| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: stop qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog on TC_H_ROOT
In qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog, Qdiscs with major handle ffff: are assumed
to be either root or ingress. This assumption is bogus since it's valid
to create egress qdiscs with major handle ffff:
Budimir Markovic found that for qdiscs like DRR that maintain an active
class list, it will cause a UAF with a dangling class pointer.
In 066a3b5b2346, the concern was to avoid iterating over the ingress
qdisc since its parent is itself. The proper fix is to stop when parent
TC_H_ROOT is reached because the only way to retrieve ingress is when a
hierarchy which does not contain a ffff: major handle call into
qdisc_lookup with TC_H_MAJ(TC_H_ROOT).
In the scenario where major ffff: is an egress qdisc in any of the tree
levels, the updates will also propagate to TC_H_ROOT, which then the
iteration must stop.
net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix 6 GHz scan construction
If more than 255 colocated APs exist for the set of all
APs found during 2.4/5 GHz scanning, then the 6 GHz scan
construction will loop forever since the loop variable
has type u8, which can never reach the number found when
that's bigger than 255, and is stored in a u32 variable.
Also move it into the loops to have a smaller scope.
Using a u32 there is fine, we limit the number of APs in
the scan list and each has a limit on the number of RNR
entries due to the frame size. With a limit of 1000 scan
results, a frame size upper bound of 4096 (really it's
more like ~2300) and a TBTT entry size of at least 11,
we get an upper bound for the number of ~372k, well in
the bounds of a u32. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rw: fix missing NOWAIT check for O_DIRECT start write
When io_uring starts a write, it'll call kiocb_start_write() to bump the
super block rwsem, preventing any freezes from happening while that
write is in-flight. The freeze side will grab that rwsem for writing,
excluding any new writers from happening and waiting for existing writes
to finish. But io_uring unconditionally uses kiocb_start_write(), which
will block if someone is currently attempting to freeze the mount point.
This causes a deadlock where freeze is waiting for previous writes to
complete, but the previous writes cannot complete, as the task that is
supposed to complete them is blocked waiting on starting a new write.
This results in the following stuck trace showing that dependency with
the write blocked starting a new write:
task:fio state:D stack:0 pid:886 tgid:886 ppid:876
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x1d8/0x348
__schedule+0x8e8/0x2248
schedule+0x110/0x3f0
percpu_rwsem_wait+0x1e8/0x3f8
__percpu_down_read+0xe8/0x500
io_write+0xbb8/0xff8
io_issue_sqe+0x10c/0x1020
io_submit_sqes+0x614/0x2110
__arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x524/0x1038
invoke_syscall+0x74/0x268
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x238
do_el0_svc+0x44/0x60
el0_svc+0x44/0xb0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x118/0x128
el0t_64_sync+0x168/0x170
INFO: task fsfreeze:7364 blocked for more than 15 seconds.
Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-00063-g76aaf945701c #7963
with the attempting freezer stuck trying to grab the rwsem:
task:fsfreeze state:D stack:0 pid:7364 tgid:7364 ppid:995
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x1d8/0x348
__schedule+0x8e8/0x2248
schedule+0x110/0x3f0
percpu_down_write+0x2b0/0x680
freeze_super+0x248/0x8a8
do_vfs_ioctl+0x149c/0x1b18
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x1a0
invoke_syscall+0x74/0x268
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x238
do_el0_svc+0x44/0x60
el0_svc+0x44/0xb0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x118/0x128
el0t_64_sync+0x168/0x170
Fix this by having the io_uring side honor IOCB_NOWAIT, and only attempt a
blocking grab of the super block rwsem if it isn't set. For normal issue
where IOCB_NOWAIT would always be set, this returns -EAGAIN which will
have io_uring core issue a blocking attempt of the write. That will in
turn also get completions run, ensuring forward progress.
Since freezing requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the first place, this isn't
something that can be triggered by a regular user. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mctp i2c: handle NULL header address
daddr can be NULL if there is no neighbour table entry present,
in that case the tx packet should be dropped.
saddr will usually be set by MCTP core, but check for NULL in case a
packet is transmitted by a different protocol. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: ip_tunnel: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in ip_tunnel_init_flow()
There are code paths from which the function is called without holding
the RCU read lock, resulting in a suspicious RCU usage warning [1].
Fix by using l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index() which will acquire
the RCU read lock before calling
l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu().
[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by ip/361:
#0: ffffffff86fc7cb0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x377/0xf60
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 361 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110
lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xd6
dev_get_by_index_rcu+0x1d3/0x210
l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu+0x2b/0xf0
ip_tunnel_bind_dev+0x72f/0xa00
ip_tunnel_newlink+0x368/0x7a0
ipgre_newlink+0x14c/0x170
__rtnl_newlink+0x1173/0x19c0
rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf60
netlink_rcv_skb+0x171/0x450
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c1/0xd80
____sys_sendmsg+0x8f9/0xc20
___sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x1e0
__sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in LemonLDAP::NG before 2.20.1 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the url parameter of the upgrade session confirmation page (upgradeSession / forceUpgrade) if the "Upgrade session" plugin has been enabled by an admin |
| An issue was discovered in LemonLDAP::NG before 2.20.1. An Improper Check during session refresh allows an authenticated user to raise their authentication level if the admin configured an "Adaptative authentication rule" with an increment instead of an absolute value. |
| Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. The algorithm used for parsing HTTP cookies in Tornado versions prior to 6.4.2 sometimes has quadratic complexity, leading to excessive CPU consumption when parsing maliciously-crafted cookie headers. This parsing occurs in the event loop thread and may block the processing of other requests. Version 6.4.2 fixes the issue. |
| GNOME libsoup before 3.6.1 has an infinite loop, and memory consumption. during the reading of certain patterns of WebSocket data from clients. |
| GNOME libsoup before 3.6.1 allows a buffer overflow in applications that perform conversion to UTF-8 in soup_header_parse_param_list_strict. There is a plausible way to reach this remotely via soup_message_headers_get_content_type (e.g., an application may want to retrieve the content type of a request or response). |
| GNOME libsoup before 3.6.0 allows HTTP request smuggling in some configurations because '\0' characters at the end of header names are ignored, i.e., a "Transfer-Encoding\0: chunked" header is treated the same as a "Transfer-Encoding: chunked" header. |
| IBM i 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 is vulnerable to bypassing Navigator for i interface restrictions. By sending a specially crafted request, an authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to remotely perform operations that the user is not allowed to perform when using Navigator for i. |
| IBM i 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5
is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. |
| An attacker with local access to the medical office computer can
access restricted functions of the Elefant Service tool by using a
hard-coded "Hotline" password in the Elefant service binary, which is shipped with the software. |
| An attacker with local access the to medical office computer can
escalate his Windows user privileges to "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" by
exploiting a race condition in the Elefant Update Service during the
repair or update process. When using the repair function, the service queries the server for a
list of files and their hashes. In addition, instructions to execute
binaries to finalize the repair process are included. The executables are executed as "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" after they are
copied over to the user writable installation folder (C:\Elefant1). This
means that a user can overwrite either "PostESUUpdate.exe" or
"Update_OpenJava.exe" in the time frame after the copy and before the
execution of the final repair step. The overwritten executable is then executed as "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM". |
| An attacker with local access the to medical office computer can
escalate his Windows user privileges to "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" by
exploiting a command injection vulnerability in the Elefant Update
Service. The command injection can be exploited by communicating with
the Elefant Update Service which is running as "SYSTEM" via Windows
Named Pipes.The Elefant Software Updater (ESU) consists of two components. An ESU
service which runs as "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" and an ESU tray client
which communicates with the service to update or repair the installation
and is running with user permissions. The communication is implemented
using named pipes. A crafted message of type
"MessageType.SupportServiceInfos" can be sent to the local ESU service
to inject commands, which are then executed as "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM". |
| Attackers with local access to the medical office computer can
escalate their Windows user privileges to "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" by
overwriting one of two Elefant service binaries with weak permissions. The default installation directory of Elefant is "C:\Elefant1" which is
writable for all users. In addition, the Elefant installer registers two
Firebird database services which are running as “NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM”.
Path: C:\Elefant1\Firebird_2\bin\fbserver.exe
Path: C:\Elefant1\Firebird_2\bin\fbguard.exe
Both service binaries are user writable. This means that a local
attacker can rename one of the service binaries, replace the service
executable with a new executable, and then restart the system. Once the
system has rebooted, the new service binary is executed as "NT
AUTHORITY\SYSTEM". |
| An unauthenticated attacker with access to the local network of the
medical office can query an unprotected Fast Healthcare Interoperability
Resources (FHIR) API to get access to sensitive electronic health
records (EHR). |
| An unauthenticated attacker with access to the local network of the
medical office can use known default credentials to gain remote DBA
access to the Elefant Firebird database. The data in the database
includes patient data and login credentials among other sensitive data.
In addition, this enables an attacker to create and overwrite arbitrary
files on the server filesystem with the rights of the Firebird database
("NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM"). |
| An authenticated attacker with the user/role "Poweruser" can perform an SQL injection by accessing the /class/template_io.php file and supplying malicious GET parameters. The "templates" parameter is vulnerable against blind boolean-based SQL injection attacks. SQL syntax must be injected into the JSON syntax of the templates parameter. |
