| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.22.3, there is a NULL pointer dereference if an application calls gss_accept_sec_context() on a system with a NegoEx mechanism registered in /etc/gss/mech. An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger this, causing the process to terminate in parse_nego_message. |
| Vulnerability in the OpenSSH GSSAPI delta included in various Linux distributions. This vulnerability affects the GSSAPI patches added by various Linux distributions and does not affect the OpenSSH upstream project itself. The usage of sshpkt_disconnect() on an error, which does not terminate the process, allows an attacker to send an unexpected GSSAPI message type during the GSSAPI key exchange to the server, which will call the underlying function and continue the execution of the program without setting the related connection variables. As the variables are not initialized to NULL the code later accesses those uninitialized variables, accessing random memory, which could lead to undefined behavior. The recommended workaround is to use ssh_packet_disconnect() instead, which does terminate the process. The impact of the vulnerability depends heavily on the compiler flag hardening configuration. |
| A cross-site request forgery vulnerability was discovered in the login functionality (both standard and SAML) due to missing validation of the anti-CSRF token. An attacker with a valid account can trick a victim into unknowingly authenticating with the attacker's credentials. Any operation performed by the victim in this state is attributed to the attacker's account, compromising the integrity of the audit trail. |
| An access control vulnerability was discovered in the Smart Polling configuration functionality due to insufficient validation of user privileges. An authenticated user with limited privileges can remotely bypass the intended access control of the web management interface and modify the Smart Polling discovery configuration. This allows the attacker to disrupt the visibility of assets in the monitored network. |
| An improper certificate/host key validation vulnerability was discovered in the Smart Polling functionality, which established encrypted connections to target devices without validating the remote host's identity, and no option was provided to enable it. A man-in-the-middle attacker positioned between a sensor and a polled device can, during a polling session, impersonate the device and intercept the communication, including the credentials used to access it. The captured credentials can then be replayed to authenticate against the device itself or against other devices sharing the same credentials, allowing the attacker to access and tamper with the device's data and to disrupt its operations. |
| An access control vulnerability was discovered in the Credentials Manager functionality due to insufficient validation of user privileges. A remote authenticated user with limited privileges can view a limited subset of the available entries in the Credentials Manager. The actual credential values are not directly visible, but the user can delete entries or edit their properties. An attacker who deletes or edits an entry can disrupt authentication for dependent devices, and one who manipulates an entry's configuration may be able to indirectly obtain the credentials. |
| A template injection vulnerability was discovered in the Dashboards functionality due to improper validation of an input parameter. An authenticated user with the required privileges can define a dashboard containing a malicious payload, or a victim can be socially engineered into importing a malicious dashboard. When the victim views or imports the dashboard, the payload executes in their browser context, allowing the attacker to modify application data or disrupt application availability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ti-adc161s626: use DMA-safe memory for spi_read()
Add a DMA-safe buffer and use it for spi_read() instead of a stack
memory. All SPI buffers must be DMA-safe.
Since we only need up to 3 bytes, we just use a u8[] instead of __be16
and __be32 and change the conversion functions appropriately. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: mpu3050: Move iio_device_register() to correct location
iio_device_register() should be at the end of the probe function to
prevent race conditions.
Place iio_device_register() at the end of the probe function and place
iio_device_unregister() accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ftgmac100: fix ring allocation unwind on open failure
ftgmac100_alloc_rings() allocates rx_skbs, tx_skbs, rxdes, txdes, and
rx_scratch in stages. On intermediate failures it returned -ENOMEM
directly, leaking resources allocated earlier in the function.
Rework the failure path to use staged local unwind labels and free
allocated resources in reverse order before returning -ENOMEM. This
matches common netdev allocation cleanup style. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()
Both ACE-walk loops in smb_check_perm_dacl() only guard against an
under-sized remaining buffer, not against an ACE whose declared
`ace->size` is smaller than the struct it claims to describe:
if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
break;
ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
if (ace_size > aces_size)
break;
The first check only requires the 4-byte ACE header to be in bounds;
it does not require access_req (4 bytes at offset 4) to be readable.
An attacker who has set a crafted DACL on a file they own can declare
ace->size == 4 with aces_size == 4, pass both checks, and then
granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); /* upper loop */
compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid); /* lower loop */
reads access_req at offset 4 (OOB by up to 4 bytes) and ace->sid at
offset 8 (OOB by up to CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
* 4 bytes).
Tighten both loops to require
ace_size >= offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE
which is the smallest valid on-wire ACE layout (4-byte header +
4-byte access_req + 8-byte sid base with zero sub-auths). Also
reject ACEs whose sid.num_subauth exceeds SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
before letting compare_sids() dereference sub_auth[] entries.
parse_sec_desc() already enforces an equivalent check (lines 441-448);
smb_check_perm_dacl() simply grew weaker validation over time.
Reachability: authenticated SMB client with permission to set an ACL
on a file. On a subsequent CREATE against that file, the kernel
walks the stored DACL via smb_check_perm_dacl() and triggers the
OOB read. Not pre-auth, and the OOB read is not reflected to the
attacker, but KASAN reports and kernel state corruption are
possible. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: fix active_num_conn leak on transport allocation failure
Commit 77ffbcac4e56 ("smb: server: fix leak of active_num_conn in
ksmbd_tcp_new_connection()") addressed the kthread_run() failure
path. The earlier alloc_transport() == NULL path in the same
function has the same leak, is reachable pre-authentication via any
TCP connect to port 445, and was empirically reproduced on UML
(ARCH=um, v7.0-rc7): a small number of forced allocation failures
were sufficient to put ksmbd into a state where every subsequent
connection attempt was rejected for the remainder of the boot.
ksmbd_kthread_fn() increments active_num_conn before calling
ksmbd_tcp_new_connection() and discards the return value, so when
alloc_transport() returns NULL the socket is released and -ENOMEM
returned without decrementing the counter. Each such failure
permanently consumes one slot from the max_connections pool; once
cumulative failures reach the cap, atomic_inc_return() hits the
threshold on every subsequent accept and every new connection is
rejected. The counter is only reset by module reload.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can drive the server toward the
memory pressure that makes alloc_transport() fail by holding open
connections with large RFC1002 lengths up to MAX_STREAM_PROT_LEN
(0x00FFFFFF); natural transient allocation failures on a loaded
host produce the same drift more slowly.
Mirror the existing rollback pattern in ksmbd_kthread_fn(): on the
alloc_transport() failure path, decrement active_num_conn gated on
server_conf.max_connections.
Repro details: with the patch reverted, forced alloc_transport()
NULL returns leaked counter slots and subsequent connection
attempts -- including legitimate connects issued after the
forced-fail window had closed -- were all rejected with "Limit the
maximum number of connections". With this patch applied, the same
connect sequence produces no rejections and the counter cycles
cleanly between zero and one on every accept. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds write in smb2_get_ea() EA alignment
smb2_get_ea() applies 4-byte alignment padding via memset() after
writing each EA entry. The bounds check on buf_free_len is performed
before the value memcpy, but the alignment memset fires unconditionally
afterward with no check on remaining space.
When the EA value exactly fills the remaining buffer (buf_free_len == 0
after value subtraction), the alignment memset writes 1-3 NUL bytes
past the buf_free_len boundary. In compound requests where the response
buffer is shared across commands, the first command (e.g., READ) can
consume most of the buffer, leaving a tight remainder for the QUERY_INFO
EA response. The alignment memset then overwrites past the physical
kvmalloc allocation into adjacent kernel heap memory.
Add a bounds check before the alignment memset to ensure buf_free_len
can accommodate the padding bytes.
This is the same bug pattern fixed by commit beef2634f81f ("ksmbd: fix
potencial OOB in get_file_all_info() for compound requests") and
commit fda9522ed6af ("ksmbd: fix OOB write in QUERY_INFO for compound
requests"), both of which added bounds checks before unconditional
writes in QUERY_INFO response handlers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size overflow
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() and set_ntacl_dacl() accumulate ACE sizes
in u16 variables. When a file has many POSIX ACL entries, the
accumulated size can wrap past 65535, causing the pointer arithmetic
(char *)pndace + *size to land within already-written ACEs. Subsequent
writes then overwrite earlier entries, and pndacl->size gets a
truncated value.
Use check_add_overflow() at each accumulation point to detect the
wrap before it corrupts the buffer, consistent with existing
check_mul_overflow() usage elsewhere in smbacl.c. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: altera-tse: fix skb leak on DMA mapping error in tse_start_xmit()
When dma_map_single() fails in tse_start_xmit(), the function returns
NETDEV_TX_OK without freeing the skb. Since NETDEV_TX_OK tells the
stack the packet was consumed, the skb is never freed, leaking memory
on every DMA mapping failure.
Add dev_kfree_skb_any() before returning to properly free the skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: vub300: fix NULL-deref on disconnect
Make sure to deregister the controller before dropping the reference to
the driver data on disconnect to avoid NULL-pointer dereferences or
use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: add missing return after LLCP_CLOSED checks
In nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc() and nfc_llcp_recv_disc(), when the socket
state is LLCP_CLOSED, the code correctly calls release_sock() and
nfc_llcp_sock_put() but fails to return. Execution falls through to
the remainder of the function, which calls release_sock() and
nfc_llcp_sock_put() again. This results in a double release_sock()
and a refcount underflow via double nfc_llcp_sock_put(), leading to
a use-after-free.
Add the missing return statements after the LLCP_CLOSED branches
in both functions to prevent the fall-through. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler
The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3
or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade
rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the
cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the
cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round
follows).
ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is
sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver
actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the
cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each
round.
Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed
the buffer.
Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays")
fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_ncm: validate minimum block_len in ncm_unwrap_ntb()
The block_len read from the host-supplied NTB header is checked against
ntb_max but has no lower bound. When block_len is smaller than
opts->ndp_size, the bounds check of:
ndp_index > (block_len - opts->ndp_size)
will underflow producing a huge unsigned value that ndp_index can never
exceed, defeating the check entirely.
The same underflow occurs in the datagram index checks against block_len
- opts->dpe_size. With those checks neutered, a malicious USB host can
choose ndp_index and datagram offsets that point past the actual
transfer, and the skb_put_data() copies adjacent kernel memory into the
network skb.
Fix this by rejecting block lengths that cannot hold at least the NTB
header plus one NDP. This will make block_len - opts->ndp_size and
block_len - opts->dpe_size both well-defined.
Commit 8d2b1a1ec9f5 ("CDC-NCM: avoid overflow in sanity checking") fixed
a related class of issues on the host side of NCM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate EaNameLength in smb2_get_ea()
smb2_get_ea() reads ea_req->EaNameLength from the client request and
passes it directly to strncmp() as the comparison length without
verifying that the length of the name really is the size of the input
buffer received.
Fix this up by properly checking the size of the name based on the value
received and the overall size of the request, to prevent a later
strncmp() call to use the length as a "trusted" size of the buffer.
Without this check, uninitialized heap values might be slowly leaked to
the client. |
