| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In childTextNodesAreLiteral, walking up the tree previously stopped at the nearest foreign ancestor once an HTML integration point was found. However, that integration point may itself be a descendant of an element that was foster-parented into a foreign namespace (such as <mglyph> or <malignmark> fostered under <mtext>), causing a parser to resolve the subtree in a different foreign namespace upon re-parsing the rendered output. Continue walking the full ancestor chain and verify that every transition from a non-empty namespace occurs at an HTML integration point before emitting literal text. |
| When coalescing adjacent text nodes in addText and fosterParent, appending to an existing TextNode's Data via string concatenation (n.Data += text) reallocated and copied the accumulated string on every token. Inputs containing many short text runs separated by ignored end tags (such as "a</x>") caused O(n^2) allocations and byte copies. Accumulate coalesced text in per-node byte slices during parsing and materialize Data strings once at the end of parse. |
| Pathological inputs could cause DoS through consumePhrase when parsing an email address according to RFC 5322. |
| The ToASCII and ToUnicode functions incorrectly accept Punycode-encoded labels that decode to an ASCII-only label. For example, ToUnicode("xn--example-.com") incorrectly returns the name "example.com" rather than an error. This behavior can lead to privilege escalation in programs using the idna package. For example, a program which performs privilege checks on the ASCII hostname may reject "example.com" but permit "xn--example-.com". If that program subsequently converts the ASCII hostname to Unicode, it will inadvertently permits access to the Unicode name "example.com". |
| Well-crafted inputs reaching ParseAddress, ParseAddressList, and ParseDate were able to trigger excessive CPU exhaustion and memory allocations. |
| url.Parse insufficiently validated the host/authority component and accepted some invalid URLs. |
| When processing HTTP/2 SETTINGS frames, transport will enter an infinite loop of writing CONTINUATION frames if it receives a SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE with a value of 0. |
| When using LookupCNAME with the cgo DNS resolver, a very long CNAME response can trigger a double-free of C memory and a crash. |
| The net/url package does not set a limit on the number of query parameters in a query. While the maximum size of query parameters in URLs is generally limited by the maximum request header size, the net/http.Request.ParseForm method can parse large URL-encoded forms. Parsing a large form containing many unique query parameters can cause excessive memory consumption. |
| Parsing an invalid SVCB or HTTPS RR can panic when the size of a parameter value overflows the message buffer. |
| The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023. |
| When returning errors, functions in the net/textproto package would include its input as part of the error. This might allow an attacker to inject misleading content to errors that are printed or logged. |
| Not all valid JavaScript whitespace characters are considered to be whitespace. Templates containing whitespace characters outside of the character set "\t\n\f\r\u0020\u2028\u2029" in JavaScript contexts that also contain actions may not be properly sanitized during execution. |
| Parsing arbitrary HTML which is then rendered using Render can result in an unexpected HTML tree. This can be leveraged to execute XSS attacks in applications that attempt to sanitize input HTML before rendering. |
| Parsing arbitrary HTML which is then rendered using Render can result in an unexpected HTML tree. This can be leveraged to execute XSS attacks in applications that attempt to sanitize input HTML before rendering. |
| Parsing arbitrary HTML which is then rendered using Render can result in an unexpected HTML tree. This can be leveraged to execute XSS attacks in applications that attempt to sanitize input HTML before rendering. |
| Parsing arbitrary HTML can consume excessive CPU time, possibly leading to denial of service. |
| Parsing arbitrary HTML which is then rendered using Render can result in an unexpected HTML tree. This can be leveraged to execute XSS attacks in applications that attempt to sanitize input HTML before rendering. |
| ReverseProxy can forward queries containing parameters not visible to Rewrite functions. When used with a Rewrite function, or a Director function which parses query parameters, ReverseProxy sanitizes the forwarded request to remove query parameters which are not parsed by url.ParseQuery. ReverseProxy does not take ParseQuery's limit on the total number of query parameters (controlled by GODEBUG=urlmaxqueryparams=N) into account. This can permit ReverseProxy to forward a request containing a query parameter that is not visible to the Rewrite function. For example, the query "a1=x&a2=x&...&a10000=x&hidden=y" can forward the parameter "hidden=y" while hiding it from the proxy's Rewrite function. |
| The Dial and LookupPort functions panic on Windows when provided with an input containing a NUL (0). |
