| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: avoid moving extents to occupied clusters
For non-auto OCFS2_IOC_MOVE_EXT operations, userspace supplies a physical
me_goal. ocfs2_move_extent() initializes new_phys_cpos from that goal and
expects ocfs2_probe_alloc_group() to replace it with a free run in the
target block group.
The probe currently leaves *phys_cpos unchanged if the scan reaches the
end of the group without finding a free run. An occupied goal at the last
bit can therefore survive the probe and be passed to
__ocfs2_move_extent(), which copies file data into a cluster still owned
by another inode before the bitmap is updated.
When the probe does find a free run, it also subtracts move_len from the
ending bit. The start of an N-bit run ending at i is i - N + 1, so the
current calculation can report the bit immediately before the free run.
Clear *phys_cpos before scanning and use the correct free-run start.
Callers already treat a zero result as -ENOSPC, so failed probes no longer
continue with an occupied caller-controlled goal. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: bound to_move in indx_insert_into_root before hdr_insert_head
indx_insert_into_root() promotes a full resident $INDEX_ROOT into
$INDEX_ALLOCATION and copies all non-last resident root entries into
a newly allocated INDEX_BUFFER via hdr_insert_head(). The source
byte count 'to_move' is summed from the on-disk resident entry sizes
and is independent of the destination buffer size, which comes from
root->index_block_size (via indx->index_bits).
A crafted NTFS image that keeps a valid, full resident root but
shrinks root->index_block_size down to 512 after the root has been
populated makes hdr_insert_head() memcpy attacker-controlled resident
entry bytes past the end of the kmalloc(1u << indx->index_bits)
allocation returned by indx_new(). For a 512-byte destination and a
resident root whose non-last entries total 560 bytes, the memcpy
overruns by 120 bytes and a following memmove extends the highest
written offset to 136 bytes past the allocation. The overflow bytes
are a direct copy of on-disk entries (via kmemdup), so they are
fully attacker-controlled.
The write is reachable from unprivileged open(O_CREAT) on a mounted
crafted NTFS image: a single sufficiently long create in a directory
whose resident root is already full forces root promotion and
triggers the copy.
This is a controlled out-of-bounds write of 120-136 bytes past a
kmalloc(index_block_size) allocation, with attacker-controlled
content. It is a bounded adjacent-heap corruption primitive; it is
not an arbitrary-address write. Successful exploitation into a named
victim object depends on the surrounding slab layout.
Reject the copy at the sink. The destination's INDEX_HDR already
reports hdr_total (the payload capacity of the new buffer) and
hdr_used (the bytes already consumed by the terminal END entry
installed by indx_new()); require that to_move fits in the remaining
payload before calling hdr_insert_head(). On mismatch, fail with
-EINVAL and mark the filesystem as having a detected on-disk
inconsistency, which is the same behaviour as the surrounding
validation in this function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/virt/sev: Revert "Drop WBINVD before setting MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN"
Revert
99cf1fb58e68 ("x86/virt/sev: Drop WBINVD before setting MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN").
Section 8.8 of the SNP spec says:
Before invoking SNP_INIT_EX with INIT_RMP set to 1, software must ensure
that no CPUs contain dirty cache lines for the memory containing the RMP.
Cachelines can be moved from cache to cache in a dirty state. The
wbinvd_on_all_cpus() before SNP_INIT_EX flushes the caches for each CPU, but
if the IPIs for WBINVD race with this dirty cacheline movement, it is possible
that they may not get flushed, violating the firmware requirement.
Doing wbinvd_on_all_cpus() before setting SNPEn is safer since the RMP
table is not yet in use.
[ Heroically bisected by Srikanth. ]
[ bp: Massage commit message. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Validate irqchip index in irqfd routing
Sashiko reported that the irqchip index is not validated for LoongArch.
Add validation and reject out-of-range irqchip indexes to avoid indexing
past the routing table's chip array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ife: require ETH_HLEN to be pullable in ife_decode()
ife decode may return after making only the outer IFE header and
metadata pullable. The caller then passes the decapsulated packet to
eth_type_trans(), which expects the inner Ethernet header to be
accessible from the linear data area.
With a malformed IFE frame, the inner Ethernet header may still be
shorter than ETH_HLEN in the linear area, which can lead to a crash in
the original code.
Fix this by extending the pull check in ife_decode() so that the inner
Ethernet header is also guaranteed to be pullable before returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-control: Validate notification payload size
Validate MODULE_NOTIFICATION payload length before reading
bytes/channel data in control update handling. |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.http.cors.CorsHandler setVaryHeader replaces application Vary headers such as Authorization or Cookie with Origin, allowing a caching proxy or CDN to reuse authenticated responses across users and disclose sensitive information. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Microsoft Azure Attestation service and Device Health Attestation Service allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Microsoft Azure Attestation service and Device Health Attestation Service allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Incorrect authorization in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.16, _read_character_string and _read_string in src/zeroconf/_protocol/incoming.py advanced self.offset by attacker-declared RDLENGTH without checking it against self._data_len, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to send a TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record with rdlength=65535 and seed DNSCache and ServiceInfo.properties with truncated, attacker-shaped key/value or address records. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.16. |
| Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in Windows DHCP Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.12, AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer retained every truncated TC-bit incoming query, each up to _MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966 bytes, in self._deferred[addr] and armed a per-address timer in self._timers[addr] without capping the per-address list or distinct addr keys, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to spoof sources, grow _deferred and _timers, and cause memory exhaustion and quadratic CPU burn. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.12. |
| Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in Windows DHCP Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: isotp: fix use-after-free race with concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER
isotp_release() looked up the bound network device via dev_get_by_index()
using the stored ifindex. During device unregistration the device is
unlisted from the ifindex hash before the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier
chain runs, so a concurrent isotp_release() could find no device, skip
can_rx_unregister() entirely, and still proceed to free the socket.
Since isotp_release() had already removed itself from the isotp
notifier list at that point, isotp_notify() would never get a chance to
clean up either, leaving a stale CAN filter that keeps pointing at the
freed socket.
Fix this the same way raw.c already does: hold a tracked reference to
the bound net_device in the socket (so->dev/so->dev_tracker) from
bind() onward instead of re-resolving it from the ifindex, and
serialize bind()/release() with rtnl_lock() so that so->dev is always
consistent with what the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier sees. so->dev
stays valid regardless of ifindex-hash unlisting, and is only ever
cleared by whichever of isotp_release()/isotp_notify() gets there
first, so the filter is always removed exactly once.
isotp_bind() now rejects a (re)bind with -EAGAIN while so->[tx|rx].state
isn't ISOTP_IDLE yet, so a timer left running by a prior
NETDEV_UNREGISTER can't act on a newly bound so->ifindex. Both checks
share the same lock_sock() section, so there is no window in which a
concurrent isotp_notify() clearing so->bound could be missed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: reject short AUTH_RECEIVE buffers
nvmet_execute_auth_receive() trusts the AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length
after checking only that it is nonzero and matches the transfer length.
In the SUCCESS1 and FAILURE1/default states, that lets a remote NVMe-oF
initiator reach the fixed-size DH-HMAC-CHAP response builders with a
kmalloc() buffer shorter than the response, so nvmet_auth_success1() and
nvmet_auth_failure1() write past the allocation; both only WARN_ON the
short length and then format the message anyway.
Impact: A remote NVMe-oF initiator with access to an auth-enabled target
can trigger a 16-byte heap out-of-bounds write via a one-byte
AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length.
Compute the minimum response length for the current DH-HMAC-CHAP step in
nvmet_auth_receive_data_len() and report a zero data length when the
host-supplied allocation length is shorter, so the existing zero-length
check in nvmet_execute_auth_receive() rejects the command before any
builder runs. The SUCCESS1 minimum is sizeof(struct
nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) plus the HMAC hash length, because the
response hash is written into the rval[] flexible-array tail, so the
minimum is state dependent rather than a flat sizeof. CHALLENGE keeps its
existing variable-length guard in nvmet_auth_challenge().
This is reachable only when in-band DH-HMAC-CHAP authentication is
configured on the target. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: xfrm_interface: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
xfrmi_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the
interface link netns xi->net. They differ once the device is created in
or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl
changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a
caller privileged there but not in xi->net can rewrite an interface that
lives in xi->net.
Gate xfrmi_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,
before any attribute is parsed. |
