the same device.
Otherwise, it can lead to kernel panics.
Calling arm_ni_init+0x0/0xff8 [arm_ni] @ 2374
arm-ni ARMHCB70:00: Failed to request PMU region 0x1f3c13000
arm-ni ARMHCB70:00: probe with driver arm-ni failed with error -16
list_add corruption: next->prev should be prev (fffffd01e9698a18),
but was 0000000000000000. (next=ffff10001a0decc8).
pstate: 6340009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : list_add_valid_or_report+0x7c/0xb8
lr : list_add_valid_or_report+0x7c/0xb8
Call trace:
__list_add_valid_or_report+0x7c/0xb8
perf_pmu_register+0x22c/0x3a0
arm_ni_probe+0x554/0x70c [arm_ni]
platform_probe+0x70/0xe8
really_probe+0xc6/0x4d8
driver_probe_device+0x48/0x170
__driver_attach+0x8e/0x1c0
bus_for_each_dev+0x64/0xf0
driver_add+0x138/0x260
bus_add_driver+0x68/0x138
__platform_driver_register+0x2c/0x40
arm_ni_init+0x14/0x2a [arm_ni]
do_init_module+0x36/0x298
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
SMP: stopping secondary CPUs |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: fix ktls panic with sockmap
[ 2172.936997] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2172.936999] kernel BUG at lib/iov_iter.c:629!
......
[ 2172.944996] PKRU: 55555554
[ 2172.945155] Call Trace:
[ 2172.945299] <TASK>
[ 2172.945428] ? die+0x36/0x90
[ 2172.945601] ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100
[ 2172.945795] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946031] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946267] ? do_error_trap+0x7d/0x110
[ 2172.946499] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946736] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
[ 2172.946961] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.947197] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 2172.947446] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.947683] ? iov_iter_revert+0x5c/0x180
[ 2172.947913] tls_sw_sendmsg_locked.isra.0+0x794/0x840
[ 2172.948206] tls_sw_sendmsg+0x52/0x80
[ 2172.948420] ? inet_sendmsg+0x1f/0x70
[ 2172.948634] __sys_sendto+0x1cd/0x200
[ 2172.948848] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[ 2172.949072] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270
[ 2172.949330] ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x5e/0x170
[ 2172.949595] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[ 2172.949817] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270
[ 2172.950211] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190
[ 2172.950632] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xc2/0xd0
[ 2172.951036] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
[ 2172.951382] do_syscall_64+0x90/0x170
......
After calling bpf_exec_tx_verdict(), the size of msg_pl->sg may increase,
e.g., when the BPF program executes bpf_msg_push_data().
If the BPF program sets cork_bytes and sg.size is smaller than cork_bytes,
it will return -ENOSPC and attempt to roll back to the non-zero copy
logic. However, during rollback, msg->msg_iter is reset, but since
msg_pl->sg.size has been increased, subsequent executions will exceed the
actual size of msg_iter.
'''
iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
'''
The changes in this commit are based on the following considerations:
1. When cork_bytes is set, rolling back to non-zero copy logic is
pointless and can directly go to zero-copy logic.
2. We can not calculate the correct number of bytes to revert msg_iter.
Assume the original data is "abcdefgh" (8 bytes), and after 3 pushes
by the BPF program, it becomes 11-byte data: "abc?de?fgh?".
Then, we set cork_bytes to 6, which means the first 6 bytes have been
processed, and the remaining 5 bytes "?fgh?" will be cached until the
length meets the cork_bytes requirement.
However, some data in "?fgh?" is not within 'sg->msg_iter'
(but in msg_pl instead), especially the data "?" we pushed.
So it doesn't seem as simple as just reverting through an offset of
msg_iter.
3. For non-TLS sockets in tcp_bpf_sendmsg, when a "cork" situation occurs,
the user-space send() doesn't return an error, and the returned length is
the same as the input length parameter, even if some data is cached.
Additionally, I saw that the current non-zero-copy logic for handling
corking is written as:
'''
line 1177
else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
if (ret == -ENOSPC)
ret = 0;
goto send_end;
'''
So it's ok to just return 'copied' without error when a "cork" situation
occurs. |
