| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: s32cc: fix uninitialized memory in s32_pinctrl_desc
s32_pinctrl_desc is allocated with devm_kmalloc(), but not all of its
fields are initialized. Notably, num_custom_params is used in
pinconf_generic_parse_dt_config(), resulting in intermittent allocation
errors, such as the following splat when probing i2c-imx:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 176 at mm/page_alloc.c:4795 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x290/0x300
[...]
Hardware name: NXP S32G3 Reference Design Board 3 (S32G-VNP-RDB3) (DT)
[...]
Call trace:
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x290/0x300 (P)
___kmalloc_large_node+0x84/0x168
__kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x34/0x120
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2ac/0x378
pinconf_generic_parse_dt_config+0x68/0x1a0
s32_dt_node_to_map+0x104/0x248
dt_to_map_one_config+0x154/0x1d8
pinctrl_dt_to_map+0x12c/0x280
create_pinctrl+0x6c/0x270
pinctrl_get+0xc0/0x170
devm_pinctrl_get+0x50/0xa0
pinctrl_bind_pins+0x60/0x2a0
really_probe+0x60/0x3a0
[...]
__platform_driver_register+0x2c/0x40
i2c_adap_imx_init+0x28/0xff8 [i2c_imx]
[...]
This results in later parse failures that can cause issues in dependent
drivers:
s32g-siul2-pinctrl 4009c240.pinctrl: /soc@0/pinctrl@4009c240/i2c0-pins/i2c0-grp0: could not parse node property
s32g-siul2-pinctrl 4009c240.pinctrl: /soc@0/pinctrl@4009c240/i2c0-pins/i2c0-grp0: could not parse node property
[...]
pca953x 0-0022: failed writing register: -6
i2c i2c-0: IMX I2C adapter registered
s32g-siul2-pinctrl 4009c240.pinctrl: /soc@0/pinctrl@4009c240/i2c2-pins/i2c2-grp0: could not parse node property
s32g-siul2-pinctrl 4009c240.pinctrl: /soc@0/pinctrl@4009c240/i2c2-pins/i2c2-grp0: could not parse node property
i2c i2c-1: IMX I2C adapter registered
s32g-siul2-pinctrl 4009c240.pinctrl: /soc@0/pinctrl@4009c240/i2c4-pins/i2c4-grp0: could not parse node property
s32g-siul2-pinctrl 4009c240.pinctrl: /soc@0/pinctrl@4009c240/i2c4-pins/i2c4-grp0: could not parse node property
i2c i2c-2: IMX I2C adapter registered
Fix this by initializing s32_pinctrl_desc with devm_kzalloc() instead of
devm_kmalloc() in s32_pinctrl_probe(), which sets the previously
uninitialized fields to zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: tcm_loop: Fix segfault in tcm_loop_tpg_address_show()
If the allocation of tl_hba->sh fails in tcm_loop_driver_probe() and we
attempt to dereference it in tcm_loop_tpg_address_show() we will get a
segfault, see below for an example. So, check tl_hba->sh before
dereferencing it.
Unable to allocate struct scsi_host
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000194
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 8356 Comm: tokio-runtime-w Not tainted 6.6.104.2-4.azl3 #1
Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 09/28/2024
RIP: 0010:tcm_loop_tpg_address_show+0x2e/0x50 [tcm_loop]
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
configfs_read_iter+0x12d/0x1d0 [configfs]
vfs_read+0x1b5/0x300
ksys_read+0x6f/0xf0
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: route: Prevent rt_bind_exception() from rebinding stale fnhe
The sit driver's packet transmission path calls: sit_tunnel_xmit() ->
update_or_create_fnhe(), which lead to fnhe_remove_oldest() being called
to delete entries exceeding FNHE_RECLAIM_DEPTH+random.
The race window is between fnhe_remove_oldest() selecting fnheX for
deletion and the subsequent kfree_rcu(). During this time, the
concurrent path's __mkroute_output() -> find_exception() can fetch the
soon-to-be-deleted fnheX, and rt_bind_exception() then binds it with a
new dst using a dst_hold(). When the original fnheX is freed via RCU,
the dst reference remains permanently leaked.
CPU 0 CPU 1
__mkroute_output()
find_exception() [fnheX]
update_or_create_fnhe()
fnhe_remove_oldest() [fnheX]
rt_bind_exception() [bind dst]
RCU callback [fnheX freed, dst leak]
This issue manifests as a device reference count leak and a warning in
dmesg when unregistering the net device:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for sitX to become free. Usage count = N
Ido Schimmel provided the simple test validation method [1].
The fix clears 'oldest->fnhe_daddr' before calling fnhe_flush_routes().
Since rt_bind_exception() checks this field, setting it to zero prevents
the stale fnhe from being reused and bound to a new dst just before it
is freed.
[1]
ip netns add ns1
ip -n ns1 link set dev lo up
ip -n ns1 address add 192.0.2.1/32 dev lo
ip -n ns1 link add name dummy1 up type dummy
ip -n ns1 route add 192.0.2.2/32 dev dummy1
ip -n ns1 link add name gretap1 up arp off type gretap \
local 192.0.2.1 remote 192.0.2.2
ip -n ns1 route add 198.51.0.0/16 dev gretap1
taskset -c 0 ip netns exec ns1 mausezahn gretap1 \
-A 198.51.100.1 -B 198.51.0.0/16 -t udp -p 1000 -c 0 -q &
taskset -c 2 ip netns exec ns1 mausezahn gretap1 \
-A 198.51.100.1 -B 198.51.0.0/16 -t udp -p 1000 -c 0 -q &
sleep 10
ip netns pids ns1 | xargs kill
ip netns del ns1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Avoid lock inversion when pinning to GGTT on CHV/BXT+VTD
On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of
dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address
space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC
with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from
intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among
reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks.
[86.861179] ======================================================
[86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U
[86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------
[86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock:
[86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.861290]
but task is already holding lock:
[86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.862233]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[86.862251]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[86.862265]
-> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390
[86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862399]
-> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390
[86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862509]
-> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0
[86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280
[86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0
[86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0
[86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
[86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180
[86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480
[86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0
[86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140
[86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660
[86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.862703]
-> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
[86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0
[86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0
[86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0
[86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0
[86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20
[86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30
[86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850
[86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0
[86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320
[86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
[86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50
[86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862947]
-> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0
[86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320
[86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
[86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60
[86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0
[86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0
[86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
[86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110
[86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[86.863114]
-> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
[86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x16
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: lookup hci_conn on RX path on protocol side
The hdev lock/lookup/unlock/use pattern in the packet RX path doesn't
ensure hci_conn* is not concurrently modified/deleted. This locking
appears to be leftover from before conn_hash started using RCU
commit bf4c63252490b ("Bluetooth: convert conn hash to RCU")
and not clear if it had purpose since then.
Currently, there are code paths that delete hci_conn* from elsewhere
than the ordered hdev->workqueue where the RX work runs in. E.g.
commit 5af1f84ed13a ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync")
introduced some of these, and there probably were a few others before
it. It's better to do the locking so that even if these run
concurrently no UAF is possible.
Move the lookup of hci_conn and associated socket-specific conn to
protocol recv handlers, and do them within a single critical section
to cover hci_conn* usage and lookup.
syzkaller has reported a crash that appears to be this issue:
[Task hdev->workqueue] [Task 2]
hci_disconnect_all_sync
l2cap_recv_acldata(hcon)
hci_conn_get(hcon)
hci_abort_conn_sync(hcon)
hci_dev_lock
hci_dev_lock
hci_conn_del(hcon)
v-------------------------------- hci_dev_unlock
hci_conn_put(hcon)
conn = hcon->l2cap_data (UAF) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: netpoll: fix incorrect refcount handling causing incorrect cleanup
commit efa95b01da18 ("netpoll: fix use after free") incorrectly
ignored the refcount and prematurely set dev->npinfo to NULL during
netpoll cleanup, leading to improper behavior and memory leaks.
Scenario causing lack of proper cleanup:
1) A netpoll is associated with a NIC (e.g., eth0) and netdev->npinfo is
allocated, and refcnt = 1
- Keep in mind that npinfo is shared among all netpoll instances. In
this case, there is just one.
2) Another netpoll is also associated with the same NIC and
npinfo->refcnt += 1.
- Now dev->npinfo->refcnt = 2;
- There is just one npinfo associated to the netdev.
3) When the first netpolls goes to clean up:
- The first cleanup succeeds and clears np->dev->npinfo, ignoring
refcnt.
- It basically calls `RCU_INIT_POINTER(np->dev->npinfo, NULL);`
- Set dev->npinfo = NULL, without proper cleanup
- No ->ndo_netpoll_cleanup() is either called
4) Now the second target tries to clean up
- The second cleanup fails because np->dev->npinfo is already NULL.
* In this case, ops->ndo_netpoll_cleanup() was never called, and
the skb pool is not cleaned as well (for the second netpoll
instance)
- This leaks npinfo and skbpool skbs, which is clearly reported by
kmemleak.
Revert commit efa95b01da18 ("netpoll: fix use after free") and adds
clarifying comments emphasizing that npinfo cleanup should only happen
once the refcount reaches zero, ensuring stable and correct netpoll
behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netconsole: Acquire su_mutex before navigating configs hierarchy
There is a race between operations that iterate over the userdata
cg_children list and concurrent add/remove of userdata items through
configfs. The update_userdata() function iterates over the
nt->userdata_group.cg_children list, and count_extradata_entries() also
iterates over this same list to count nodes.
Quoting from Documentation/filesystems/configfs.rst:
> A subsystem can navigate the cg_children list and the ci_parent pointer
> to see the tree created by the subsystem. This can race with configfs'
> management of the hierarchy, so configfs uses the subsystem mutex to
> protect modifications. Whenever a subsystem wants to navigate the
> hierarchy, it must do so under the protection of the subsystem
> mutex.
Without proper locking, if a userdata item is added or removed
concurrently while these functions are iterating, the list can be
accessed in an inconsistent state. For example, the list_for_each() loop
can reach a node that is being removed from the list by list_del_init()
which sets the nodes' .next pointer to point to itself, so the loop will
never end (or reach the WARN_ON_ONCE in update_userdata() ).
Fix this by holding the configfs subsystem mutex (su_mutex) during all
operations that iterate over cg_children.
This includes:
- userdatum_value_store() which calls update_userdata() to iterate over
cg_children
- All sysdata_*_enabled_store() functions which call
count_extradata_entries() to iterate over cg_children
The su_mutex must be acquired before dynamic_netconsole_mutex to avoid
potential lock ordering issues, as configfs operations may already hold
su_mutex when calling into our code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vmw_balloon: indicate success when effectively deflating during migration
When migrating a balloon page, we first deflate the old page to then
inflate the new page.
However, if inflating the new page succeeded, we effectively deflated the
old page, reducing the balloon size.
In that case, the migration actually worked: similar to migrating+
immediately deflating the new page. The old page will be freed back to
the buddy.
Right now, the core will leave the page be marked as isolated (as we
returned an error). When later trying to putback that page, we will run
into the WARN_ON_ONCE() in balloon_page_putback().
That handling was changed in commit 3544c4faccb8 ("mm/balloon_compaction:
stop using __ClearPageMovable()"); before that change, we would have
tolerated that way of handling it.
To fix it, let's just return 0 in that case, making the core effectively
just clear the "isolated" flag + freeing it back to the buddy as if the
migration succeeded. Note that the new page will also get freed when the
core puts the last reference.
Note that this also makes it all be more consistent: we will no longer
unisolate the page in the balloon driver while keeping it marked as being
isolated in migration core.
This was found by code inspection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: BPF: Disable trampoline for kernel module function trace
The current LoongArch BPF trampoline implementation is incompatible
with tracing functions in kernel modules. This causes several severe
and user-visible problems:
* The `bpf_selftests/module_attach` test fails consistently.
* Kernel lockup when a BPF program is attached to a module function [1].
* Critical kernel modules like WireGuard experience traffic disruption
when their functions are traced with fentry [2].
Given the severity and the potential for other unknown side-effects, it
is safest to disable the feature entirely for now. This patch prevents
the BPF subsystem from allowing trampoline attachments to kernel module
functions on LoongArch.
This is a temporary mitigation until the core issues in the trampoline
code for kernel module handling can be identified and fixed.
[root@fedora bpf]# ./test_progs -a module_attach -v
bpf_testmod.ko is already unloaded.
Loading bpf_testmod.ko...
Successfully loaded bpf_testmod.ko.
test_module_attach:PASS:skel_open 0 nsec
test_module_attach:PASS:set_attach_target 0 nsec
test_module_attach:PASS:set_attach_target_explicit 0 nsec
test_module_attach:PASS:skel_load 0 nsec
libbpf: prog 'handle_fentry': failed to attach: -ENOTSUPP
libbpf: prog 'handle_fentry': failed to auto-attach: -ENOTSUPP
test_module_attach:FAIL:skel_attach skeleton attach failed: -524
Summary: 0/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED
Successfully unloaded bpf_testmod.ko.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/CAK3+h2wDmpC-hP4u4pJY8T-yfKyk4yRzpu2LMO+C13FMT58oqQ@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/CAK3+h2wYcpc+OwdLDUBvg2rF9rvvyc5amfHT-KcFaK93uoELPg@mail.gmail.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lan966x: Fix sleeping in atomic context
The following warning was seen when we try to connect using ssh to the device.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:575
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 104, name: dropbear
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 104 Comm: dropbear Tainted: G W 6.18.0-rc2-00399-g6f1ab1b109b9-dirty #530 NONE
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
Call trace:
unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xac
dump_stack_lvl from __might_resched+0x16c/0x2b0
__might_resched from __mutex_lock+0x64/0xd34
__mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24
mutex_lock_nested from lan966x_stats_get+0x5c/0x558
lan966x_stats_get from dev_get_stats+0x40/0x43c
dev_get_stats from dev_seq_printf_stats+0x3c/0x184
dev_seq_printf_stats from dev_seq_show+0x10/0x30
dev_seq_show from seq_read_iter+0x350/0x4ec
seq_read_iter from seq_read+0xfc/0x194
seq_read from proc_reg_read+0xac/0x100
proc_reg_read from vfs_read+0xb0/0x2b0
vfs_read from ksys_read+0x6c/0xec
ksys_read from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
Exception stack(0xf0b11fa8 to 0xf0b11ff0)
1fa0: 00000001 00001000 00000008 be9048d8 00001000 00000001
1fc0: 00000001 00001000 00000008 00000003 be905920 0000001e 00000000 00000001
1fe0: 0005404c be9048c0 00018684 b6ec2cd8
It seems that we are using a mutex in a atomic context which is wrong.
Change the mutex with a spinlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: make sure last_fence is always updated
Update last_fence in the vm-bind path instead of kernel managed path.
last_fence is used to wait for work to finish in vm_bind contexts but not
used for kernel managed contexts.
This fixes a bug where last_fence is not waited on context close leading
to faults as resources are freed while in use.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/680080/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pci: Avoid deadlock between PCI error recovery and mlx5 crdump
Do not block PCI config accesses through pci_cfg_access_lock() when
executing the s390 variant of PCI error recovery: Acquire just
device_lock() instead of pci_dev_lock() as powerpc's EEH and
generig PCI AER processing do.
During error recovery testing a pair of tasks was reported to be hung:
mlx5_core 0000:00:00.1: mlx5_health_try_recover:338:(pid 5553): health recovery flow aborted, PCI reads still not working
INFO: task kmcheck:72 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kmcheck state:D stack:0 pid:72 tgid:72 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
[<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590
[<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0
[<000000065256f572>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x22/0x30
[<0000000652570a94>] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x484/0x8a8
[<000003ff800673a4>] mlx5_unload_one+0x34/0x58 [mlx5_core]
[<000003ff8006745c>] mlx5_pci_err_detected+0x94/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000652556c5a>] zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery+0xf2/0x398
[<0000000651b9184a>] __zpci_event_error+0x23a/0x2c0
INFO: task kworker/u1664:6:1514 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u1664:6 state:D stack:0 pid:1514 tgid:1514 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000
Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:00:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core]
Call Trace:
[<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590
[<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0
[<0000000652172e28>] pci_wait_cfg+0x80/0xe8
[<0000000652172f94>] pci_cfg_access_lock+0x74/0x88
[<000003ff800916b6>] mlx5_vsc_gw_lock+0x36/0x178 [mlx5_core]
[<000003ff80098824>] mlx5_crdump_collect+0x34/0x1c8 [mlx5_core]
[<000003ff80074b62>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_dump+0x6a/0xe8 [mlx5_core]
[<0000000652512242>] devlink_health_do_dump.part.0+0x82/0x168
[<0000000652513212>] devlink_health_report+0x19a/0x230
[<000003ff80075a12>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xba/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
No kernel log of the exact same error with an upstream kernel is
available - but the very same deadlock situation can be constructed there,
too:
- task: kmcheck
mlx5_unload_one() tries to acquire devlink lock while the PCI error
recovery code has set pdev->block_cfg_access by way of
pci_cfg_access_lock()
- task: kworker
mlx5_crdump_collect() tries to set block_cfg_access through
pci_cfg_access_lock() while devlink_health_report() had acquired
the devlink lock.
A similar deadlock situation can be reproduced by requesting a
crdump with
> devlink health dump show pci/<BDF> reporter fw_fatal
while PCI error recovery is executed on the same <BDF> physical function
by mlx5_core's pci_error_handlers. On s390 this can be injected with
> zpcictl --reset-fw <BDF>
Tests with this patch failed to reproduce that second deadlock situation,
the devlink command is rejected with "kernel answers: Permission denied" -
and we get a kernel log message of:
mlx5_core 1ed0:00:00.1: mlx5_crdump_collect:50:(pid 254382): crdump: failed to lock vsc gw err -5
because the config read of VSC_SEMAPHORE is rejected by the underlying
hardware.
Two prior attempts to address this issue have been discussed and
ultimately rejected [see link], with the primary argument that s390's
implementation of PCI error recovery is imposing restrictions that
neither powerpc's EEH nor PCI AER handling need. Tests show that PCI
error recovery on s390 is running to completion even without blocking
access to PCI config space. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: Prevents free active kevent
The root cause of this issue are:
1. When probing the usbnet device, executing usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0);
put the kevent work in global workqueue. However, the kevent has not yet
been scheduled when the usbnet device is unregistered. Therefore, executing
free_netdev() results in the "free active object (kevent)" error reported
here.
2. Another factor is that when calling usbnet_disconnect()->unregister_netdev(),
if the usbnet device is up, ndo_stop() is executed to cancel the kevent.
However, because the device is not up, ndo_stop() is not executed.
The solution to this problem is to cancel the kevent before executing
free_netdev(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/namespace: fix reference leak in grab_requested_mnt_ns
lookup_mnt_ns() already takes a reference on mnt_ns.
grab_requested_mnt_ns() doesn't need to take an extra reference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
timers: Fix NULL function pointer race in timer_shutdown_sync()
There is a race condition between timer_shutdown_sync() and timer
expiration that can lead to hitting a WARN_ON in expire_timers().
The issue occurs when timer_shutdown_sync() clears the timer function
to NULL while the timer is still running on another CPU. The race
scenario looks like this:
CPU0 CPU1
<SOFTIRQ>
lock_timer_base()
expire_timers()
base->running_timer = timer;
unlock_timer_base()
[call_timer_fn enter]
mod_timer()
...
timer_shutdown_sync()
lock_timer_base()
// For now, will not detach the timer but only clear its function to NULL
if (base->running_timer != timer)
ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true);
if (shutdown)
timer->function = NULL;
unlock_timer_base()
[call_timer_fn exit]
lock_timer_base()
base->running_timer = NULL;
unlock_timer_base()
...
// Now timer is pending while its function set to NULL.
// next timer trigger
<SOFTIRQ>
expire_timers()
WARN_ON_ONCE(!fn) // hit
...
lock_timer_base()
// Now timer will detach
if (base->running_timer != timer)
ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true);
if (shutdown)
timer->function = NULL;
unlock_timer_base()
The problem is that timer_shutdown_sync() clears the timer function
regardless of whether the timer is currently running. This can leave a
pending timer with a NULL function pointer, which triggers the
WARN_ON_ONCE(!fn) check in expire_timers().
Fix this by only clearing the timer function when actually detaching the
timer. If the timer is running, leave the function pointer intact, which is
safe because the timer will be properly detached when it finishes running. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: Fix proto fallback detection with BPF
The sockmap feature allows bpf syscall from userspace, or based
on bpf sockops, replacing the sk_prot of sockets during protocol stack
processing with sockmap's custom read/write interfaces.
'''
tcp_rcv_state_process()
syn_recv_sock()/subflow_syn_recv_sock()
tcp_init_transfer(BPF_SOCK_OPS_PASSIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB)
bpf_skops_established <== sockops
bpf_sock_map_update(sk) <== call bpf helper
tcp_bpf_update_proto() <== update sk_prot
'''
When the server has MPTCP enabled but the client sends a TCP SYN
without MPTCP, subflow_syn_recv_sock() performs a fallback on the
subflow, replacing the subflow sk's sk_prot with the native sk_prot.
'''
subflow_syn_recv_sock()
subflow_ulp_fallback()
subflow_drop_ctx()
mptcp_subflow_ops_undo_override()
'''
Then, this subflow can be normally used by sockmap, which replaces the
native sk_prot with sockmap's custom sk_prot. The issue occurs when the
user executes accept::mptcp_stream_accept::mptcp_fallback_tcp_ops().
Here, it uses sk->sk_prot to compare with the native sk_prot, but this
is incorrect when sockmap is used, as we may incorrectly set
sk->sk_socket->ops.
This fix uses the more generic sk_family for the comparison instead.
Additionally, this also prevents a WARNING from occurring:
result from ./scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 337 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:68 mptcp_stream_accept \
(net/mptcp/protocol.c:4005)
Modules linked in:
...
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_accept (net/socket.c:1989)
__sys_accept4 (net/socket.c:2028 net/socket.c:2057)
__x64_sys_accept (net/socket.c:2067)
x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:41)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
RIP: 0033:0x7f87ac92b83d
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtdchar: fix integer overflow in read/write ioctls
The "req.start" and "req.len" variables are u64 values that come from the
user at the start of the function. We mask away the high 32 bits of
"req.len" so that's capped at U32_MAX but the "req.start" variable can go
up to U64_MAX which means that the addition can still integer overflow.
Use check_add_overflow() to fix this bug. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atlantic: fix fragment overflow handling in RX path
The atlantic driver can receive packets with more than MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17)
fragments when handling large multi-descriptor packets. This causes an
out-of-bounds write in skb_add_rx_frag_netmem() leading to kernel panic.
The issue occurs because the driver doesn't check the total number of
fragments before calling skb_add_rx_frag(). When a packet requires more
than MAX_SKB_FRAGS fragments, the fragment index exceeds the array bounds.
Fix by assuming there will be an extra frag if buff->len > AQ_CFG_RX_HDR_SIZE,
then all fragments are accounted for. And reusing the existing check to
prevent the overflow earlier in the code path.
This crash occurred in production with an Aquantia AQC113 10G NIC.
Stack trace from production environment:
```
RIP: 0010:skb_add_rx_frag_netmem+0x29/0xd0
Code: 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 41 89
ca 48 89 d7 48 63 ce 8b 90 c0 00 00 00 48 c1 e1 04 48 01 ca 48 03 90
c8 00 00 00 <48> 89 7a 30 44 89 52 3c 44 89 42 38 40 f6 c7 01 75 74 48
89 fa 83
RSP: 0018:ffffa9bec02a8d50 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: ffff925b22e80a00 RBX: ffff925ad38d2700 RCX:
fffffffe0a0c8000
RDX: ffff9258ea95bac0 RSI: ffff925ae0a0c800 RDI:
0000000000037a40
RBP: 0000000000000024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000021
R10: 0000000000000848 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffffa9bec02a8e24
R13: ffff925ad8615570 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
ffff925b22e80a00
FS: 0000000000000000(0000)
GS:ffff925e47880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff9258ea95baf0 CR3: 0000000166022004 CR4:
0000000000f72ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
aq_ring_rx_clean+0x175/0xe60 [atlantic]
? aq_ring_rx_clean+0x14d/0xe60 [atlantic]
? aq_ring_tx_clean+0xdf/0x190 [atlantic]
? kmem_cache_free+0x348/0x450
? aq_vec_poll+0x81/0x1d0 [atlantic]
? __napi_poll+0x28/0x1c0
? net_rx_action+0x337/0x420
```
Changes in v4:
- Add Fixes: tag to satisfy patch validation requirements.
Changes in v3:
- Fix by assuming there will be an extra frag if buff->len > AQ_CFG_RX_HDR_SIZE,
then all fragments are accounted for. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work
A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free
in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0
Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work
The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an
interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget->work
at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget().
Commit 399a45e5237c ("usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after
device removal") attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after
device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new
work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but
before the gadget's memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free.
This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a 'teardown'
flag and a 'state_lock' spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is
set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to
prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced.
The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under
the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix delayed allocation of a cell's anonymous key
The allocation of a cell's anonymous key is done in a background thread
along with other cell setup such as doing a DNS upcall. In the reported
bug, this is triggered by afs_parse_source() parsing the device name given
to mount() and calling afs_lookup_cell() with the name of the cell.
The normal key lookup then tries to use the key description on the
anonymous authentication key as the reference for request_key() - but it
may not yet be set and so an oops can happen.
This has been made more likely to happen by the fix for dynamic lookup
failure.
Fix this by firstly allocating a reference name and attaching it to the
afs_cell record when the record is created. It can share the memory
allocation with the cell name (unfortunately it can't just overlap the cell
name by prepending it with "afs@" as the cell name already has a '.'
prepended for other purposes). This reference name is then passed to
request_key().
Secondly, the anon key is now allocated on demand at the point a key is
requested in afs_request_key() if it is not already allocated. A mutex is
used to prevent multiple allocation for a cell.
Thirdly, make afs_request_key_rcu() return NULL if the anonymous key isn't
yet allocated (if we need it) and then the caller can return -ECHILD to
drop out of RCU-mode and afs_request_key() can be called.
Note that the anonymous key is kind of necessary to make the key lookup
cache work as that doesn't currently cache a negative lookup, but it's
probably worth some investigation to see if NULL can be used instead. |
